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FOREWORD 
My interest in this topic began with irritation. There is lots of sentimental 
drivel written about care and the activity of caring. It seemed to me - as a 
parent, friend, colleague, political activist - that caring about people involves 
something quite different to a sort of watered-down, uncritical love plus an 
unreasonable amount of self-sacrifice (this is a caricature for the sake of 
argument). And it also seemed to me that care ethics should be able to deliver 
a punchy, tough account of what it means to care. This turned out not to be 
the case; I hope that I now have filled in some of that lacuna. 
Writing this dissertation has been a long journey - not only in terms of time - 
but also in terms of discovery. I thought, chapter by chapter, that I had 
'arrived': I thought that particularism had the answer - it didn't. Then I 
thought that an epistemological approach with a constructivist take on moral 
horizons would help - it didn't. Then I tried virtue ethics - and hated it. I even 
tried realism (now removed from these pages). What looked like the solution 
at the beginning, turned out to be the problem and what I thought was the 
problem, turned out to be the solution. I was convinced, after these other by-
ways, that I would conclude with reason and rule, and reject experience and 
irrationality - like a good Kantian. But I discovered to my embarrassment that 
reason was the problem and that the non-deliberative, phenomenological was 
the solution! 
Though the subject-matter is care ethics, I have found almost all care 
ethicists' accounts wanting on the topic of motivation and have had to take 
recourse to quite other philosophers: Harry Frankfurt, Margaret Walker, 
Philippa Foot, John McDowell, Rosalind Hursthouse, Barbara Herman, 
Marcia Baron and Christine Korsgaard. The results are sometimes surprising 
and the learned reader will have to be prepared to leave the safe haven of his 
or her own philosophical tradition and sample others. I have striven at all 
times to be non-dogmatic and philosophically adventurous. 
For those readers wanting a short-cut through the labyrinth of the answer to 
why we care, here is my recommendation: my favourite care ethicist (despite 
all odds) is Nel Noddings (Chapter One). My favourite chapter -  though it is 
not a quick read - is Chapter Six containing the redoubtable Christine 
Korsgaard and her formidable account of normativity. For those amongst us 
with little time: the summary contains the racy (though long) conclusion and 
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the punchline. In order to prepare you for what you will find: this dissertation 
is concern with the question why we care, why we are moved to care, what 
persuades us. It is not an empirical study into the nature or type of care tasks; 
nor is it an examination of the request from the point of view of the person 
needing or wanting care. It is about daily and 'ordinary' care and not about 
professional and/or medical care , or care in a medical context. 
This dissertation is, albeit indirectly, about Nynke and Joran. I was once 
given the advice to stop any academic research when it got too personal. I 
can't say that I followed that advice: this topic has come sometimes too close 
for comfort and that didn't make it easier (the case study in the introduction 
has distinct echoes with my own experience). My greatest debt is therefore to 
my children: both have endured this long project and I dedicate the thesis to 
them in gratitude for their patience. 
My thanks also to my supervisor, René Boomkens. For someone who once 
professed a hatred for ethics, you have come a long way in supervising this 
dissertation! Thank you for your birthday message, René - we have both 
come to appreciate it!  
To my mother, thank you for your interpretation of my topic and to Fré,  
thank you for your midnight work in transforming this into a beautiful book 
cover.  
To my immediate colleagues - Anita,  Arnold, Fré, Gyan, Hauke, Janny, 
Jorine, Kirsten,Trijnie - I owe a special thanks. Not only did you divert calls 
and solve all kinds of student advisor tasks when I was in some or other 
dissertation crisis: you give me your generous shoulders to cry on and were 
full of practical tips. This is also true of my PhD-student colleagues: writing 
can be hell and you were all supportive and kind to me when I was in mine. 
For those of who who still have to jump the hoops: keep up the good work! 
The teaching staff at the Faculty of Philosophy, especially the ‘vakgroep’ 
Practical Philosophy, have done more than their share of reading and 
commenting and giving advice over the years. Thank you for your kind 
support! And the many students who no only took advice but also gave it, 
thank you. Dear friends and family: this has been a long haul and you were 
all very supportive. It is done! I hope to see you all at the after-party and 
much more often after that - we have things to catch up on. 
Last but not least I want to thank Johan: you have done more caring than you 
had perhaps ever counted on. I could count on you - and I thank you for that. 
Without you this project would never have been realised. 
   
  9 
CONTENTS 
 




What characterises care ethics? .................................................................21 
Motivation in care ethics ...........................................................................29 
Terminology ..............................................................................................31 
Structure of book .......................................................................................31 
 
CHAPTER ONE: ENGROSSED CARE .......................................................34 
Introduction ...............................................................................................34 
Ontological caring .....................................................................................35 
Terminology ..............................................................................................36 
Three key concepts ....................................................................................39 
Normative vacuity .....................................................................................43 
Vicarious caring meets volitional necessity...............................................47 
Conclusion.................................................................................................52 
 
CHAPTER TWO: POSTMODERN CARE ETHICS....................................55 
Introduction ...............................................................................................55 
Postmodernism and care ethics..................................................................56 
Objections to obligation.............................................................................57 
Care as social practice ...............................................................................60 
A postmodern care ethics ..........................................................................63 




CHAPTER THREE: KNOWING CARE ......................................................79 
Introduction ...............................................................................................79 
Simulated knowledge ................................................................................80 
Intolerance of ignorance ............................................................................85 
Epistemic vigilance ...................................................................................88 
Naturalised epistemology ..........................................................................90 
Practices of responsibility..........................................................................97 
Conclusion.................................................................................................99 
 10   
 
CHAPTER FOUR: VIRTUE-ORIENTATED CARE.................................103 
Introduction .............................................................................................103 
Agents and agents’ lives ..........................................................................105 
Inclinations ..............................................................................................107 
Social skills..............................................................................................108 
Two types of naturalism ..........................................................................111 
How does Virtue Motivate?.....................................................................115 
Conclusion...............................................................................................118 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: REFURBISHED OBLIGATION...................................120 
Introduction .............................................................................................120 
Why obligation? ......................................................................................121 
Care ethicists’ critique of Kantian moral philosophy ..............................124 
Kantians to the defence............................................................................129 
Conclusion...............................................................................................143 
 
CHAPTER SIX: NORMATIVE CARING..................................................146 
Introduction .............................................................................................146 
When is caring normative? ......................................................................148 
What is the source of normativity? ..........................................................150 
How does normativity work?...................................................................160 
Non-deliberative yet normative ...............................................................167 









   
  11 
INTRODUCTION: WHY CARE? 
Introduction 
The fascinating thing about care, as an ethics and a public morality, is its 
capacity to appeal, cajole and irritate. It is a concept that is impossible to 
deny yet very difficult to give form to: we all need care at some stage or 
other, some people have a disproportionate amount of caring to do, yet others 
do their best to avoid doing it or reflecting upon it. No one seems to be able 
to agree about what it is precisely or what it entails, yet it is a word that is 
bandied about on political platforms, used in proposals for social reform and 
is milked mercilessly in advertising. It is a concept that moves us – it reminds 
us of something primordially human, seems at the same time to promise 
something utopian and ideal and yet is often the terrain of bitter 
disappointment. 
Just how care moves us is the subject of this dissertation. I want to know how 
care moves us – or in philosophical terms, how it motivates us, in particular 
how it does so in the form of an ethics. My concern is first and foremost 
normative: why should we care? But I am also concerned to know if there is 
an ethical theory that can sustain such a normative message – and whether we 
would want to have such a theory. How could we persuade someone to care 
for someone else if they are not inclined to?  
The latter question, about how to persuade those who do not engage in the 
activity of caring to commence doing so, is a stringent manner of putting care 
ethics to the test. The following case study provides an example of someone 
who is apparently not susceptible to the normative message of the importance 
of caring. He notes it but does not feel it. He knows what is expected of him 
but cannot do it. He can think about his desire to care, his belief that he 
should, understand his role as a carer but none of this means that he can. He 
does want to care but somehow cannot. Can care ethics help this man? Does 
the ethics of care have the means at its disposal to persuade him, motivate 
him to be caring? 
Case study 
After two years of marriage, Pim and his wife moved from Amsterdam to 
Abcoude and a year-and-a-half later their son Sam was born. 
INTRODUCTION 
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“I am ashamed to admit it, but I found parenthood terribly difficult. I 
am so pleased with my son and I have not experienced one minute’s worth of 
regret concerning my choice to have a child, but I never expected it to be so 
exhausting. My wife breast-fed for the first nine months and I could sleep 
reasonably well at night and in the morning. But after that we planned to 
share the care for Sam equally. And that wasn’t easy, despite the fact that 
Sam spent three days in the week at the day-care and I only had to look after 
him for one whole day. 
“As the months passed I felt more and more tired. I began to dread 
the days I had to look after Sam. Not because of him but because of 
everything that had to happen around him. Getting up early, changing his 
nappy, dressing him, preparing a bottle, making sandwiches, taking him to 
bed, conducting a careful phone call while listening for him all the while, 
vacuuming, checking my mail and yes, he was awake once more. Dressing 
him, another bottle, another sandwich, going to the shops, playing, afternoon 
nap. By half-past five I was tired-out and happy that my wife came home to 
take over from me. But yes, then he still had to eat supper, yoghurt, in bath 
and bed. And that time and time again. 
“It drove me crazy that I could never do what I wanted to, without 
being disturbed. That all my activities were planned in advance and that I 
barely had any time to do things for myself. I must admit that I find that very 
difficult. Recently I have not been feeling very well and suffer regularly from 
rashes. I am also more frequently sick than I used to be. I am amazed at how 
my wife manages it all. She has a busy job in advertising, finds time to sport 
three times a week and nevertheless whistles while she folds the clean clothes 
in the evening. It seems as if she can manage everything.” 
This case study is cited in an article in the Volkskrant (Magazine 19 February 
2005: 22 - 26) called “The Young Father is a Little Tired”, and concerns a 
“new” phenomenon: the masculine variety of postnatal depression. This 
phenomenon is linked to the recent and increasing trend in the Netherlands of 
men who have children rather late in life - in their forties – and who have 
difficulty in adjusting to their new role. The article attributes the problems 
men have with caring tasks to a discrepancy between cognition and emotion: 
rationally they think that they should be able to participate equally in caring 
for the children and in the housework, but their behaviour shows something 
altogether different. It might have something to do with a clash of their 
convictions, as the article argues. One conviction could be that the man 
thinks of himself as a modern father who self-evidently should participate in 
caring, but at the same time he might have the conviction that women are 
  WHY CARE? 
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actually better at caring for children than men are or that caring for children 
would be bad for his career. All of these convictions influence his behaviour.  
It might also be a generational problem. Pim’s parents, in rebellion against 
their parents with their nineteen-fifty’s notions of family structures, were 
probably affected by the anti-establishment resistance to rules and structure 
mores of the sixties and seventies. Pim might very well have been brought up 
with a lack of rules and limitations: he did not have to do any housework 
when he was a child and could spend all his attention and energy playing. 
The result of this kind of upbringing is a type of man who has lots of space 
for his own needs but none for social obligations. This pattern is reinforced 
after leaving home: he studied, lived a luxurious life with (relatively) lots of 
money, went on holiday six times a year and then suddenly, the romantic idea 
of a descendant, the product of his greatest love, turns out to be the disrupter 
of this pleasant existence. All at once he is expected to delimit his private 
space and that hurts, concludes the article, even to the extent of his sinking 
into a postnatal depression. 
While most of the care ethics literature begins with examples of loving and 
tender caring moments,1 I have expressly chosen a case study that illustrates 
what I regard as the most urgent problem that care ethics faces: how to 
motivate people to care for others, particularly when they seem insufficiently 
moved to do so. What is problematic for care ethics is that there are those 
who do care and those who do not, and the danger is that the twain shall 
never meet. Furthermore, those who do not can do so by virtue of those who 
do; and those who do are obliged to continue doing so because of those who 
do not. Can care ethics effectively address those who do not do caring?2 An 
ethics cannot force anyone to act morally (and supposing it could do so, there 
are good reasons for not wanting any system of thought that tries to). As 
force is out of the question, we are left to consider various persuasive or 
prescriptive theories and choose the ones with the most compelling 
arguments to motivate. Is caring best (most persuasively) described as a 
virtue? Or as essential to our nature as human beings? Is it a part of a broader 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Selma Sevenhuijsen’s Citizenship and the Ethics of Care (1996) or 
Peta Bowden’s Caring (1997) and especially Nel Noddings’ Caring (1984). 
2
 A note on terminology: 'to care' means 'to like' as well as 'to be concerned for the 
welfare of... '. I want to distinguish between 'to care for' in the sense of liking from 
'being caring' or 'doing care' which is meant in the sense of actively caring for, 
ensuring the well-being of, someone. The latter meaning is that which is central to the 
feminist tradition of care ethics which stems from Carol Gilligan's psychoanalytical 
research in the nineteen eighties. 
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humanitarian approach that also values our weaknesses? Is caring a practice 
and not a (universalisable) theory because it is otherwise too individual and 
particular to be encompassed in a theory?  
This latter aspect, that of expressing and encompassing (some aspects of) 
complex relationships, is a noteworthy aspect of care ethics. This ethical 
tradition emphasises dependence, vulnerability, fallibility and asymmetrical 
relations, argues that these qualities are typical of individuals rather than any 
abstract (Enlightenment) virtues - like freedom, autonomy, and rationality 
which are not attainable for all - and that we need the ethical skills of 
compassion and sympathy in order to have responsive relationships. This is 
an important and significant contribution by care ethics to the ethical 
literature. Care ethics is however less explicit in justifying its particular 
approach to motivation. It lays claim to a compelling type of motivation – 
caring should be done and it is good if it is done - but does not explicate why 
this is so. Rather, the value of caring is assumed to be self-explicit and to 
bear its own motivational logic. I want to know if we should be caring and 
how caring motivates us to action? In which ways does it affect us? Should it 
affect us more? How can it move us most? But first we need to know more 
about what care ethics is, starting with its history. 
Background 
In the nineteen-eighties, Carol Gilligan’s psychoanalytic research into 
women’s responses to moral dilemmas was responsible for a new trend in 
feminist research into what Gilligan called a distinctive moral orientation, a 
“different voice”, which she refers to as the care perspective.3 The care 
perspective in ethics involves seeing oneself as connected to others within a 
web of various relationships. And the ‘voice’ is one of care and 
responsibility, of concern and connection with other people. Gilligan claims 
that it stems from a self that is intrinsically related to other people. In the 
words of Gilligan: 
From within the care perspective, the relationship becomes the 
figure, defining self and other. Within the context of the 
relationship, the self as a moral agent perceives and responds to 
the perception of need. The shift in moral perspective is 
                                                          
3
 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
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manifested by a shift in the moral question, from ‘What is 
just?’ to “How do I respond?’4 
From this brief quotation we can distinguish three characteristics that are – in 
general - vital to care ethics. Primarily, it is a perception of the self within 
pre-existing social and relational forms and these forms define the self and 
others to whom the self has relationships. The self, significantly, is defined 
by relationships rather than by other factors like rationality or freedom, for 
example. Gilligan also describes relationships as being the context in which 
the “need” of the other becomes manifest:5 the perception of and response to 
need occurs within a pre-existing bond. Need is not something that exists as a 
problem prior to relationships; or rather, need can only be seen and dealt with 
from within a bond between people. Secondly, the person required to care 
must be able to perceive the appeal or request or demand for care – and 
respond to it. Indeed, perception of need is that which prompts the caring 
response not only the capacity of the person caring to care. Like need, caring 
also only exists within bonds between people and is a response to a perceived 
situation rather than a permanent state of affairs. Caring is the product of 
social relations: it is not prior in any transcendent sense. And lastly, Gilligan 
indicates that there is a shift from the question as ‘what is just?’ to the 
question ‘how do I respond?’ First of all, she clearly indicates that the caring 
response to need - or ‘care’ for short - is in opposition to justice and a 
tradition of ethics that sustains justice as a primary good. Second, there is a 
clear methodological shift away from the abstract query as to what something 
is (always and unchangingly), toward a first-person, contextual, concrete 
question: how do I respond?  
To summarise, Gilligan names three characteristics of the care perspective: it 
is defined by relationships, it is the response to an awareness of need and it 
comprises a contextualised first-person approach. Most, if not all, of the chief 
characteristics of care as found in the tradition of care ethics that followed 
Gilligan are variations of or elaborations on these three aspects and all three 
characteristics will receive detailed attention in the course of this dissertation. 
But for the moment I want to concentrate on Gilligan’s question: ‘how do I 
respond?’  
                                                          
4
 Carol Gilligan, “Moral Orientation and Moral Development”, in Kittay and Diane T. 
Meyers (eds.) Women and Moral Theory, 1987, 23. 
5
 A small point of terminology: I would prefer not to use the term ‘need’ because it is 
a complex term that could mean many things (‘vulnerability’, ‘want’, ‘necessity’, 
‘desire’, etc) but I shall follow Gilligan in this matter for the moment. 
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Because Gilligan (and all other care ethicists) reject a ubiquitous notion of 
caring, the individual instance and first-person perception is the most (and 
sometimes the only) relevant point of view. This approach contains within it 
two problems: according to which standards and measurements can we 
decide what good, or appropriate, care is? And what do we do in instances in 
which someone is unwilling or less willing to care? I suggest that the answer 
to the second question is contained within the first – if we know what the 
normative boundaries of care are - what is good or right about care - then we 
are more capable of persuading someone of its merits. In other words, 
specifying the normativity of care provides an explanation of how care 
motivates. Let me illustrate this by returning to the case study that I cited at 
the beginning of this chapter.  
What can we say about Pim’s response? Well, first of all, in all fairness to 
Pim, he is aware that his response – his dread of having to take on the 
responsibility for a day’s caring and his (unconscious?) seeking escape in 
illness – is inadequate. He compares himself to his wife and sees his 
contribution to the caring tasks by no means matching her energy and 
consistency; in short, she takes on the greater responsibility for caring for 
Sam, contrary to their agreement. What is so patently missing from his 
perception though is what he could do to alter it, supposing that he does want 
to do so. What he sees is that his wife has some kind of caring ‘drive’ that he 
supposedly lacks.  
The analysis that the article in the Volkskrant Magazine offers is that Pim’s 
response has to do with other convictions he might hold due to or as well as 
his background as an over-indulged child of ‘baby boomer’ generation 
parents. This would suggest, supposing that this is the case, that his response 
has been moulded by very specific economic-cultural conditions and, quite 
frankly, the ‘solution’ to his dilemma about why he can’t seem to want to 
care is unlikely then to come from those quarters. The point is that Pim’s 
response is suffused with his own inclinations to be free and spontaneous (“I 
could never do what I wanted to” because everything was planned or because 
he was always being interrupted), and to enjoy solipsistic pleasures (“do 
things for myself”). Pim sees his pleasures being disturbed by his 
responsibilities; he is, if you like, a wanton6 who places the burden of blame 
for the failure of his desired life-style outside of himself and would rather 
                                                          
6
 This term is borrowed from Harry Frankfurt’s article “Freedom of the Will” (in The 
Importance of What We Care About 1988) in which he describes “wantons” as agents 
whose only desire is to satisfy their immediate desires. 
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sustain his solipsistic pleasures than sacrifice them. In this sense, Pim weighs 
up his alternatives according to psychological hedonism, according to which 
he must always choose what he believes to be the greater pleasure or the 
lesser pain – and he must therefore take whichever course of action it is that 
he believes will result, overall, in the most pleasant or least painful outcome, 
all things considered.7 But psychological hedonism is not going to help Pim 
to win any prizes in the ethics of care.  
Can Gilligan’s question ‘how do I respond?’ be of any constructive help to 
Pim? He knows that Sam is dependent on him, he knows that he has agreed 
to meet Sam’s dependencies on occasion and he knows that his response is 
inadequate. But, I argue, Pim’s pondering solely on his own concrete 
situation will not render a further motivation to care because his specific 
economic-cultural background reinforces rather than alleviates his lack of 
motivation. Rather, what Pim needs to do is to be able to think critically and 
reflexively about those influences that have shaped his desires, to be able to 
consider alternatives to them and to have access to a set of normative 
guidelines to which he can refer when he senses a clash between his desires 
and his responsibilities. And these normative guidelines should not be narrow 
in the sense that they shouldn’t be institutional (for example, the policy on 
family structures advocated by Dutch Christian Democrats), nor should they 
be gendered (for example, the argument that women are better at caring 
because they supposedly have a pre-natal bond with their children). On the 
contrary, they should have a relevance that goes far beyond politics and 
should be general, in the sense of pertaining to both men and women.  
Where should these guidelines come from? (Of course, it must be 
acknowledged that this recent interest in the ethics of care is itself the result 
of certain social trends - every conceptual discussion is unavoidably the 
result of very specific historical constellations.)8 In the case of caring, we can 
draw attention to Sam’s status as a young and vulnerable person, in need of 
care and nurturing. We can draw attention to the mutual benefits, Sam and 
Pim’s and Sam’s mother, in terms of emotional development that can be 
achieved by attentive and loving care. And we can draw attention to the 
                                                          
7
 Part of (the fifth premise of) David Davidson's account of 'weakness of will'. 
Davidson concludes that there are no incontinent actions – no actions on the basis of a 
lack of self-restraint. Cited in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 1998 
"Akrasia'". 
8
 See, for example, Albert Hirschman’s delightful book in the tradition of the history 
of ideas, The Passions and the Interests, 1977. 
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beneficial results of contributing to human flourishing in an however small 
and individual fashion. In short, the reasons for caring are to protect and 
nurture those who are incapable of doing so for themselves, to encourage 
emotional development especially in those close to you (though not 
exceptionally) and to contribute to a society in which human flourishing is a 
general ideal. Where precisely these guidelines come from, whether they are 
Judeo-Christian virtues, or liberal democratic ideals, or late twentieth-century 
Dutch social norms, is not relevant here. What is significant is that they 
express a particular constellation of individual and social ideals that find their 
expression now: ideals of modern fatherhood, childhood, family structures 
and their relation to society as a whole. They are, to varying degrees, tried 
and tested ideals, though it is important to preserve a historical perspective: 
the idea of fatherhood as a nurturing role is novel; the notion of the family in 
which both parents work and have careers is less new though; and what we 
might consider to be unalterable truths about childhood are only a century or 
so old.9  
Pim’s reply to “how do I respond?” will, therefore, have much to do with his 
current socio-cultural and historical context. But his reply – on a conceptual 
and ethical level – will also (whether in opposition to or confirmation of) 
relate to tradition and more universal values. Values like ‘humanity’, ‘rights’ 
and ‘rationality’, for example. Care ethics has also had to deal with this 
conceptual heritage: it is very firmly rooted in a tradition of Enlightenment 
critique and is therefore part of more than two centuries of critical feminism, 
starting with Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women 
(1792). The care perspective in ethics has been contrasted, by successive care 
ethicists after Gilligan, with what they refer to as a ‘rights-based’ tradition in 
philosophy. Adherents of this liberal-democratic tradition are regarded as 
including the moral philosophy of the eighteenth-century philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, the moral and political philosophy of the nineteenth-century 
philosopher John Stuart Mill and the moral and political philosophy of the 
twentieth-century neo-Kantian philosopher John Rawls. The central features 
of this liberal-democratic tradition (and focus of contestation) for care 
ethicists are the notions of individual autonomy and possession of rights. In 
this tradition each individual is seen as having certain basic rights, such as the 
right to life, liberty and property. The self is seen as an autonomous 
                                                          
9
 Philippe Aries, in his book Centuries of Childhood 1962, argues that our 
contemporary ideas of a childhood that lasts eighteen or so years dates back to the end 
of the nineteenth, beginning of the twentieth century. Childhood (as we know it here 
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individual, free to make those choices that do not infringe upon the basic 
rights of others. Justice, and the tradition that sustains it, these care ethicists 
argue, is a perspective that weighs up conflicting claims against a standard of 
equality or equal respect. This perception of equal individuals, possessing 
liberty, rights, and freedom is supposedly the dominant Western idiom and is 
the foil against which the care perspective has been developed: with its self 
defined by relationships, perceptive to need and responding to concrete 
situations.  
Care ethicists argue that care ethics provides a much-needed alternative to 
current ethics which is either based on the sovereign individual or on the 
universal principle. Gilligan, for example, argues that the dynamics of family 
relations and friendships require another type of morality than rights-based 
morality. Intimate relations are fluid rather than formal and often both 
presuppose and require trusting and imaginative engagement for which there 
are no hard and fast rules, she says. Yet there are (morally) good and bad 
ways to act within intimate relations. In addition, as the moral philosopher 
Annette Baier argues, how we treat strangers in the political realm would 
seem to depend at least partially on whether we have learned from intimates 
what it means to truly respect, trust and appreciate another human being.10 
And Gilligan says: 
All human relationships, public and private, can be 
characterised both in terms of equality and in terms of 
attachment, and…both inequality and detachment constitute 
grounds for moral concern. Since everyone is vulnerable both 
to oppression and to abandonment, two moral visions – one of 
justice and one of care – recur in human experience. The moral 
injunctions, not to act unfairly toward others, and not to turn 
away from someone in need, capture these different concerns. 
(Gilligan 1987, 20) 
Caring relations, because of the broader import or significance of their effect, 
are neither exclusively public nor private. Indeed, care ethics often proceeds 
from a first-person perspective that alternates between the private and public 
realm. The assumption is that caring is relevant to both spheres. No one 
sphere is prioritised. 
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Gilligan’s book (In a Different Voice) evinced a huge number of reactions, 
including a large body of feminist ethics on the issue of justice versus care, or 
justice and care. Yet despite their critique of this justice perspective, some 
feminists have had doubts about substituting an ethic of justice with an ethic 
of care, since justice and fairness are so obviously necessary in the public as 
well as the private sphere. As the feminist Susan Moller Okin argues, justice 
is needed to frame caring relationships and care for others is “so crucial for 
the achievement and the maintenance of justice”.11 And Alison Jaggar, a 
prominent care ethicist, argues that care and justice as values or ideals are 
compatible - but when they are construed as alternative modes of moral 
thinking or reasoning they are not.12 Some current approaches to the potential 
rivalry of care and justice, however, would suggest that they could not be 
synthesised. Care is an independent style or practice of moral thinking argues 
the care ethicist and ‘maternal thinker’ Sara Ruddick: they each have 
distinctive ontological, epistemological and practical commitments. Care and 
justice are “two non-assimilable moral orientations which foster distinctive 
cognitive capacities, appeal to distinctive ideals of rationality, elicit 
distinctive moral emotions, presume distinctive conceptions of identity and 
relationships, recognise distinctive virtues and make distinctive requirements 
on institutions.” Justice and care each offer: 
a point of view from which alone a certain sort of 
understanding of human life is possible. That is to say, each 
orientation is genuinely moral: neither can be replaced by or 
subsumed under the other, each covers the whole of the moral 
domain and therefore can check and inform the other; there is 
no third, “mature”, single integrative moral perspective within 
which each orientation has its place. (Sara Ruddick “Injustice 
in Families” 1995 in Held, V (ed.) Justice and Care.) 
Yet other approaches have explored ethical concepts that overlap aspects of 
justice and care, for example, the concepts of trust, responsibility, empathy, 
dignity, respect, solidarity and relational autonomy.13  
The justice versus care debate is indeed a large and comprehensive debate 
and has been exceedingly well documented.14 But this is not the focus of this 
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dissertation. Rather, what this dissertation sets out to do is to locate the best 
type of motivating argument within care ethics that will persuade someone 
like Pim that he should care. The search for this type of argument will take 
me through a range of alternatives in the care ethics literature: care as 
ontologically basic, care as a practice, care as reliable knowledge, and care as 
a virtue. Each alternative has its own account of motivation and I shall review 
these one for one and work my way to a type of motivation that I regard as 
most persuasive. But before I leap into the discussion of motivation, we need 
to know more about care ethics in general. What is it? How does it differ to 
other ethical approaches? What makes it special? 
What characterises care ethics? 
There are several alternative opinions of what care ethics is in the literature – 
there is no one care ethics. Nevertheless, care ethics in general can be 
described as being typified by two distinct starting-points: first, care ethics 
argues that human existence is fundamentally relational and second, care 
ethical argumentation contains within it a moral sensibility, namely 
commitment and attentiveness. One could very well call the first starting-
point ‘ontological’ because it is concerned with the definition of what human 
beings are and how they live in a world in which they have to survive 
together with others. The second starting-point has to do with (careful) moral 
reasoning and is related to a dedication to caring and to the role that caring 
plays in something teleological (the best example is the quite ordinary desire 
or goal to lead a good life). Neither of these starting-points however yet 
sharply distinguishes care ethics from other types of ethical traditions (care 
ethics in this regard resembles virtue ethics, for example).  
Add to these two starting-points specifically what is meant by ‘care’ and we 
will begin to form the idea of a distinct type of ethics. Herta Nagel-Docekal 
in her article “Feminist Ethics: How It Could Benefit from Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy”,15 argues that care ethics generally has three characteristics by 
which care is usually defined: it is sensitive to context, it is guided by 
relationships and it is governed by feelings. Care ethics’ sensitivity to context 
is derived from the “situated knowledge” tradition in critical feminist 
philosophy of science.16 In this tradition, shared by feminists like Donna 
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Harraway, Sandra Harding, Seyla Benhabib, Lorraine Code and Claudia 
Card, knowledge is regarded as being generated and understood in specific 
contexts. This view emphatically rejects the notion that there is a neutral 
‘view from nowhere’ which would produce universal or non-contextualised 
knowledge. Thus the question is not what is known but who knows. From 
within care ethics, Gilligan’s question, ‘how do I respond?’, for example, 
falls within this situated approach.  
The second characteristic of care, its relationality, is a very basic precept for 
care ethics. All of care ethics is about relations with others.17 But there are 
significant inclusions and exclusions in this category. Some care ethicists 
focus on the aspect of humanity and define humanity in terms of being 
vulnerable and fallible (care ethicists like Marian Verkerk and Henk 
Manschot and other Dutch care ethicists).18 The American care ethicist, Daryl 
Koehn also emphasises the concern of care ethics with vulnerability. She 
argues that: “Female ethics… argue for something like an obligation to care 
for and to empathise with (the) vulnerable members of our community”.19 
Some care ethicists focus rather on perception and ‘how it is with the other’. 
This can include need and vulnerability - as well as happiness. The carer 
recognises and takes pleasure in the other’s happiness and identifies with and 
is concerned about her needs, and is also aware and responsive to the fragility 
and mortality of human existence.20 Ruddick argues that participants in 
caring relationships also strive to delight and empower each other.21 Those 
relations included in care ethics are thus ones of vulnerability and of 
happiness. 
Those relations excluded from care ethics are relations expressed in terms of 
power. The issue of asymmetrical relations is addressed – some care ethicists 
argue that caring is selfless to the degree of not requiring a response, while 
others (like Marian Verkerk, following Ricoeur) argue that every reception of 
caring comprises of a response even if it is exceedingly weak: 
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This is perhaps the greatest test of care: when an unequal 
capacity finds compensation in an authentic reciprocity, which, 
in the hour of fear, can be found in whispering together or in 
weakly holding each others’ hand. (Paul Ricoeur Oneself as 
Another 1992:191, cited in Verkerk “Zorg of contract” 1994, 
64). 
But the potential that caring might have for the actualisation of ‘disvalues’ - 
exploitation, submission, subversion, manipulation, or domination – has not 
been a primary focus in care ethics.22 This is largely because care ethics 
describes an ideal and beneficial addition to human existence and, as such, 
often has a tone of buoyant optimism (which can also be encountered in the 
Aristophanean ethics23 of Harry Frankfurt and in substantivist ethical theories 
like virtue ethics). However, given the critical feminist tradition upon which 
much of care ethics is based, and given that tradition’s assertive fluency on 
the subject of the negative consequences of many developments in modern 
Western liberal democracies for women, this is a controversial point. Some 
critics of care ethics have accused it of merely reinforcing gender roles found 
in society, whereas some care ethicists have made a point of promoting care 
ethics precisely as a means of breaking these stereotyped roles down.24  
A third characteristic of care, as defined by Nagel-Docekal, in addition to its 
contextuality and relationality, is its ‘being governed by feelings’. (This 
emphasis on feelings is however not what the more politically-orientated care 
ethicists like Tronto and Jagger and Verkerk are concerned with. These 
political care ethicists are concerned rather with the notion of a competent 
practice and instrumental design.)25 Nagel-Docekal is correct that feelings do 
play a rather unique role in “personalist” or affective care ethics, two roles to 
be precise. The first role is that feelings26 are the instruments by means of 
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which caring is expressed and information about the cared-one is gathered. 
All the beneficent inclinations (like compassion, concern, sympathy, 
empathy, and trust) are involved in gathering information and expressing the 
felt care. What precisely these caring inclinations comprise of has not been 
critically examined by care ethicists27- so we are left a little in the dark about 
how they should work. Caring inclinations are assumed to exist but not 
specified, or contextualised, or elaborated on.  
The historical roots of care ethics might reveal something more about what 
care comprises. Care ethics harks back to the moral sentiments theories of the 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers Adam Smith, David Hume and Adam 
Ferguson.28 ‘Benevolence’, the corner stone of this eighteenth-century ethical 
tradition, is the precursor of ‘care’ and was regarded by these moral 
philosophers as a universal sentiment. Both benevolence and care include 
commitment and attentiveness and both regard this sentiment as universally 
present.  
The second role of inclinations in care is encountered in the writings of Nel 
Noddings, one of the creators of care ethics, in her book Caring. A Feminist 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984). This second role is one of 
absence or abeyance: Noddings’ caring theory proceeds from a selfless (and 
thus ‘inclination-less’) point of view. The idea is “to perceive the reality of 
the other” and to suspend an awareness of the self in order to do so. Noddings 
wants to ‘receive’ the other in herself. This is in contrast with the idea behind 
empathy, which is to project myself into the other by identifying with and 
understanding another’s situation, feelings and motives.29 Empathy is too 
indirect an experience of what the other is experiencing as far as Noddings is 
concerned. Noddings does not wish that the self be present in the ‘perceiving 
of the other’. This approach is also mirrored in the work of a more 
contemporary care ethicist, Vrinda Dalmiya, who concurs with Noddings that 
the only way in which the requirements of the other can be perceived is by a 
self that is not self-preoccupied or encumbered at that moment with its own 
inclinations.  
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This is an important but contentious point in care ethics. Perceiving the other 
as fully as possible is a noble goal in any ethics. How can it be achieved? 
There is a sense in which Noddings’ (and others’) suspension of the self 
coincides with older and more established notions of “disinterested interest”. 
This is a Stoic concept used to allow the person striving towards goodness to 
be able to do so - detached from inclinations. Good deeds are performed not 
for the benefits they bring to the one performing them, but because they are 
right. Kant, too, refers to this disinterested interest in his Doctrine of Virtue 
(“practical love” or “beneficence”)30. Care ethicists, in contrast, do not aim at 
a detachment from inclination because they do not argue, as Kant does, that 
inclinations cannot be moral. Care ethicists wish to suspend the self because 
it intrudes between the one caring and the one cared for. While I can imagine 
that a one’s self-interests could get in the way of perceiving the other fully, I 
am sceptical about the likelihood of selflessness being at all possible – or, for 
that matter, desirable. (I shall spend time discussing this aspect of care ethics 
in later chapters.) 
Thus the three characteristics of care, contextuality, relationality and the 
significance of inclinations, are not uncomplicated.31 Especially the latter two 
characteristics need further specification: care is relational with respect to 
certain inclusions and certain exclusions. Care includes relations of 
vulnerability and happiness but has hitherto excluded detailed discussions of 
disvalue. Care prioritises certain beneficent inclinations and insists on the 
absence of self-interest - it propagates an absence of inclinations on behalf of 
the person caring.  
It is quite possible that these inclusions and exclusions, and presences and 
absences have to do with the following feature of care ethics, namely, 
‘particularity’. Why? Because ‘particularity’ is a thoroughly contextualised 
and descriptive conception of where someone is, here and now therefore 
requiring a far reaching inquiry into the position of the other. ‘Particularism’ 
is a viewpoint of the individual as she is at that particular moment, with her 
own needs, desires and possibilities, her own history and own perspective on 
life. It requires that each instance be, if necessary, judged on its own merit 
which demands a singular degree of ‘openness’ of mind on the part of the one 
caring. Not only openness as such, but a well-meaning or beneficent 
preparedness to perceive and a capacity to make judgements that are not 
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determined by one’s own preferences. After all, what is good for one 
person’s well-being might not be good for another. 
Because of this particularism, care ethics makes its own - and unique - 
demands on moral reasoning. Empathy and attentiveness for the other, in 
respect to the uniqueness or difference of the other, demands ‘careful’ moral 
reasoning, directed at a particular and situated practice. This is why care 
ethics claims to be wary of rule-based or universal-type ethical theories 
(though, as I have indicated above, I believe that care ethics has its own 
universalising tendencies). Rather, care ethics finds natural allies in virtue 
ethics - especially someone like the virtue ethicist Michael Slote - and 
narrative ethics - like the moral philosopher Margaret Walker, for example - 
but finds that it does not easily fit in with other traditional ethical trends like 
deontology or utilitarianism. 
How does care ethics relate to its allies? Firstly, virtue ethics: some reviewers 
of the care ethics tradition argue that care ethics is a form of virtue ethics.32 
They argue this because, generally speaking, caring is treated as a skill, an 
accomplishment developed together with practical wisdom and is, as such, 
firstly, a feature or characteristic of a person and, secondly, something that is 
applied variously and according to the circumstances. Caring is a practice 
rather than a rule. These two aspects apparently overlap with an Aristotelian-
type of conception of what a virtue is: a characteristic and part of what it is to 
have practical wisdom. The virtue ethicist Michael Slote says that he thinks 
that the morality of caring is best regarded as a form of “agent-based” virtue 
ethics. (Slote defines “agent-basing” as a form of morality in which the 
normativity is decided solely at the discretion of the person committing the 
deed. For example, Noddings wants to relate everything in morality to the 
motive or attitude of caring – rather than bringing in independent principles 
or considerations of justice, truth-telling, or whatever – and this is 
characteristic of agent-basing, says Slote.) As such, he says, the claim that 
this ethics makes - that caring is morally good or virtuous - is “a 
fundamental, intuitive judgement from which other moral judgements 
derive.”33 He argues that the ethic of caring is a distinctive morality that can 
stand on its own, and as such caring can be regarded as “an overarching and 
ideal moral virtue whose status as such is intuitively plausible in its own 
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right.”34 Whether or not and to what degree care ethics is a virtue ethics will 
be discussed at length in Chapter Four of this dissertation. Suffice it to say 
for the moment that virtue ethics is certainly an ally of care ethics because 
some versions of care ethics and virtue ethics share important assumptions 
and values. 
Secondly, how does care ethics relate to narrative ethics? A narrative is a life 
story and, as the feminist ethicist Margaret Walker points out, it is the story 
of any life in any form. It is not necessarily a master story with a telos (as 
Alasdair MacIntyre would have it), or a “quest” (MacIntyre and Charles 
Taylor), or a “human life lived according to a plan” (John Rawls) or a “life 
roulette” (Bernard Williams).35 Lives (and therefore the stories thereof) 
“make sense of different actions (that) might be many, local, fragmentary, or 
discontinuous.”36 A life narrative can proceed in fits and starts and contain 
developments and interruptions; it is not an orderly or necessarily progressive 
account from problem to solution, or from chaos to order, and can sometimes 
even lack a clear linear or teleological structure. It is a story that can also 
include fallibility and aimlessness.  
It is the narrative of an individual and, as such, has a strong particularistic 
character. In relation to narrativism, particularism means that people in 
different contexts tell moral stories in which meaning and significance, value 
and judgements are awarded. But particularity goes further than context: it 
contains within it a moral enhancement (rather than a reduction) of the 
individuality of the person. Moral particularity has been described as being 
non-universalisable because those practising it assign a discretionary weight, 
rank, or value to moral particulars, in the process of defining their own moral 
personae, the kind of persons they are.37 Indeed, responding to the needs of 
others in their concrete specificity as care ethics wishes to do, is understood 
as responding to them as unique, irreplaceable individuals rather than as 
“generalised others regarded simply as representatives of a common 
humanity”, according to the feminist Seyla Benhabib.  
Perhaps the most distinctive and controversial feature 
attributed to care thinking is its particularity, which means not 
only that it addresses the needs of others in their concrete 
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specificity but that it is unmediated by general principles. 
(Benhabib “The Generalized and the Concrete Other”, 1986, 
164) 
Universal versus particular is a consistent theme in care ethics. The moral 
philosopher Lawrence Blum argues that care cannot be reconstructed in terms 
of rules that are in principle universalisable: “Care is a moral perception 
whose task it is to individuate the situations in which moral judgement 
operates, not to apply moral principles.”38 Care reasoning therefore focuses 
on the specificities of each situation, emphasising the ways in which it is 
unique and responding to those involved as particular in the sense of non-
substitutable or irreplaceable. 
To summarise, what are the specific features of care ethics? Care ethic’s 
starting point is that of human relations and its moral sentiment is 
characterised by attentiveness and commitment. Add to these characteristics 
of care the features of contextuality, the relations of vulnerability and 
happiness, and the importance of inclinations - as beneficent presence or as 
absence of self-orientation. These features do indeed go part of the way to 
distinguish care ethics from other ethics. But the most important 
distinguishing feature of care ethics is particularity. It distinguishes care as a 
practice rather than a rule and it creates the preconditions for certain 
philosophical allies - virtue ethics and narrativism - and certain opponents. It 
is also the approach which supposedly characterises the ‘openness’ of the one 
caring to the cared for: the ability to see what the other in that time and place 
requires. 
Care ethics is thus an outspoken protagonist of particularism and ‘agent-
based’ normativity. This means that moral dilemma or questions must be 
solved at the level of the individual, as care giver and care receiver, perhaps 
even at the level of uniqueness. Of course care ethics cannot succeed in 
maintaining this status of being one of a kind at every stage of its moral 
reasoning and nor should it endeavour to do so. Rather, the sui generis status 
of care ethical reasoning should be seen as the basis of a kind of practical 
wisdom or practice which means that care ethics strives to perceive the 
individual as individual without being blinded by theory or imposed moral 
precepts. As such, care ethics represents a critical deconstruction of 
monolithic tendencies in ethics, especially systems of ethics that sustain 
generalising, or what care ethicists call, ‘universalist’ moral theories. 
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However, as some critics have pointed out,39 the particularistic approach in 
care ethics suffers from a dearth of moral justification: approaching each 
caring act as a unique action undercuts being able to have reasons for those 
acts.  
I fail to see why care ethics might benefit from this lack of justificatory 
explanation. On the contrary, I shall argue that not only can we find sound 
arguments to justify caring but that we should do so. Furthermore, I believe 
that care ethics, precisely because of its ‘agent-based’ normativity and its 
preference for particularism, lends itself to a very interesting type of 
phenomenological motivation. What moves me to care? How am I moved? 
When does it feel right (here I am using ‘feeling’ in the sense of moral 
sensibility)? Why should Pim care, especially when there seem to be several 
psychological and cultural factors hindering or impeding him from doing so? 
Is there a theory of motivation that can also facilitate the particularity of care 
ethics?  
Motivation in care ethics 
This dissertation focuses on the motivation for caring given in personalist (in 
other words, apolitical) types of care ethics: why it is we care. Furthermore, I 
shall seek a normative basis to this question: why should we care? This does 
not mean that the results of such a morality of caring are not important. On 
the contrary, anyone who cares about others cares about the consequences of 
his actions for those others. But, if we subscribe to a morality of caring, this 
doesn’t mean that we have to judge actions in terms of their good or bad 
results. On the contrary, an individual’s motivation is of first concern in any 
judgement of caring. As Slote persuasively argues:  
(i)f a caring individual makes her best efforts on behalf of a 
friend but fails to be helpful, we may still have a high moral 
opinion of her efforts; and such a judgement, to a first 
approximation, will be based on the caring individual’s 
motivation, rather than on any consideration of the 
consequences that result from her action. (Slote “The Justice of 
Caring”, 172) 
Of course caring motivation is directed towards certain consequences, but 
‘caring’ involves having a certain inclination or motivation and expressing it 
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in the form of a moral sentiment of attentiveness and commitment. ‘Caring’, 
in this perception, is primarily an attitudinal disposition. Or in the words of 
Slote, “the very expression “morality of caring” implies the primacy of 
motivation within any such view”.40 For this reason, he believes that “the 
distinctive nature, and indeed force, of a morality of caring is best brought 
out by interpreting it in motivation-based terms rather than as some sort of 
(…) consequentialism”.41  
But focussing on motivation, as I wish to do, does mean limiting myself to 
the functioning of the inner life of caring individuals. On the one hand, caring 
is a response - directly prompted by situations and contexts outside of 
oneself. We can be compelled to care in response to someone’s suffering or 
vulnerability, or cuteness or lovability. On the other, it is something that we 
do despite ourselves, or because of ourselves, or for qualities intrinsic to the 
person we care for; it can be voluntary, or involuntary or even as a result of 
an obligation. In short, I argue that caring involves that most contradictory 
(but most everyday) experience of being ‘voluntarily constrained’ or 
‘willingly compelled’. Caring does something with us: it moves us, it propels 
us into action, it agitates and tugs at us – and it often does not even require 
our conscious and intentional participation to do so. Caring, in this sense, is 
‘necessary’ – it is a motivation that is very difficult to say “No” to (and even 
if we do say “no” we have to refuse or deny the motivation thereby 
acknowledging it as motivation). 
At the same time caring is normative: there is adequate or appropriate caring 
and inadequate and inappropriate caring. Therefore this compelling activity 
also requires from us that we critically examine how and under what 
conditions we care and if what we do is the best thing to do or the most we 
can do under the circumstances. We are required to endorse or confirm doing 
this compelling thing: to use our practical knowledge and engage our 
experience and judgement in performing it. Therefore, to summarise, the 
motivation to care contains within it a series of potential contradictions or 
tensions between opposite tendencies and it is amongst these tensions that I 
argue that the dynamic and unique qualities of caring lie. What I shall be 
doing in this dissertation is to set out to explore these tensions and describe 
what I regard as the best way of expressing them. 
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Terminology 
A brief note on terminology used here: 
I do not make a distinction between ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’. In some literature 
ethics is represented as being about the ‘good life’ (teleology) and morality as 
being about rules regarding the ‘right thing to do’ (deontology).42 As far as I 
am concerned, and I believe I share this approach with several philosophers, 
doing the ‘right’ thing is intimately concerned with leading a ‘good’ life and 
the two cannot be separated. I therefore use ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ 
indiscriminately. 
‘Ethics of care’ refers to the body of literature on caring, now an established 
tradition in ethics. Because ‘care’ etymologically also means ‘being 
concerned’ or ‘worried about’ – which I do not always mean when I talk 
about care ethics, I prefer the term ‘caring’ which refers more directly to the 
activity or motivation of being committed or attentive to someone. 
As I indicated earlier, I shall avoid referring to the needs of others as the 
motivating force for caring actions. I will be concentrating on the person 
caring, i.e. the person doing the act of care, as the subject of my investigation 
of motivation in care ethics. This is not to deny the importance of the person 
cared-for and their requirements and appeals to be cared for. This is merely a 
designation of the area of my focus. 
In the literature there are several terms used to indicate the person doing the 
caring. I shall use ‘the one caring’. And for the person being cared for I shall 
use: ‘the cared-for’. The person caring is the one who is performing actions 
that I regard as moral actions and I am concerned about the motivational and 
normative content of specifically these actions. 
Structure of book 
In Chapter One, entitled Engrossed Care, I examine what I call a 
phenomenological account of what it is to experience the urge to care. Nel 
Noddings is the oft-cited care ethicist who has developed this approach to 
care ethics. I compare Noddings’ account of caring with that of Harry 
Frankfurt. These two authors are very different, at first glance. Further 
investigation reveals however that they share a (fairly radical) subjectivist 
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approach to care that involves necessity and a minimum of normativity. I 
argue that their approaches have some strong advantages to examining the 
question why we care – but also some very strong disadvantages. 
In Chapter Two, entitled Post Modern Care Ethics, I examine an account of 
an ethics that rejects what it calls “overarching’ or “supra-natural” categories 
of value. Each perspective is a unique perspective, argues Selma 
Sevenhuijsen (whom I have chosen to represent this theme in care ethics). 
Sevenhuijsen attempts to temper her radical particularity with an emphasis on 
the importance of solidarity and responsibility. I am critical of this attempt 
and include a discussion of Margaret Walker’s much more social concept of 
responsibility in this chapter as an alternative to Sevenhuijsen.  
In Chapter Three, entitled Knowing Care, I examine an epistemological 
account of care ethics in which it is argued that caring generates a particular 
and better kind of knowledge – knowledge about the cared-for. Like the first 
two accounts of caring, this is based on knowledge generated by situated and 
particularised epistemic positions. The basis for this discussion is Vrinda 
Dalmiya’s epistemological care ethics and Walker’s epistemological basis for 
an ethical approach. 
In Chapter Four, entitled Virtue-Orientated Care, I examine a type of care 
ethics that breaks with the tradition of accentuating the selflessness of the one 
caring. Virtue-orientated care ethics, represented here by Raja Halwani, in 
contrast to post-modern and epistemological care ethics, has a central role for 
the moral agent. This role includes a discussion of character, inclinations and 
social skills. Halwani argues that caring is necessary because of its essential 
role in securing quality of life. I have reservations about this particular form 
of argument. I refer to John McDowell critique of naturalism and 
Hursthouse’s exposition of character in order to elaborate on notions of virtue 
ethics and offer alternatives to Halwani’s approach. 
In Chapter Five, entitled Refurbished Obligation, I continue the discussion 
of the notion of what necessity means in the context of an ethics. I spend 
much time revising the concept of obligation – taken from a philosophical 
tradition hitherto reviled by care ethicists - so that it is capable of expressing 
a complex and sensitive moral standpoint and is simultaneously a means of 
demarcation for moral actions. I discuss its ability to command, give 
permission and to restrain and I do so in a manner inspired by Barbara 
Herman and Marcia Baron. This chapter forms a bridge to the point to which 
I have been working throughout this dissertation, namely a discussion of (the 
compellingness of) normativity – in caring. 
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In Chapter Six, entitled Normative Caring, I enquire what normativity does. 
In order to do this, I look at Christine Korsgaard’s concept of normativity and 
some of her critics. I formulate a reply to the question ‘Why care?’ and I 
conclude that Pim must care at peril of feeling worse than death. 
 
   
34 
CHAPTER ONE: ENGROSSED CARE  
Introduction 
I shall begin directly with the compelling aspect of caring. This is to my mind 
the most ambivalent aspect of caring: it is precisely this aspect that propels 
one, sometimes irrespective of one’s choice, into relations of caring and it is 
therefore also the aspect that repels those who do not desire such intimacy. 
The ‘propelling’ or ‘compelling’ quality of care will receive attention in this 
chapter.  
The care ethicist who has the most unique and outspoken approach to this 
aspect of care is the philosopher Nel Noddings, author of Caring. A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984). Noddings has come to 
occupy a prominent position in care ethical literature that is primarily 
concerned with emotions and experience: she is one of the founders of this 
tradition in care ethics - her approach is (unlike Gilligan’s whose approach is 
psychoanalytical) primarily philosophical, focussing on existential and 
phenomenological issues in caring. Noddings will play a prominent role in 
elucidating what I mean by an ‘ontological’ type of care ethics. I have 
dubbed this type “engrossed” care, an oft-cited phrase of Noddings’. 
This chapter concerns caring in an ontological sense: a phenomenological 
account of what it is to experience the urge to care and how this urge is given 
form in the relationship essential to humankind, namely an urge that is given 
form in the mother-child relation. This relation, as argued by Noddings and 
others,1 is basic to all human experience and forms and informs all our other 
relations – it captures the essential human relationship and I therefore call it 
ontological.2  
                                                          
1
 By what are referred to as “maternal thinkers” like Sara Ruddick and Nancy 
Chodorow, for example; feminists such as Jean Elshtain, Susan Okin and Adrienne 
Rich. Philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, David Hume, Charles Taylor and 
others centralize not so much the mother-child relation but family relations in general 
as basic for moral development and maturation. 
2
 Strictly speaking, the mother-child relation is a posteriori - for the mother at least. 
The infant’s experience of this relation however is arguably so early that it is prior to 
experience and serves to form experience rather than being a conscious experience in 
itself. Noddings places the ontological emphasis on the universality of the infant’s 
experience and regards it as a pre-rational basis existing in all human beings. 
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What is the structure of this chapter? As to the title, “engrossed” refers to the 
manner in which Noddings argues the other must be perceived in a caring 
relationship: the person caring must be entirely involved or ‘engrossed’ in the 
other’s reality. Noddings has created her own terminology to deal with (what 
I have characterised as) her ontological approach to caring and I shall start 
off this chapter with a section specifying her ontological approach, followed 
by a section on terminology. Her terminology is derived from the existential 
and psychoanalytical literature she refers to but has a very distinct, 
neologistic feel to it. I shall therefore take time to elucidate her concepts. I 
shall only be dealing in depth with three concepts key to her ethic of care – 
“engrossment”, “reciprocity” and “joy”. In particular, I shall discuss 
Noddings’ account of “motivational displacement” involved in caring as 
engrossment. I will discuss the advantages of Noddings’ account – and also 
the disadvantages - and I will sketch Harry Frankfurt’s (similarly 
phenomenological) account of caring as an alternative to the notion of 
displacement.  
Ontological caring 
Noddings’ gives her central question - “how to meet the other morally?” - an 
ontological reply, in other words, a reply in terms of the essential and 
definitional characteristics of human beings. Noddings argues that the 
mother-child relation is basic to human beings, so much so that this relation - 
and only this relation – is definitive for the normativity of other relations. 
“Meeting the other morally” can only be done well if it is done so within the 
bounds of the essential goodness of the mother-child relation. Ethical caring, 
she says, arises out of “natural caring”, in particular from the “natural bond” 
between mother and child; and this ideal caring relation is  
(…) that condition toward which we long and strive, and it is 
our longing for caring - to be in that special relation - that 
provides the motivation for us to be moral. We want to be 
moral in order to remain in the caring relation and to enhance 
the ideal of ourselves as one-caring. (Noddings 1984, 5) 
This short quotation contains, in a nutshell I argue, four aspects of Noddings’ 
care ethics: first, the general human element – we all “long and strive” 
towards the mother-child relation. Second, this relation is “special” because it 
is basic and good and definitional for human beings. Third, on this basis we 
are driven to be moral – this relation creates in us the preparedness to strive 
toward goodness. And fourth, we all desire to return to or repeat, in some 
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way, this special relation: we want ideally either to be cared-for or to care. 
These are the most important suppositions of Noddings’ distinctive care 
ethics and, through-out this chapter, I shall tease out their implications for 
how to understand what Noddings’ caring involves. 
Importantly, according to Noddings, “an ethic of caring locates morality 
primarily in the pre-act consciousness” of the person caring.3 Thus 
experience of, and longing for, a caring relationship is condition general to all 
humans - which it must be, she argues, in order to avoid relativism. She 
expresses it as follows: “the caring attitude is universally accessible”,4 in 
other words, everyone has, or has had, access to one or more caring 
relationships and we all know, “pre-act consciously” what this relationship 
entails. However, she insists that this is not a command to care but a human 
capacity to do so. 
This ethical ideal guides us when we attempt to form a relationship with 
another person – what Noddings calls “meeting the other morally”.5 Our 
attitude towards the other is an integral part of “the quest for personal 
goodness”.6 This quest must be in reference to other people: my goodness, 
she stipulates, is partly a function of how the other receives me and responds 
to me. This is what being “moral” means – working to achieve goodness – 
and is, if I understand Noddings correctly, a pre-condition for being able to 
take part in a caring relation. The other ought to be met, not provisionally or 
nominally, but with her three caring concepts of ‘engrossment’, ‘reciprocity’ 
and ‘joy’. Being caring, for Noddings, is what it is to be human. 
Terminology  
Noddings’ ontology has two traceable origins, namely developmental 
psychology (including the authors Carol Gilligan and Lawrence Kohlberg, 
and others) and existentialism. However, her version of existentialism is her 
own.7 An important difference between an ethic of caring and other ethics 
                                                          
3
 Noddings 1984, 28. 
4
 Op cit, 5. 
5
 Op cit, 4 ff 
6
 Op cit, 6. 
7
 What precisely the defining characteristics of an existentialist approach are will not 
be gone into here. Suffice it to say that a distinctive phenomenological position, an 
emphasis on consciousness, and a defining ontology characterise 'the' existentialists. 
One of the problems is that existentialism varies considerably from author to author, 
whether one is reading Martin Heidegger, or Søren Kierkegaard, or Jean-Paul Sartre, 
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that focus on subjectivity is ethic of caring’s foundation in relation, she 
argues. This relationalism and especially the form she gives it, characterises 
Noddings’ particular brand of existentialism. The philosopher, she says 
(presumably Sartre), who begins with a supremely free consciousness - an 
aloneness and emptiness at the heart of existence - identifies anguish as the 
basic human effect. Noddings, on the contrary, identifies joy as a basic 
human effect. Thus what we have here is a modified existentialist ethics: a 
large part of the anguish that existentialist philosophers associate with our 
apprehension of freedom springs from our awareness of obligation and the 
endless claims that can be, and will be, made upon us. Noddings transforms 
this dread for freedom-versus-obligations into joy in the impulse to care for 
others and therefore a willing acceptance of these claims.  
Noddings distinguishes her definition of care from that in dictionaries. 
According to her, dictionaries define care in terms of a “state of mental 
suffering or of engrossment”; ‘to care’ is to be in a burdened mental state, 
one of anxiety, fear, or solicitude about something or someone.8 
Alternatively, she argues, one cares for something or someone if one has a 
regard for or inclination toward that something or someone. Noddings offers 
another definition (based on Milton Mayeroff, On Caring, 1971): “To care 
for another person, in the most significant sense, is to help him grow and 
actualise himself”.9 Thus, for Noddings, caring is primarily a nurturing 
involvement rather than a state of anxiety. This nurturing definition of ‘care’ 
is utilised - more or less consistently - by care ethicists after Noddings. 
Noddings uses the phrase “apprehending another’s reality” throughout her 
book and means “taking on the other’s reality as possibility and begin to feel 
its reality and to feel that you must act accordingly”.10 In other words, says 
Noddings, apprehension of another’s reality is in effect “feeling impelled to 
act as though on my own behalf, but on behalf of the other” (this may sound 
                                                                                                                             
or Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Noddings leans heavily on Sartre, in particular on his 
essay "The Emotions: Outline of a Theory," in Essays in Existentialism, written in 
1939, contemporaneous with Nausea. She also refers to Kierkegaard, especially 
Either/Or and Fear and Trembling, and to the Judaic scholar and philosopher Martin 
Buber (I and Thou, translated from German by Walter Kaufmann, 1970), and the 
theologian Paul Tillich (The Courage to Be, 1952). 
8
 This is in fact only one of the meanings of 'care'. The English Oxford Dictionary 
(1993) also gives three other meanings: 1. serious attention, heed; caution, pain; 
regard, inclination; 2. charge, protective oversight, guardianship; and 3. an object or 
matter of concern; a thing to be done or seen to. 
9
 Noddings 1984, 9. 
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a little confusing. I will try to paraphrase: ‘I feel as if I am acting for myself 
but it is not my action; it is that of another’). Thus ‘possibility’, in the phrase 
“taking on another’s possibility’, has a very specific meaning. It refers to a 
form of compulsion, being ‘impelled’ to comprehend the other’s reality 
(situation, position, dilemma or standpoint). What is significant here is not 
only the notion that one can apprehend someone’s reality, but that this 
apprehension has an immediate effect - you feel you must act according to 
the reality of the other. In this sense the reality of the other is a possibility – it 
is an additional or alternative reality for the perceiver. Noddings derives this 
concept of “apprehension” from Kierkegaard who originally used the word 
“possibility” in the sense of apprehending another’s reality as possibility.11  
What happens once you have “apprehended the other’s reality”? This other 
perception has an effect upon you: just as your own reality (your situation, 
your sense perception) affects you. Once the reality of the other has been 
admitted into your consciousness, you cannot ignore it just as you cannot 
ignore your own reality (at least, it cannot be done unless at some expense 
either in terms of repressing or in some way containing this apprehension). 
This apprehension is by no means a given. It requires effort. Noddings refers 
to it as a “struggle” and its goal is to “eliminate the intolerable, reduce the 
pain, fill the need, and actualise the dream.”12 All of this is what Noddings 
implies when she uses “caring”. Encapsulated in the notion of apprehension 
is the drive to care for the other – and apprehension inevitably leads to the 
desire to intervene in another’s life (just as one would act in one’s own life).  
A last point on terminology: when Noddings refers to the person caring, she 
calls them “one-caring” who is “universally feminine”, “she”. The person 
who is cared for is the “cared-for” (“masculine”, “he”).13 In creating her own 
terminology, Noddings thus - like other existentialist philosophers, especially 
Heidegger - sets up a system of neologisms. The advantage of so doing is that 
                                                                                                                             
10
 Noddings 1984, 16. 
11
 Kierkegard Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David F. Swenson 
and Walter Lowrie 1941, cited in Noddings 1984, 14. Apprehending in this way is to 
be touched, to have aroused in me something that will disturb my own ethical reality: 
instead of only my own perception of my reality, I must see the other's reality as a 
possibility for myself. 
12
 Noddings op cit, p 14. 
13
 As a result of Noddings’ choice of normative gender specifications - the one caring 
is a ‘she’ and the one cared for is a ‘he’ - I find myself in somewhat of a dilemma. 
Usually I refer to the agent as a she, as is the trend in much contemporary ethical 
writing, but that alternative has been corrupted by Noddings’ usage. Ironically I find 
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it draws our attention to Noddings’ very distinct way of thinking and talking 
about caring ethically. The disadvantage is that it creates a hyperbolic 
language that resonates ritualistically rather than adds to the discussion of 
what is, to my mind, an important yet commonplace human activity. 
Nevertheless, because Noddings’ contribution to care ethics is important and 
influential, it is worth our while to pay these neologisms some attention. 
Three key concepts  
Three key concepts in Noddings’ account of caring are “engrossment”, “joy” 
and “reciprocity”. These concepts characterise her version of an existentialist 
ethics of care and address what she perceives as problems in such an ethics.  
Noddings uses “engrossment” to provide solutions to two problems: that of 
the movement away from the self which apparently characterises caring; and 
that of commitment to, and sustaining of, a caring relationship. The first 
problem, that of caring resulting in a denial of, or distancing from, the self, 
Noddings solves as follows. She argues that caring is so basic to humanity 
that whatever roles I assume in life, I may be described in constant terms as 
one-caring. My first and unending obligation is to meet the other as one-
caring. Formal restraints may be added to the fundamental requirement, but 
they do not replace or weaken it, she says.14  
Thus caring, in this account, does not lead to a diminution of self; it is self. 
This is because caring is so basic to the self that the one cannot be thought of 
without the other. “Engrossment” gives expression to this form of being in 
the sense that by caring, the boundaries between the self and other are 
dissolved (the other’s “reality” becomes your own). Her description of what 
happens is derived from Buber who describes “engrossment” in caring as 
follows:  
He is no longer a He or a She, limited by other He’s and She’s, 
a dot in the world grid of space and time, not a condition that 
can be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named 
qualities. Neighbourless and seamless, he is Thou and fills the 
firmament.” (Buber, 1970 quoted in Noddings, 1984, 74)  
Noddings describes ‘engrossment’ as “a total conveyance of self to other, a 
continual transformation of individual to duality to new individual to new 
                                                                                                                             
myself having to now switch to the out-dated ‘he’. 
14
 Noddings 1984, 17. 
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duality”.15 The only limitation in caring that she is prepared to accept is that 
of caring for those beyond her comprehension: unknown others.16 Universal 
caring is impossible to actualise, she argues, and leads us to abstract problem-
solving and mere talk instead of genuine caring.17 Thus Noddings’ concept of 
caring is relevant only for people who are both proximate in both space and 
acquaintance. 
Noddings uses “engrossment” to solve the potential problem of sustaining 
caring relationships over time and in varying intensity: in other words, 
problems of temporality and of commitment. Caring relationships must often 
be sustained over a period of time and they have a “requirement of 
engrossment” in order to be good relationships, according to Noddings. How 
can the caring relationship be sustained under varying pressure and over 
time? As far as temporality is concerned, Noddings argues that engrossment 
is not always equally active. It can also be latent for long periods, she says: 
“it endures, but only in the alternation of actuality and latency”.18 As far as 
the issue of commitment is concerned, Noddings argues that the cared-for 
seeks for something that tells him that the one-carer has regard for him, that 
he is not being treated perfunctorily. This attitude can be described as 
“disposability, the readiness to bestow and spend oneself and make oneself 
available, and its contrary, indisposability”.19 In the terminology of 
Noddings, one who is disposable recognises that he has a self to invest, to 
give. He is present to the cared-for. Whereas indisposability closes the cared-
for off from the one-caring: “When I am with someone who is indisposable, I 
am conscious of being with someone for whom I do not exist; I am thrown 
back on myself”.20  
Being indisposable is the state of not being available for the cared-for. This is 
not merely a lack of disposability: it also has negative consequences for the 
one-caring. Noddings says that we hear the “I ought” - direct and primitive – 
and is ignored at the cost of suffering guilt. Why? Because of what I ought to 
respond to, I will feel even if I ignore or reject it. Furthermore, even if I do 
                                                          
15
 Noddings 1984, 61. 
16
 Op cit, 86. 
17
 Op cit, 28 - 9. 
18
 This is what Buber says of love, cited in Noddings op cit, 17. 
19
 This term is taken from the Christian existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel, 
translated from the French disponibilité. In H.J. Blackham, Six Existential Thinkers, 
1959, cited by Noddings op cit, 19. Note that “disposability” is used in the sense of 
being free and available. 
20
 Marcel cited in op cit, 19. 
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make myself disposable - in genuine response to the other and to the internal 
“I ought” – it may go awry, bringing pain to the cared-for and guilt to me.21 
Caring is thus not without risk. 
Thus “engrossment” is an all-encompassing involvement in the other, an 
overwhelming empathy, regard and desire for the other’s well being. In this 
sense Noddings argues that sustaining or committing oneself to caring is not 
problematic because (1) caring is indistinguishably basic to human beings 
and (2) involves dissolution of the boundaries of the self. In other words, 
Noddings describes caring as necessary (in the sense of being essential to 
human beings) and direct (in the sense of being able to access the reality of 
the other). These are broad and interesting claims – in particular in the light 
of my quest in this chapter to describe ‘compelling’ care. 
The second key concept is “joy”. According to Noddings, joy is our “basic 
reality and affect”: it frequently accompanies a realisation of our relatedness. 
It is the special affect that arises out of the receptivity of caring, and it 
represents a major reward for the one-caring. The experience of joy-in-
relatedness encourages growth of the ethical ideal. Joy is an “affect” or 
“feeling” rather than an emotion in Noddings’ vocabulary. She distinguishes 
between reflective and non-reflective modes of consciousness; “joy” is 
reflective and emotion, non-reflective. Joy is an awareness of ourselves 
feeling, and is therefore reflective. Noddings regards emotion as being non-
reflective because it is a mode in which we meet objects directly and are 
apparently unaware of ourselves as conscious beings. It is the relation, or our 
recognition of the relation, that induces the affect she calls “joy”.22  
“Joy” is Noddings’ substitute for the existentialist concept of anguish. 
Existentialist philosophers, in Noddings’ account, often speak of anguish as a 
basic affect in relation to an object. For Jean-Paul Sartre, ontology posits a 
lonely emptiness trying to actualise itself, a consciousness forever subject to 
some object. Anguish is the inevitable accompaniment to our realisation of 
our aloneness - of our essential freedom to choose our world and ourselves. 
Noddings’ view of basic reality is the direct opposite of this view: it is a view 
of relatedness rather than aloneness. If relatedness rather than aloneness is 
our fundamental reality, and not just a hopelessly longed-for state, then 
recognition or fulfilment of that relatedness might well induce joy. 
Recognition of our obligation in relation arouses anguish, says Noddings, but 
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 Noddings 1984, 40. 
22
 Op cit, 132. 
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recognition of the actual or possible caring in relation produces joy. Joy then 
- at least one form of joy - must be reflective; that is, it necessarily involves 
consciousness looking at itself. Joy is different from anger, fear, and shame 
in that it flows from that caring relation between the one-caring and the 
cared-for in general. It has thus no direct object. It is also not a “basic 
emotion” in that it is essentially reflexive, according to Noddings.23  
What is its place in the realm of care ethics? Noddings argues that joy - as 
ordinarily experienced, not at the level of religious ecstasy - is empirically 
linked with altruism, and it tends to increase appreciation and social 
responsiveness. It sustains the one-caring. (But it is not necessarily linked to 
the ethical good.) Receptive joy is important to caring: a willing 
transformation of self under the “compelling magic” of other “subjectivities” 
points to a receptive consciousness, one that is energised by engagement and 
“enlightened by looking and listening”.24 Noddings’ version of joy might not 
be - as she says - experienced religiously, nevertheless it is the means by 
which the individual can participate in a larger, or greater ‘whole’ – “the 
joy”, or “absolute joy”. Noddings speaks of “the sense of connectedness”, of 
“harmony” which is the combination of excitement and serenity, and the 
sense of “being in tune” with other subjectivities. 
“Reciprocity”, Noddings’ third concept, is the ideal role for the cared-for in 
the caring relation. By responding to caring in an equally open-minded and 
spontaneous fashion as the one-caring, the cared-for completes the gesture 
made to him and regenerates the caring impulse. Thus caring and reciprocity, 
according to Noddings, ideally succeed and generate each other. The cared-
for responds to the presence of the one-caring. He feels the difference 
between being received and being held off or ignored (the “indisposability”, 
in the words of Noddings, of the one-caring). Whatever the one-caring 
actually does is enhanced or diminished, made meaningful or meaningless, in 
the response of the cared-for. Something, not necessarily identical to 
engrossment as one-caring, is required of the cared-for.  
The key, according to Noddings, lies in Buber’s “experience”. When we 
experience something, we have already made that which we experience into 
an object or thing. Thus the cared-for need not hear my ‘Thou’ (meaning the 
cared-for) in his experience; that is, he need not acknowledge it 
propositionally. But he must respond to it. (Again, Noddings touches on the 
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 Noddings 1984, 138. 
24
 Op cit, 144. 
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compulsive aspect of her definition of caring.) The freedom, creativity and 
spontaneous disclosure of the cared-for that manifest themselves under the 
nurture of the one-caring complete the relation. Reciprocity contributes to the 
maintenance of the relation and serves to prevent the caring from “turning 
back on the one-caring in the form of anguish and concern for self”.25  
These three concepts, “engrossment”, “joy” and “reciprocity”, reflect the 
heart of Noddings’ ontological approach to care ethics. All three reflect the 
manner in which Noddings perceived caring to be a compelling activity: 
“engrossment” because it is a basic human necessity to perceive the reality of 
the other as directly as possible; “joy” because this is what caring evokes, 
both for the one-caring and the cared-for; and “reciprocity” because it is part 
of the compulsive response of the cared-for to the one-caring. With this 
terminology Noddings aims to solve the problems of the (bounded) self, the 
issue of temporality, the anguish of the realisation of our aloneness and the 
asymmetry of caring relations. Caring, in her vision exemplorised in the 
mother-child relation, is a basic human activity that constitutes the 
normativity of all human relations – it is the source of goodness, the standard 
by means of which other relations must be measured. It is at the same time 
the origin of goodness and also the ideal towards which we strive. While, no 
doubt, an ontological account of caring must qualify as a most compelling 
account of why we should care – it is indeed empirically impossible to refute 
that caring is essential to human beings – there are certain distinct 
disadvantages to Noddings’ ontological ethics. 
Normative vacuity  
Certain critical points merit mentioning in relation to Noddings’ account of 
caring. Quite apart from the question whether or not this type of care ethics 
will appeal to a broad philosophical audience, with its holistic emphasis on 
joy and harmony and limitless engrossment in the proximate other, there are 
several critical points that I wish to mention.  
Firstly, there is the problem of the falsification of Noddings’ more general 
claims. Noddings, for example, argues that the mother-child relation is basic 
to all relationality and argues that our ability to act caringly is in memory of 
this mother-child experience. Noddings quotes the nineteenth-century 
philosopher Friederich Nietzsche as confirmation of her position:  
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There is something so ambiguous and suggestive about the 
word love, something that speaks to memory and to hope, that 
even the lowest intelligence and the coldest heart still feel 
something of the glimmer of this word. The cleverest woman 
and the most vulgar man recall the relatively least selfish 
moments of their whole life, even if Eros has taken only a low 
flight with them. (“Mixed Opinions and Maxims”, in The 
Portable Nietzsche, Kaufmann (ed.), 1954, quoted in Noddings 
1984, 79).  
Noddings’ admixture of metaphysical, existentialist philosophy and 
developmental psychology makes it difficult to separate empirical statements 
from her descriptions of ideal caring relationships. This “glimmer” that 
Nietzsche speaks of is far removed from the emotionally fulfilling, mother-
child relation that Noddings wishes to base her ethics on. Ironically, the proof 
that Noddings needs in order to argue for the centrality of the mother (or 
rather nurturer)-child relation is found in the branch of developmental 
psychology that studies dysfunctional relations. Adults who are incapable of 
sustaining good caring relations have very often experienced poor caring 
relations as young children. Noddings’ claim that the nurturer-child relation 
is key to our being able to have relations is therefore correct but, if she 
wishes to make an appeal to the empirical sciences in order to do so, she can 
only find evidence to support a limited claim: only those children lucky 
enough to have a good, caring relation with their nurturers might develop into 
adults capable of good, caring relations. Noddings’ claim that the mother-
child relation is good in fact an ontological claim: it a claim about the nature 
of being rather than a statement about what kind of relationship the mother-
child relation should be. It is ‘factual’ and not normative. 
Secondly, there is the issue of essentialism. Women, argues Noddings, give 
reasons for their acts that point to feelings, needs, situational conditions and 
their sense of personal ideal rather than universal principles and their 
application. Women prefer to discuss moral problems in terms of concrete 
situations. Women’s deeper understanding of feelings and needs is due to the 
social role that they have played. Noddings cites Carol Gilligan, who argues 
that  
. . . women not only define themselves in a context of human 
relationship but also judge themselves in terms of their ability 
to care. Women’s place in man’s life cycle has been that of 
nurturer, caretaker, and helpmate, the weaver of those networks 
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of relationships on which she in turn relies. (“Woman’s Place 
in Man’s Life Cycle”, Harvard Educational Review 49, 1979, 
cited in Noddings 1984, 96).  
Noddings posits furthermore that there is reason to believe that women are 
somewhat better equipped for caring than men are. This is because the most 
intimate situations of caring are ‘natural’, not ‘moral’ (by which she means 
judgements governed by universal principles). She gives psychological 
reasons as explanation: girls can identify with the one caring for her and thus 
maintain this relation while establishing identity. A boy must find his identity 
with the absent one - the father - and thus disengage himself from the 
intimate relation of caring.26  
I must confess that I have great difficulty accepting this type of, what I regard 
as, essentialistic argumentation. I find it most unsatisfying as well as 
inherently untrue. If women have been cast into the role of nurturers because 
of their biological role and enforced by cultural factors, then this does not 
mean that this either an ideal situation or an unchangeable, ontological fact. 
Supposing that women are better nurturers, then why is it necessary to have 
an ethic of caring? We could, for example, pose the question which Annette 
Baier poses in her Moral Prejudices (1994, paraphrased): if women are 
already inherently moral, why do they need to be made more so? And why 
should so much time and effort be spent trying to persuade men that they 
should be more caring if they are naturally bad at it? In all fairness to 
Noddings, it must be said that her book is intended as a treatise on moral 
education (albeit that the subtitle of her book is A Feminine Approach to 
Ethics and Moral Education): it is her intention to educate men and women 
who do not do caring, or do it badly, to learn to be caring.  
It might seem, thirdly, that Noddings is arguing from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ – 
women are better equipped to be carers (biology, psychology, history) and 
therefore they should be the better carers. Noddings does however anticipate 
this critique: she distinguishes between “ethical caring” - reflective or 
secondary considerations about caring - and “natural caring” - actual 
examples of caring as in the mother-child relation. Noddings argues that 
recognising that ethical caring requires an effort that is not needed in natural 
caring does not commit us to a position that elevates ethical caring over 
natural caring. An ethic built on caring strives to maintain the caring attitude 
and is thus dependent upon, and not superior to, natural caring. The source of 
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ethical behaviour is, then, lies within twin sentiments - one that feels directly 
for the other and one that feels for and with that best self, who may accept 
and sustain the initial feeling rather than reject it. Thus, according to 
Noddings, both ‘is’ and ‘ought’ are distinct and equally necessary for making 
judgements in caring.  
Fourthly, and this has to do with Noddings’ ontological approach to care 
ethics, I find myself increasingly irritated by Noddings’ lack of explicit 
normativity in her ethics of care. The terms that she uses to describe the 
affect of caring – ‘joy’, ‘engrossment’, ‘harmony’ and ‘reciprocity’ - are 
strikingly non-normative (or are given a non-normative content like 
‘intensity’). Noddings never claims to want to establish normative boundaries 
for good caring. Her reliance on existentialist literature can probably provide 
the key to her lack of normative commitment. Existentialist ethics is often 
regarded as being a ‘non-naturalistic’ type of moral philosophy because it is 
in principle uninterested in the contents of life, in utility, human nature or 
evolution, in God, or in any other a priori hall-marked moral authority. 
However existentialism is significantly naturalistic in that it fundamentally 
rejects the concept of diversified intrinsic qualities of good and evil, right and 
wrong, obligatory and forbidden as apprehended in moral experience. 
Furthermore, it reduces the moral problem of the human race entirely to the 
theme of its being genuinely ‘existent’; thus reducing ought, not to what ‘is 
good’, but to Is.27 The value-experience underlying twentieth-century 
existentialism is unmistakably aesthetical, argues the philosopher Aurel 
Kolnai, rather than moral. Existentialism is not moral because “it tends to 
value intensity at the cost of direction, and the presence of man’s ‘full 
personality’ is in his action rather than in the goodness of its describable 
objective features”.28 
Without going further into Kolnai’s objections to existentialism, the point I 
wish to make is that Noddings (mostly) shares this lack of normativity with 
the existentialists of whom she is so fond. However there is an ambiguity in 
her text: there is no doubt that Noddings regards caring as a superior and 
worthy form of ethical behaviour yet she sticks to the tendency to describe it 
as the existentialists describe ‘existence’: as an intensity, without direction. 
Noddings’ caring – that which she argues to be basic to all ethical behaviour 
– consists of apprehension and engrossment. Joy flows out of the caring 
experience and reciprocity in caring. The more intense these three 
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experiences are, the better the caring is, argues Noddings. Noddings’ caring 
is a curious admixture of, on the one hand, normatively empty intensity, and 
on the other, a caring relation that is the source of all goodness. But this 
‘goodness’ is not a normative quality; it is an ontological given – essential to 
human relations. 
I have laid some serious charges at Noddings’ door: especially that of 
essentialism and normative vacuity. I am prepared to accept that her 
ontological grounds lead Noddings to a degree of essentialism – after all, she 
is pursuing what she believes to be basic truths about human beings. This, in 
turn, leads her to make strong statements about the nature of the existence of 
humans, statements that run the risk of being both essentialistic and non-
empirical, I find. The charge of normative vacuity is somewhat more serious. 
Noddings only addresses the question whether caring is basic and she barely 
designates where caring ends (and self-caring begins). She does so only at a 
few points in her book: in her discussion of non-disposability for example, 
and her mentioning that the strain on one who would care can be great (page 
47), further borne out by a discussion of what she calls the “toughness of 
care” (page 98 ff.), Noddings does touch on the fragility of human beings and 
the enormity of the task of caring. However, the overwhelming message of 
her book is that caring must be done in terms of “displacement” (which is the 
“total conveyance of self to other”), an adoption of the reality of the other 
with no holds barred; a process in which the individual (the one-caring) 
becomes a “duality”. I dub this approach in which the one-caring can 
apparently experience the same reality as ‘vicarious’.29  
Vicarious caring meets volitional necessity  
A vicarious approach to caring appears to have distinct advantages: the self 
melds into the other, regards the other’s reality as its own and responds to the 
pain, or the discomfort, or requirements, as it would to its own. Caring for 
another becomes as direct and as uncomplicated as caring for oneself (can 
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be). It solves the nefarious epistemological problem of perceiving someone 
else’s pain and reduces the problem to a first-person phenomenological 
experience. It also goes some of the way in explaining why the predicament 
of another might motivate us to caring deeds – if we care as much about their 
well-being as we do our own, then we will be motivated (hence Noddings’ 
term “motivational displacement” to describe this ‘melding’ of self and 
other).  
The disadvantages though, are legion. Is it feasible? What happens to the self 
with its baggage of interests and desires when you ‘convey ‘yourself to the 
other? Where does it go? When do you get it back? What happens when you 
don’t want to ‘convey’? (Not to mention the normative question that 
Noddings does not pose: why should you?) Perhaps these concerns are 
exaggerated: after all, there are many people who do caring and they do not 
walk around as if devoid of selves. But what worries me is the following: 
Noddings is very clear that ‘engrossment’ involves not merely experiencing 
what the other experiences but having the same reality as the other. This 
means that the reality is directly felt as if it were your own. My question is 
then: can you still be caring if you feel the reality of the other to the same 
extent that they feel it? Are there extra moral intuitions that the one-caring 
has that the cared-for does not and do these intuitions supersede the reality of 
the cared-for so that the one-caring can be caring while at the same time not 
be overwhelmed by the reality of the other? Noddings does not provide an 
answer to this; she does not see it as an issue. 
The alternatives to Noddings’ ‘engrossment’ are altruism and empathy. I can 
certainly make an empathetic effort to understand what the other is 
experiencing, and on those grounds imagine what the other is going through, 
but this does not mean that my mental and emotional baggage disappears. I 
can temporarily suspend my own interests when considering those of another, 
and if they are similar or identical then there is a match. But if my interests 
should clash with the other’s then I shall only be made more acutely aware of 
my own preferences. If my motives are altruistic then I shall be concerned 
for the welfare of others - from my own viewpoint. Empathy and altruism are 
mental actions performed by a self-aware (or self-conscious) person: there is 
no conveyance of the self as there is in Noddings’ vicarious approach.  
Where do the limits lie in ‘apprehending the other’s reality’? There are many 
realities which I would not wish to or could not apprehend to the extent that 
they too became my reality. I have no desire to feel another’s anguish and I 
am unlikely ever to share the collector’s paroxysms of joy over stamps or 
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bottle tops or matchboxes. Noddings does not impose any limitations on this 
‘apprehension’. She does however speak of the anticipation of hardship when 
an unknown other (in contrast to a proximate other) makes a claim on her: 
she does not know what the extent of the claim is or what the cost to herself 
will be. In this respect I believe she is entirely right: the claim to care made 
by something (one of her examples is a stray cat) or someone (the stranger) is 
initially unbounded in the sense that it is unknown or unfamiliar. However, 
the next step should be: what can I do? What am I prepared to do? What 
should I do? The idea of positing an unbounded preparedness to care – as 
Noddings does - in reply to an alien claim is unnerving! 
I wish to offer here an alternative to the vicarious account of caring while 
retaining the strength of Noddings’ account of the phenomenological 
experience of the other. The American philosopher of action and moral 
psychology, Harry Frankfurt,30 has developed an account of “volitional 
necessity”. Presupposed in this account is a self that has agency and is self-
conscious. What Frankfurt does is to offer us an explanation of what it is for 
this agent to have that peculiar concern for the well-being and existence of 
something or some one – namely, what it is for him to care. 
An important concept in Frankfurt’s theory is the concept of “second-order 
desires”.31 In this theory Frankfurt defends a so-called hierarchical model of 
independence, a model in which expressions of will, or desires, or wants, 
occupy different levels. We are motivated by effective first-order desires - 
which often (but not always) involve the satisfaction of primary needs and 
short-term desires for food, stimulants, chocolate, comfort and the like – 
which are then supported or confirmed by second-order desires. Wanting to 
have a particular desire is a second-order desire. Restraining my desire, or 
controlling myself, is also the exercise of second-order desires. The capacity 
for reflective self-evaluation is manifested in the formation of second-order 
desires, argues Frankfurt. Persons who respond only to first-order desires and 
have no or undeveloped second-order desires are “wantons”. All adults can at 
some stage or other behave wantonly but a committed wanton is someone in 
the grip of their first-order desires only - namely an addict (whether they are 
willingly addicts or not). But what does this all have to do with caring? 
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Frankfurt starts his account of the importance of what we care about with the 
statement: “Caring, insofar as it consists in guiding oneself along a distinct 
course or in a particular manner, presupposes agency and self-
consciousness.”32 Caring is reflexive because a person who cares about 
something identifies themselves with what they care about. This they do by 
making themselves “vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits 
depending upon whether what (they) care about is diminished or enhanced.”33 
In this sense, by caring about something, the agent is connected to that thing 
– he shares its fate, as it were.  
Caring about something, according to Frankfurt, is not the same as liking or 
wanting it (because it is possible to care for something that you might never 
have); nor is it necessarily intrinsically valuable or desirable (what you care 
for might be low on my list of things I care about). Caring, according to 
Frankfurt, is specifically prospective: to care about something is to consider it 
having a future. Caring is not only identification with the thing cared for, but 
also identification in the sense of an investment (to invest something with 
importance, or significance, or meaning). 
These aspects of caring as reflexive and prospective are important. But that 
which is most significantly distinct about Frankfurt’s analysis, to my mind, is 
his emphasis of the fact that what a person cares about is not generally under 
their (immediate) control. Luther’s declaration “Here I stand; I can do no 
other” is an example of what Frankfurt refers to as the “necessity” of caring: 
caring so much for something that you cannot forbear from a certain course 
of action.34 This is neither causal nor logical necessity: what Luther was 
unable to exercise was not the power to forbear, but the will. This necessity is 
moral. 
Frankfurt refers to this kind of constraint as “volitional necessity” – a type of 
necessity that renders it impossible for a person to act in any other way other 
than he acts; it renders it impossible by preventing him from making use of 
his own capacities. Luther might have prevented himself from taking the 
action he took. But he could not bring himself to do so. He was unwilling to 
oppose it and, furthermore, his unwillingness was itself something that he 
was unwilling to alter. To put this into caring terms: Luther cared about 
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caring about whatever it was that made him take a stand – he was 
constrained/motivated by his own higher-order desires. 
Frankfurt asserts that the reason a person does not experience the force of 
volitional necessity as alien or external to himself is because it coincides with 
– and is partly constituted by – desires which are not only his own but with 
which he actively identifies himself. This is why Frankfurt, right from the 
start, insists that caring presupposes agency and self-consciousness. 
Necessity is thus to a certain extent chosen, or allowed, or even self-imposed 
- and to a certain extent imposed or maintained involuntarily. The latter must 
be the case otherwise we could not explain why the agent cannot prevent 
himself from caring merely at will. Caring is not a matter of willing, or at 
least, not only a matter of will. What is it then? 
The answer is that the person caring is “captivated” by the object of care. 
“(His) attention is not merely concentrated upon the object; it is somehow 
fixed or seized by the object.”35 Frankfurt analyses “seized” in terms of being 
guided by the characteristics of the cared-for object rather than the agent’s 
own; he succumbs to, what I call, the ‘normative pull’ of the other. The 
normative pull is effective because of the agent’s feelings for the other and he 
voluntarily concedes to this pull because he wants to (because he regards the 
other as important for himself). He has the right concerns or love that link 
him to the object of care. Or he concedes to the pull because he doesn’t not 
want to. Thus to care for something is also to be (willingly or not 
unwillingly) “captivated”, “seized” or “pulled”. It is not inactive in the sense 
that caring is mere submission – there is a distinctly volitional aspect to 
caring in terms of being an investment or a prospective interest. How does 
this relate to the necessity part of caring?  
‘Volition’ usually means consciously wishing or willing something, whereas 
‘necessity’ implies being under (considerable) constraint to do something. 
Frankfurt’s “volitional necessity” model of caring about something, or 
feeling that something is important, expresses precisely this tension between 
willing and being constrained: a person who is constrained by volitional 
necessity, says Frankfurt, accedes to (the constraining force) because he is 
unwilling to oppose it and because, furthermore, his unwillingness is itself 
something which he is unwilling to alter.36 The most resonant aspect of 
Frankfurt’s volitional necessity is the image of the agent in the grip of that for 
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which he cares. Caring about it because it is something that he, as a self-
conscious agent, finds worth caring about, yet seized by his commitment to 
that thing, its fate, its future successes or failures. Necessitated to care, yet 
done willingly.  
There is an inherent dynamic in Frankfurt’s account of being ‘seized’ by the 
cared-for object, a dynamic which is also prominently present in Noddings’ 
“engrossed” care. Noddings describes caring as something that does not 
happen entirely voluntarily. Although the one-caring must be prepared to 
care, or be “disposable”, once he has “apprehended the other’s reality as 
possibility” for himself, seeing this inevitably leads to the desire to intervene 
in another’s life. Apprehension can be willed but the compulsion to intervene 
and to care is not. This compellingness or involuntary character of caring in 
Noddings’ account is the factor that first alerted me to an interesting overlap 
between the, what might seem at first glance to be, different approaches of 
Frankfurt and Noddings.  
Another factor that they share is a deliberate avoidance of normativity in their 
accounts of caring - that nether accounts tell us when ‘the pull’ to care is 
justifiably present or absent.37 As far as Frankfurt is concerned, the object of 
caring has no inherent qualities whatsoever other than it is cared for by 
someone. “What makes the thing worth caring about is… that the 
justification of importance originates from the caring and not from the object 
of care.”38 Noddings, in her turn, chooses intensity above teleology or 
normativity in her account of the caring process. Neither of these authors 
have the pretension of providing us with a normative account. Noddings does 
however, unlike Frankfurt, hold the one-caring responsible for replying to the 
cared-for’s appeal and provides us with an account of the consequences of 
caring (reciprocity and joy).  
Conclusion  
Noddings’ ‘engrossment’ is enabled by perceiving what she calls the ‘reality’ 
of the cared-for. Once the one-caring has perceived the cared-for as 
possibility, the one-caring cannot but ‘struggle towards’ the cared-for’s 
reality, which is to attempt to understand the situation, pain, and desires of 
the other. This perception of the cared-for’s “reality” makes the one-caring 
want to “eliminate the intolerable, reduce the pain, fill the need”. And once 
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this perceptive step has occurred, it is not possible to deny this pain, or the 
need of the cared-for, because the one-caring feels an irresistible compulsion 
to eradicate the pain or fill the need.  
“Engrossment” is an all-consuming involvement, a total commitment, a 
concentrated absorption in the cared-for. It is a perception of the reality of the 
cared-for so that it becomes the once-caring’s own reality and he feels as 
compelled to alleviate pain or meet the needs of the cared-for as urgently as 
he would for himself. I have dubbed it “vicarious caring” because the 
emphasis is on having the same feelings as the cared-for. It is not imitation, 
or substitution, or empathy (the projection of one’s personality into, and so 
fully understanding, the object of contemplation). Imitation, substitution and 
empathy keep the desire-set of the one-caring intact. Engrossment is full-
blown absorption.  
But in order to become engrossed in the cared-for, the one-caring must first 
be disposable: the one-caring must be open to the apprehension of the cared-
for’s claim; the one-caring must be prepared to care, willing to “engross’ in 
the cared-for’s reality. Noddings even argues that one must always be 
susceptible to caring: “Whatever roles I assume in life, I may be described in 
constant terms of one-caring.”39 This is the willing part of caring. 
There is also a compelling or necessary part. Noddings argues that appeal for 
caring is irresistible: the one-caring must make himself “disposable” to the 
cared-for. How can these two things – the disposability or willingness to care 
and the compelling appeal to care - be combined? On the one hand caring is a 
volitional; on the other it is necessary. “Volitional necessity” has been coined 
by Frankfurt: caring for, he argues, is to be ‘captivated’ by something 
irrespective of your will and yet it is also something you do because you are 
willing to do so – to be caring is something that can only be done 
volitionally.  
How can something be both necessary and yet volitional? If something - say 
care - is indispensable, or required or even inevitable in human relationships, 
then how can that care also be something that is (voluntarily) willed? On the 
one hand, if the will expresses a logical set of desires, then necessity and will 
are compatible. But, because we can imagine that something is willed, then 
we can also imagine that is not willed, this means that the will, unlike logic, 
is not bound to the same inevitabilities. In other words, how can something 
be indispensable, inevitable or required and yet voluntary and contingent? 
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This is the tension that characterises the ontological approach to caring: the 
determinism of the necessary caring relationship in relation to the (potential) 
contingency of the will. 
There is much that I do not like about Nodding’s Caring, its essentialism and 
modified existentialism, it quasi-evangelical message about the holistic 
qualities of joy through caring. Her ethics of care is only suitable for what 
she calls “proximate others” and can be described as “personalist” or 
affective care ethics – it is an ethics that operates on the dynamic of one-to-
one connections or closeness (as is evident in her terminology: 
‘apprehension’, ‘engrossment’, ‘conveyance of the self’, ‘reciprocity’). This 
is not, I would argue, an ethics that will provide a good basis for a political or 
conceptual notion of caring; nor is it a suitable basis for a competent practice 
of caring - for the same reason. Noddings’ lack of concern with the 
boundaries of caring (she advocates ‘constant’ disposability and ‘total’ 
conveyance of the self) only adds to the impracticality of her ethics of care. 
But what Noddings does do, I believe, is to give us a very vivid 
phenomenological account of the irresistible forces at work in the context of 
a caring relationship. Her account of caring has been very influential and 
subsequent care ethical accounts are often related in some way or other to 
Noddings’ phenomenological account. She has addressed most of the major 
themes in the ethics of care: what the appeal for care by the cared-for does to 
the one-caring; how the one-caring should react to this appeal; who the one-
caring can care for; and what the reward is of caring for both one-caring and 
cared-for.  
The following chapter, Postmodernist Care Ethics, takes the theme of non-
normativity a step further. This is part of the attempt to formulate an ethics 
that is entirely free of fundamental assumptions and non-naturalist 
definitions. I shall introduce the important theme of particularism in this 
chapter, a theme typical of (most of) care ethics. The dynamics of motivation 
in this postmodernist care ethics are unlike anything yet discussed - there will 
be no talk of the compelling or necessary nature of care. What then motivates 
post-modernist care ethics? 
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CHAPTER TWO: POSTMODERN CARE ETHICS 
Introduction 
Any chapter on postmodern ethics should, according to radical 
postmodernists, consist of blank pages only. Ethics is one of the great, 
modern meta-narratives, to borrow a term from the post-modern philosopher 
pur sang, Jean-Fransçois Lyotard, and should, á la Lyotard, be treated with 
incredulity and deconstruction. However, less radical reviewers of 
postmodernism, like Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth,1 argue that postmodernism 
does not spell the end of meaning and value, still less the end of humanist 
meaning and value, only the end of certain hegemonies of ‘truth’, ‘nature’, 
and ‘reality’. 
Ethics is rejected because it supposedly employs the ‘view from nowhere’ – a 
view ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ individual views or perspectives - that prescribes 
how we should behave. This view does not exist, insist postmodernists. On 
the contrary, they argue, each perspective is unique and every situation in 
which this perspective takes place is a coincidental collation of 
contingencies. Furthermore, experience is fleeting and essentially subjective 
– how can we possibly speak then of shared normative values? In the words 
of Ermarth, “Postmodernism presents a new problematic of negotiation 
between finite systems of meaning and value where no transcendental 
reference is possible.”2 
If the meta-narrative of ethics may not exist, then how can a postmodern care 
ethics be possible? It could only be possible in the absence of “transcendental 
references” (like ‘good’ and ‘right’), and if it strove to achieve a finite 
perspective of normativity. This perspective is what Selma Sevenhuijsen, a 
Dutch moral and political theorist, attempts to describe in her postmodernist 
ethics of care. In her book, Citizenship and the Ethics of Care (1998), in 
which she develops her vision of the place of ethics of care in contemporary 
democratic theories and societies, Sevenhuijsen advocates shared values in a 
differentiated, relativised and particularised form instead of transcendental 
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references. Her shared values are based on a postmodern brand of humanism 
and form the basis of her notion of communitarianism.  
The question I shall be addressing in this chapter is what does postmodernism 
add to care ethics? To put it differently, why does modernist ethics not 
suffice according to postmodern care ethicists when it comes to giving an 
account of caring? I shall consider this question in the light of my quest for a 
clarification of motivation in care ethics.  
Postmodernism and care ethics 
Sevenhuijsen particularly emphasises the temporal (and temporary) aspect of 
solving ethical dilemmas. “Only attention to specificity and contextuality can 
keep us from expecting ethics to be a source of absolute normative truth”, she 
says.3 Sevenhuijsen is opposed to “foundationalism and the grand narrative of 
human progress”. She argues that, if we accept the postmodernist project, we 
should accept the fragmented, ambiguous and contingent nature of the human 
condition. She quotes Lyotard when he says that every attempt to describe a 
homogenous and unambiguous image of human nature contributes to the 
maintenance of an illusion. This illusion, at best, is counterproductive and at 
worst leads to a politics of uniformity and totalitarianism, which attempts to 
manage or eradicate every difference between individuals.4  
In this, Sevenhuijsen faithfully reproduces the central project of post-
modernism: in Lyotard’s famous words, the “incredulity towards meta-
narratives”. However, what does Sevenhuijsen replace modernist moral meta-
narratives with? This is, of course, the crucial question. She rejects 
obligation, a concept which is representative, according to her, of the most 
destructive of all modernist inventions, the atomistic, self-governed 
individual. Nevertheless, she emphatically asserts the need for normative 
idiom in feminist philosophy. How does this idiom work to produce the 
humanist and communitarian effects that Sevenhuijsen desires? What are her 
normative alternatives to obligation? 
But before we proceed, we need to understand in more detail that the 
combination of an ethics of care and postmodernism is by no means a self-
evident one. On the contrary, as Sevenhuijsen points out in her book, the idea 
of an ethics of care was all too often the target of attack by postmodernist 
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feminists. These feminists felt that care ethics only confirmed women in a 
traditional, one-sided identity. Care ethics was accused of bringing a general 
truth about women into the world, which could have a normative effect on 
their self-image and behaviour, and which, certainly in political contexts, 
could be counterproductive. In this, argues Sevenhuijsen, postmodern 
philosophy offered an important warning against the risks and pitfalls 
inherent in a feminist ethics of care. In other words, postmodernism warns 
that care ethics runs the danger of re-emphasising rather than eradicating 
stereotyped gender-associated roles and reactions in which ‘the’ woman is 
loving and compassionate and sympathetic and so on, and men and the 
masculine democratic ethos, on the whole, are not. And further, postmodern 
philosophy emphasises, says Sevenhuijsen, that women’s emotions need to 
be included in the male-dominated public sphere. 
The power of post-modernism, in Sevenhuijsen’s opinion, is that it provides a 
number of philosophical considerations and methods of interpretation which 
help to make the ethics of care productive for feminism. Postmodernism as a 
methodology, as Sevenhuijsen employs it, undercuts identities and 
essentialisms like ‘women are loving and compassionate’; it differentiates, 
fragmentises and disperses identity. It allows her, she argues, to concentrate 
on every individual context rather than having to think in terms of large-scale 
social structures or conventions. Her ethics is then rather interpretative or 
hermeneutic than systematic – she concentrates on the reading of the 
situation rather than on the plotting of its contours, she says.  
But what does she have to say about motivation? If every situation and every 
context is potentially unique, what does Sevenhuijsen have to say on the 
subject of what motivates us to act morally? Is there a human identity or ideal 
that transcends the uniqueness of every individual? Before I attempt to 
answer these questions, I shall first examine her reasons for rejecting what 
she refers to as the ‘liberal individualist’ concept of obligation. 
Objections to obligation 
Sevenhuijsen’s ethics of care develops out of a critique of modernist 
liberalism, in particular, out of a critique of liberal conceptions of individuals 
as atomised or detached “rights holders”. These individuals are separated 
from community and use ‘obligations’ to mitigate or counter the detachment 
that arises in a society of atomistic, self-governed individuals.5 Obligations 
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are thus derived from the rights of modern liberal individuals, concludes 
Sevenhuijsen.6 This has two important consequences. Firstly, obligations are 
conceived of as necessary connections between individuals or between 
communities and individuals only as a means to make good the isolating and 
estranging effect of individualism. And secondly, the law is thus the main 
guarantor of the existence of morality, rather than an individual or communal 
normative culture. Sevenhuijsen cites the post-modernist Zygmunt Bauman7 
who argues that “individual responsibility is then translated as the 
responsibility for following or breaching the socially endorsed, ethical legal 
rules”. In his analysis, modernity thrives on an “expropriation of the moral”, 
a process in which individuals are dispossessed of moral capacities. These 
capacities are transferred to the state and transformed into moral legislation. 
Modernity, argues Sevenhuijsen, is fuelled by a deep-seated mistrust of the 
moral capacities of its subjects and thus aims to legislate its moral truth 
claims by laying them down in moral imperatives. (Hence the continuing 
urge to derive legal obligations from notions of rights, argues Sevenhuijsen.) 
Modern morality, in this conception, is thus a quasi-legal measure of control, 
sanctions and penalties.  
Sevenhuijsen’s alternative is as far removed from liberalism’s atomised 
individualism as possible: she advocates an ethics of care, a post-modern 
ethics of care that is ontologically relational. Furthermore she demands an 
ethics in which “situated questions of responsibility and agency” are central, 
in which taking concrete situations and asking what is ‘the proper thing to 
do’ is the appropriate way of thinking about moral interactions.8 
Sevenhuijsen argues that ontology generates a far stronger compelling force 
to be caring (than an appeal to rights would) because, she argues, of our 
communitarian or relational human nature. She does not, however, go the 
same way as the ‘maternal thinkers’, like Ruddick and Noddings for 
example, inferring from the mother-child bond a necessarily relational human 
character. Sevenhuijsen is far more interested in the development of the 
subject – albeit in relation to others – into a “processional self”, something 
that is much more self-conscious and self-aware than the preconscious 
imprinting of a relation of dependence that the maternal thinkers argue 
happens. Sevenhuijsen’s ‘self’ is a conscious and aware self, capable of 
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friendship and intimacy and respect; a self that is contextualised but also 
distinct and distinguishable from that context.  
Sevenhuijsen is not in favour of an obligation, or duty, to care because she 
reads ‘obligation’ as being primarily a political relationship and she fears that 
a government could potentially inflict upon its citizens policies that might 
ultimately have negative results in the interests of an emancipation policy, for 
example. The idea of ‘caring obligation’ in reality remains within the bounds 
of contractual thinking, she argues, and is thus subject to its shortcomings, 
namely that there is such a thing as a pre-social self, that all communication 
is entered into as equals, and that the individual is separated from the 
community. Rights are not in themselves sufficient to create a moral 
community she argues. 
If ‘obligations’ represent only that which is pernicious and impinged on 
individuals from without, then what is Sevenhuijsen’s alternative to 
obligation? Sevenhuijsen wants to rephrase obligations in terms of 
responsibilities, she says, because obligations are inherently and historically 
connected to rights (universal, unchanging) whereas ‘responsibility’ is a 
flexible attitude towards diverse and dynamic situations. The central question 
in care ethics according to her is not “what am I obliged to do in general?” 
but “how must I deal with dependency and responsibility?” A government 
that favours the latter, she argues, will implement policy that creates 
preconditions for responsibility; a government that favours obligation will 
use its authority to compel and force responsibility.9 Sevenhuijsen rejects 
external pressures to enforce morality and embraces what she regards as an 
“internally produced normative reaction” absent of outside force, namely 
‘responsibility’.  
Many care ethicists, like Sevenhuijsen, reject the concept of obligation but 
embrace the notion of responsibility because, they argue, responsibility is a 
broader notion that does not have (as some moral theorists argue that 
‘obligation’ or ‘obligation’ do have) a narrowly described task that can be 
deduced from general norms. Indeed, as the moral philosopher Margaret 
Urban Walker argues, the concept ‘responsibility’ consists in “many facts, in 
the context of judgements, perceptions, feelings, and reactions shaped in 
particular (and only roughly co-ordinate) ways.”10 What ‘responsibility’ is 
however, is not clear. Walker agrees with Bernard Williams that while 
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responsibility clearly consists of various general, human abilities – human 
causal power, intention, state of mind and responses to harm or damage – 
“There is not, and there could never be, just one appropriate way of adjusting 
these elements to one another … [in] one correct conception of 
responsibility.”11 Despite of, or perhaps because of, the difficulty of reducing 
responsibility to “one appropriate way” of understanding what it is and what 
it does, moral philosophers like Tronto, Baier, Walker and Sevenhuijsen 
prefer the notion of responsibility to the notion of obligation because it can 
be used as a critical “tracking device.”12 Used as such, tracking 
responsibilities can reveal the distribution of who bears the social and 
familial burdens of care taking tasks, for example. 
In addition to ‘responsibility’, Sevenhuijsen and Verkerk point out that there 
are other alternatives to obligation-based morality - friendship, mutual 
connections, intimacy, and respect - all of which are not needs that people 
can base rights on. But they are needs that make a worthy humane existence 
possible.13 Sevenhuijsen thus wishes to separate morality from the 
democratic vocabulary of obligations, rights and privileges and locates 
instead the motivation for normative behaviour in individuals seeking a 
worthy life through networks of trust, responsibility, and care taking. 
Care as social practice 
The chief concept underpinning Sevenhuijsen’s notion of post-modern care 
ethics is that of social practice. She defines care as a social practice in which 
participants experience, interpret and evaluate the need for care. She 
distinguishes between the activity of caring and the context in which it must 
take place. This makes it easier, she says, to see that care takes place in all 
kinds of contexts (from education to intimate relations, from professional 
medical care to political policy). Sevenhuijsen derives her definition of a 
social practice from the feminist philosophers Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola 
Lacey who state that “practice” refers to human action that is socially based 
and organised, underpinned by formal or informal institutions, usually a 
combination of these.14 Practices are bound up by discourses that are both 
produced by and produce practices. Practices and discourses exist 
independently of particular social subjects, yet they are also constituted by 
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constellations of human action and behaviour. Formal and informal rules and 
habits, interpretative conventions and implicit or explicit normative 
frameworks direct practices, thus conceived. These rules and norms are not 
fixed, however, but subject to dispute: they are the objects of 
(re)signification, interpretation, negotiation and conflict.  
Against this conception of practices, care can be seen as a mode of acting in 
which participants perceive and interpret care needs and act upon those 
needs. How their interpretation and acting proceeds varies according to the 
situation and social and institutional contexts and depends on a variety of 
factors, such as norms and rules about good caring and the relational 
dynamics between the actors concerned. This approach makes it possible to 
acknowledge, argues Sevenhuijsen, that care takes place in all kinds of 
contexts, from child-rearing practices and intimate relations, to social 
services, education and political deliberation. It also means that, by 
acknowledging the flexible and contested nature of gender and care, care can 
be ‘saved’ from associations with traditional and fixed gendered identities 
that is, according to Sevenhuijsen, an association which continues to lurk 
within most versions of communitarian thought.15  
Though critical of ‘most versions of communitarian thought’, like Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s version in his After Virtue (1981) for example, Sevenhuijsen 
emphasises that communitarianism is nevertheless the most ideal social form 
in that it defines people as ontologically relational. But not just any form of 
communitarianism. She aims at a “social-constructivist and hermeneutic 
interpretation of care” derived from a definition of “dialogical 
communitarianism.”16 This form of communitarianism proceeds from the 
social ontological notion that people live in communities that give meaning 
and interpretation to, and are important for, the forming of moral subjectivity. 
However, it rejects any nostalgic longing for a return to ‘old certainties’ that 
is associated with many types of communitarianism, says Sevenhuijsen. 
Dialogical communitarianism is dynamic, she argues: it proceeds from the 
notion that people participate in many social practices and have layered 
identities, and that this is a positive value in terms of morality and politics. 
By accentuating the dialogical aspect of social relationships in which the 
hermeneutic aspect is given various contexts, she argues, experience, 
interpretation, meaning and action become the most important aspects of 
morality. There is an “interpretative moment” that is mediated by language 
                                                          
15
 Sevenhuijsen 1998, 21– 2. 
16
 Frazer and Lacey 1993, in Sevenhuijsen 1996, 34 
CHAPTER 2 
62   
and marked by the psychic or emotional dispositions of those involved. And 
there is also a politics of “need-interpretation” - which needs should be met 
and how? - in which moral and epistemological aspects of care like listening, 
responsiveness, attentiveness and commitment form the basis.17  
Though having rejected MacIntyre’s communitarianism, Sevenhuijsen 
appeals to us, as MacIntyre does, to reconsider the virtues: she insists on 
regarding care as a virtue.18 Yet Sevenhuijsen is very critical of MacIntyre’s 
rejuvenation of the virtues. She argues that he separates morality from its 
bearers, that he puts high moral demands on moral practices and argues that 
moral practices in themselves set goals and demand virtues. She rejects what 
she calls the “teleological image of human nature” and the idea that forms of 
social life have an “intrinsic purpose”, as MacIntyre claims.19 Instead, 
Sevenhuijsen emphasises the need for perception and interpretation in 
constructing meanings of care. The perception of people’s need for care is 
not directly determined by those needs themselves or by any “necessity”, she 
argues.20 They are mediated by the language in which we talk about them and 
by the vocabularies deemed applicable to care practices. They are also 
marked by the psychological and emotional dispositions of those involved 
and by their psychodynamic interaction patterns.21 
To summarise: care, according to Sevenhuijsen, is a social activity that 
consists of a myriad of different interpretations and can best be understood in 
practice. This practice is produced by many discourses (for example, 
professional care, education, intimacy and family - each with its own set of 
norms and priorities). The care-taker must use his power of interpretation - 
namely commitment, listening, responsiveness and attentiveness - to find the 
appropriate practice of caring for every different context. Caring is, on the 
one hand, representative of an activity that is so diverse as to impossible to 
define; on the other, Sevenhuijsen wishes to regard caring as a stable and 
unequivocal moral value – a virtue. 
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A postmodern care ethics 
It shall by now be apparent that Sevenhuijsen’s ethics of care is an eclectic 
combination of diverse ethical approaches: it combines first, ontology; 
second, post-modern feminism and humanism; third, communitarianism; 
fourth, epistemology and fifth, virtue ethics. First, it is ontological in that she 
proceeds from the basic and unavoidable relational aspect of humanity: she 
argues that care is the core of human life because everyone is vulnerable 
and/or dependent at some stage in their lives, and that this must be given a 
central place in individual and collective behaviour. Feminist care ethics, 
says Sevenhuijsen, proceeds from “an existential fact of mutual 
dependence”.22 Second, Sevenhuijsen’s plea for care ethics is a plea for a 
post-modern form of humanism in which she argues that people strive 
towards a worthy and humane existence.23 She emphasises diversity and 
alterality as key features of that humanity: she refers to “psychodynamic” 
notions of moral subjectivity24 in which the self is not preconceived of as a 
thing but as a protagonist in a life story that can exhibit all kinds of 
ambiguities and unexpected developments. The self is ‘processional’, a self 
that is always being formed; very different to the pre-social self of liberal 
ethics, says Sevenhuijsen. And it is a feminist ethics in that it reassesses the 
traditionally ‘female’ virtues, such as trust, kindness, responsiveness, 
responsibility, and care while rejecting exclusively masculine discourses on 
rights and privileges and obligations. Third, Sevenhuijsen talks about 
‘dialogical communitarianism’ in which moral identity is continually being 
developed and revised in relation to others. Morality is inherently a social 
practice, she says: something we do within social interaction and relations 
and specific social and political contexts.25 Fourth, Sevenhuijsen’s 
epistemological approach lies in her accentuation of two aspects: she argues 
that moral knowledge is derived from the situation rather than from any 
preconceived notions, in other words, that knowledge of how to act proceeds 
from a perception, or interpretation, of a specific situation26. Furthermore, 
she favours a narrative approach that, she argues, refuses to separate needs 
from those who are its subject and proceeds from the point that people do (or 
can) possess knowledge about their own subjectivity and are in principle 
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capable of expressing who they are (or want to be) and what they need.27 
Sevenhuijsen, fifth, also wishes to treat care as a virtue because she intends 
care to fulfil a new position in society – together with the newly-won position 
of emancipated women in the public sphere - and she would like caring to be 
instated in the public sphere as a moral ideal. To conclude this list, in her 
own words, “care is epistemic, dialogical, communicative and 
interpretative”.28 
Sevenhuijsen’s postmodernism lies not only in her eclecticism29 but also in 
her historical perception in which she typifies a time after modernism. She 
argues that historical changes have rendered much of modern morality 
irrelevant and out-of-date. In particular, she mentions “demographic changes 
and the enormous speed of globalisation and different forms of mobility 
(that) cause ruptures and sudden changes in patterns of ‘caring about’ and 
‘caring for.’”30 The conflicts and dilemmas arising from this, argues 
Sevenhuijsen, form fruitful starting-points for considering the values that can 
be seen as relevant for future society and for political decision-making about 
the direction of social change. The society of the near future will, she says, in 
one way or another have to adjust to a plurality of lifestyles and moral 
orientations and the resultant social and political frictions. She argues that it 
is more productive to use this fact as a constructive starting-point for 
reflecting on current value systems than it is to fall back on old and secure 
patterns or, conversely, to fear that a positive evaluation of care will carry 
women back into tradition. This is why, she warns, it would be a historical 
mistake to neglect the meaning of motherhood and care for women. Or to 
dismiss it as incapable of normativity from the perspective of a post-modern 
fear of the notion of fixed identities.  
Feminists, according to Sevenhuijsen, have in the past focused too much on 
identity and not enough on agency and morality. In a key passage in her 
book, Sevenhuijsen gives us her vision of motherhood under post-modern 
conditions. It can perhaps best be conceptualised, she says, 
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(…) as a series of changing social practices. Motherhood, both 
as a social institution and as an experience, is expressed in 
various settings: cultural representations, ideals of child-
rearing, legal discourses, medical-technical inventions, the 
regulation of labour and care, norms of professionalism and the 
possibility of being able to combine these with care…and the 
way in which care is valued as an aspect of the human 
condition. …Motherhood should not be seen simply as an 
identity, but as a series of relationships within which identity 
and commitment are expressed.” (Citizenship and the Ethics of 
Care 1998, 26) 
She accentuates the need to treat caring as a social practice because, she 
argues, care relationships alter continuously. From a perspective of women’s 
lives, the issue of care has long since ceased to be merely the dilemma 
between paid work and motherhood. Care relationships are a continual part of 
adult life, she argues, in work situations, in friendships, and in relation to 
children, parents and relatives. Furthermore, children are no longer, as a rule, 
born and raised in a life-long relationship between a man and a woman. In 
dealing with issues of care we have to consider test-tube babies, artificial 
insemination, egg donation, surrogate motherhood and prenatal screening, 
and the way in which the modern reproductive technologies influence kinship 
cultures. Upbringing and care take place in the most diverse family and 
kinship relations, and in the public debate we are continuously challenged for 
our opinions on such issues. 
Not only has the family altered radically in form, it also has lost the 
normative patina of a “haven in a heartless world”.31 Marital rape and sexual 
abuse have attained the status of ‘citizenship questions’, says Sevenhuijsen, 
but for a long time these issues were either ignored or repressed by liberal 
political philosophy or had a discreet veil drawn over them. We encounter 
these sorts of contests about care every day in the media and television, often 
linked to problems such as poverty and insecurity. Thus care and caring 
relations in situ are by no means unambiguous representations of virtue. She 
describes how shame, guilt or aggression can lurk behind the best well-
intentioned caring.32 Sevenhuijsen thereby problematizes the relation 
between norm and reality.  
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Furthermore Sevenhuijsen also problematizes the dichotomy between 
‘public’ and ‘private’. She argues that the diversity of experiences and moral 
questions relating to the quality of care has far outgrown the traditional 
dividing-line between the private and public spheres. This line had for so 
long marked the separation between care and politics and which in fact is 
continually being disputed and redrawn. The argument that we now find 
ourselves in a “heterogeneity of public spheres”33 provides a more 
satisfactory starting-point for characterising the post-modern condition in 
general and also with regard to the social organisation of care, says 
Sevenhuijsen. This description does justice to the fragmented nature of the 
public sphere and to the fact that there are many different locations in which 
people shape their political agency and social involvement, just as there are 
many locations in which we have to deal with decision-making and authority. 
This description also makes it clear that in post-modern existence there are 
few aspects of life that can be kept private and legitimately protected from 
any form of public control. Against this background we are continually 
confronted with the task of reflecting on the meaning of the liberal ‘right to 
freedom’, argues Sevenhuijsen, such as the protection of privacy and 
intimacy. Here too the ethics of care can offer new points of departure, she 
says following Martha Nussbaum34, through its arguments that intimacy and 
close relationships be counted as important humanitarian values. 
Sevenhuijsen’s plea for consideration of a diversity of social practices and 
situations from the perspective of the ethics of care prevents care from being 
too firmly linked to a fixed division of roles between caregivers and care-
receivers, she believes. It also ensures that the ethics of care is not framed 
solely in terms of the caregiver’s experience and motivation (as it is in some 
other accounts of care ethics, for example in Noddings’ Caring 1984). At 
some point in their lives, almost everyone will assume the role of receiver as 
well as provider of care, although the extent to which each of these roles is 
fulfilled may vary greatly during a lifetime. Thinking in terms of a fixed 
pattern quickly reproduces the mechanism whereby vulnerability and needs 
are located in the so-called ‘needy’, and not in ‘normal’ moral subjects 
themselves, argues Sevenhuijsen. This can lead to complicated patterns of 
interaction, such as projection or displacement of needs and responsibilities. 
It also reproduces a one-sided image of human nature, enshrined in the idea 
of a self-sufficient individual as the basis of moral existence and political 
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regulation, an idea that Sevenhuijsen is most anxious to dislodge from its 
prominent position in liberal moral and political vocabulary. An analysis of 
morality in which only caring deeds are central and exclusively located in 
others can have a harmful effect on the practising of morality says 
Sevenhuijsen, since this contributes to an ‘externalisation’ of morality. 
Furthermore this is a rather thin conception of what moral subjectivity is all 
about, she argues. The ideal of autonomy in fact overlooks what it is that 
makes caring or being cared for an element of the human condition. In other 
words, care recognises that all people are sometimes vulnerable and 
dependent during periods of their lives, and that we all have to find ways of 
dealing with this in our daily existence and in the values which guide our 
individual and collective behaviour. This is one of the main themes in 
Sevenhuijsen’s book. In this respect, she insists, her argument for a feminist 
ethics of care can be seen as a plea for a postmodern form of humanism.35 
Postmodern solidarity 
Throughout this chapter there are continual references to this or that being 
‘postmodern’ in Sevenhuijsen’s ethics. But what is postmodernism and can 
there be such a thing as postmodern ethics? Postmodernism can most 
broadly, and safely, given the enormous internal variety, be described as a 
break with modernity. Whether it is an entirely new intellectual era or 
whether it is merely a phase within the modernism is the crucial question. 
René Boomkens, essayist, social philosopher and author of Een drempel 
wereld36 for example, argues that postmodern thinking has nothing ‘real’ to 
offer us. Postmodernism has introduced us into a reality in which notions 
such as ‘truth’, ‘authenticity’ or ‘realness’ have become stranded in a 
sometimes nearly perverse game of pastiche and parody, he argues. This 
game presented itself often as being the ‘only real’ one but was never in a 
state to loosen itself from the grip of the only real story, that of modernity, 
and should only, warns Boomkens, be understood as a phenomenon of the 
dissolution or disintegration of modernism itself. Postmodernism is, in other 
words, a typically modern product, albeit a product of modernism in crisis. 
Postmodernism parasites on this crisis: it makes itself bigger and stronger by 
denying the crisis, and by declaring modernism dead. Boomkens talks about 
the crisis of modernism, the “new disorder”, in the words of the social 
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philosopher Jürgen Habermas, which is characteristic of the actual ‘modern’ 
condition.37  
However, Boomkens tempers this rather severe judgement of post-
modernism by arguing that now, after fifteen to twenty years of post-
modernism, we can carefully conclude that, while few admit themselves 
adhering to the philosophical, literary, artistic or political opinions of ‘the 
postmodernists’, almost everyone, some more enthusiastically than others, 
agrees with the idea of the failure of the ‘Metanarratives’. This term coined 
by Lyotard has succeeded in bringing about a “progressive problem shift”38, 
argues Boomkens. Lyotard’s concept, ‘metanarratives’, became the 
determining password for the postmodern movement (which can be dated 
back to the publication of Lyotard’s La condition postmoderne in 1979 
though international debate on postmodernism only became established in the 
eighties). Modernity and modernism were portrayed, with the help of this 
concept, as universal myths, sort of religious structures, that had an all-
encompassing and, at the same time, founding story to tell by means of which 
the world could be understood and furnished. ‘Metanarratives’ were the 
stories of science or rationality; the story of emancipation or freedom of 
mankind; of the Market with its promises of progress; and the Revolution, the 
story of solidarity with the oppressed and its promise of utopia.39 
Sevenhuijsen’s critique of the notion of moral identity, and her emphasis of 
diversity, alterality, ambiguity of social and moral practices and the 
importance of individual context, place her in one kind of post-modern 
tradition. In this she is faithful to the ‘strict’ or programmatic post-moderns 
who argue that we ought continuously to relativise. But Sevenhuijsen also 
works from within another tradition, that of social critique. She emphasises 
transformations that, in her eyes, are in contradistinction to modernism, 
especially the rupture between normative values and the reality that they are 
supposed to represent (for example, the family as a haven in a heartless 
world). In her critique she prefers a post-Marxist explanation of social 
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structures and practices (‘social practices’) and chooses a left-wing orientated 
type of hermeneutic or ‘dialogical’ communitarianism. 
Has Sevenhuijsen provided an alternative to modernism, normative as well as 
practical, which is not subject to the same pitfalls of modernism? Has she 
succeeded in avoiding the dilemma of postmodernism? Boomkens argues 
that it is very tempting to fall into the typical trap of post-modernism by 
rejecting ‘the metanarratives’ in such a way that one’s own position becomes, 
once again, a ‘metanarrative’. This is what happens to all those who see a 
new and independent vocabulary in post-modernism that is capable of 
replacing modernism, argues Boomkens.40 Sevenhuijsen’s alternative to 
universal morality and teleological types of virtue is the idea of ‘social 
practices’, in which the meaning of values and ideas become established 
through use, interpretation and context rather than by reference to pre-
existing and pre-established concepts. It is ironic though that she should 
choose a term from a Marxist-revisionist (or neo-Marxist or post-Marxist) 
tradition. In her attempt to describe a fluid yet formal, established though 
flexible set of social relations, she refers to a political-philosophical tradition 
that specialised in mega-metanarratives (as critique of and alternative to other 
mega-metanarratives, of course).  
In her social critique she has not succeeded in avoiding the pitfalls of 
postmodernism; does she fare any better in her relativism? The answer to this 
question is in the affirmative: yes, Sevenhuijsen successfully deconstructs an 
important element in modern metanarratives, ‘identity’ and puts in its place a 
contextualised and temporal agent. She insists on a “processional self” rather 
than a self with a teleological goal, on finite social practices rather than 
established normative systems, on “hermeneutic communitarianism” in 
which participation is based on interpretative deeds, and on “difference” and 
individual particularity.  
Which leaves us with the dilemma of how to read her postmodern ethics: is it 
primarily fragmentary in that it places the particular experiences of the agent 
at the core of every normative judgement? Or is it less radically fragmented 
than that and are there nevertheless social structures and practices which exist 
and persist beyond a myriad of individual practices? If we take the first 
reading, then we must conclude that motivation for moral decisions can only 
be described on an individual level of experience and reaction here and now: 
in terms of trust and responsibility, intimacy and love. If we choose the 
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second reading then we must conclude that the experiences of individuals 
overlap and persist to a considerable degree and that it is possible to speak of 
the community lending meaning to moral subjectivity, rather than the other 
way around. This is the unresolved tension in Sevenhuijsen’s ethics of care: 
between the primacy of moral subjectivity and the primacy of moral 
communitarianism. Obviously they mutually constitute each other, but which 
one takes priority? How? And why? I would argue that Sevenhuijsen’s 
vagueness on this point is unsatisfactory. 
To illustrate what I mean I shall compare Sevenhuijsen’s ontology with that 
of the post-modern philosopher and anti-historicist par excellence Michel 
Foucault. Foucault advocated an “ontology of the present” versus, what he 
regarded as the desire of analytic philosophy for, truth in general. ‘Ontology’ 
refers to “structures of being”, to “supra-historical characteristics of 
existence”; ‘present’ conjures up the momentary, the acute or the actual, that 
which is relevant now.41 The ultimate reason for asking the ontological 
question can only exist in and as the actuality of the one asking question, 
argues Foucault. There is no ‘view from nowhere’, neither from the 
collective (which does not exist for Foucault), nor above or beyond the 
collective. The question is only relevant to and for the individual, thus the 
answer will always be different. Sevenhuijsen too rejects teleological 
normative concepts and emphasises rather specific responses in specific 
contexts to specific questions. Her ontology, nevertheless, is not radically 
individualist, as one might expect from a programmatic postmodern, but 
communitarian. She argues that our ‘structures of being’ are relational, thus 
placing the emphasis for the motivation for moral behaviour on communality, 
mutuality and relations with others (trust, responsibility and care).  
Is this not ultimately a cop-out? A compromise that neither radically 
challenges modern normative concepts with consistent relativism, nor dares 
to confirm an unequivocal communitarian collectivity of values? 
Sevenhuijsen chooses to opt for a concept of the self that is contextual but 
also distinct from context, a social practice that is constituted but also exists 
distinct from context, a communitarianism that gives meaning to moral 
concepts but is interpreted and created through dialogue by those semi-
independent selves. Two institutional modern ingredients are present: the self 
and society. What Sevenhuijsen has eliminated from this metanarrative is 
what traditionally connected the structures to each other: identity and 
obligation. We now have selves that are under no compulsion to be moral 
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other than their own interpretation of their own contexts and their own 
responsibilities; and a society that does not comprise of identities but of 
identifying practices.  
Sevenhuijsen rejects obligation because she associates it with atomistic and 
minimalist individuals who are forced to co-operate with each other because 
of the lack of other, more meaningful ways of co-operation and instead offers 
us “solidarity”. She argues that this concept gives a political meaning to care 
and to mutual commitment. Solidarity without care is an impoverished sense 
of mutual commitment; care without solidarity strengthens the privatisation 
and “moralisation” of care.42 She argues that we need “caring solidarity” 
because everyone in different ways and to different degrees needs care at 
some points in their lives.43 What does Sevenhuijsen mean by solidarity in 
caring? Does it mean that we should all conceive of ourselves as needing care 
and/or as care givers? Or does it mean that we should all feel sympathetic 
towards those receiving or giving care, even if we are not in the same 
position ourselves? ‘Solidarity’, according to Marion Smiley, means feeling a 
sense of commonality with a group: sharing common attributes and 
expressing a form of collective responsibility. Group solidarity exists where 
group members identify themselves as group members and assert their shared 
interests and needs.44 The problem with this definition for Sevenhuijsen is 
two-fold. First of all, she does not refer to a group as to the society (or 
community) at large – she argues that it is the responsibility of the 
community to be solidaire, or interdependent. This means that the 
community as a whole has to see itself as having an identity, namely a caring 
identity. This gives rise to the second issue: in order to motivate such a 
communal identity this would presuppose that the community accepts that 
their identity is one that needs or is expressive of caring. This might be 
possible if it were accepted, for example, that all human beings are 
(potentially) vulnerable and that the community should be designed or 
formed in such a way so as to express this fact.45 The question then arises 
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how such changes could be implemented in contemporary society – if we 
accept that these changes should be made.  
The problem with such a proposal is, very generally, that vulnerability is not 
a politically of economically accepted identity in contemporary liberal 
democracies. Rather, the situation of being in need of care (and, by extension, 
giving care) is commonly regarded as an exceptional situation. Societies are 
defined from the point of view of healthy, independent, self-sufficient 
individuals and those who are ill, or dependent, or need care are regarded as 
the exception to the rule. I fear that the effect that the term solidarity might 
have is merely to accentuate that there is a large(r) group of people not 
involved in caring relationships. In this respect ‘solidarity’ resembles 
‘charity’ in that the charitable can be generous precisely because they are not 
in the same detrimental position as those requiring charity. Sevenhuijsen 
argues, briefly,46 that the recognition of all people as temporarily vulnerable 
and dependent is the basis for a plea for a post-modern form of humanism. 
The problem, it seems to me, is precisely that Sevenhuijsen has successfully 
argued that people are not equal but particular and therefore fails to find 
sufficient grounds for arguing in favour of a common humanity or communal 
identity.  
Postmodern motivation 
Sevenhuijsen’s accentuation of diversity and plurality instead of identity and 
unequivocal role-playing, and ambiguity in the relationship between norm 
and reality, has direct implications for her notion of what caring is. She 
rejects the idea that caring is a moral obligation because she rejects the 
vocabulary of rights and duties; equally, she rejects the notion of necessity47 
because the need for care, she argues, is closely connected to temporality and 
to the various roles and practices that we are involved in. 
 To further complicate matters, while acknowledging that care is to a certain 
extent generated by dependency and attentiveness, Sevenhuijsen also stresses 
the existence of conflicting and contested notions of care. Caring for others 
can also stem from far less noble motives than wanting to protect vulnerable 
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people from vulnerability, like the urge to meddle or to control others. The 
motive behind care, the product of some kind of response to human suffering, 
is certainly not the only factor in determining the quality of the caring 
activities themselves, says Sevenhuijsen. ‘Bad’ motives can lead to ‘good’ 
care, just as a ‘good’ motive, attentiveness to vulnerability, is no guarantee of 
good care. It can also lead to paternalism or undue protection.48 Therefore it 
is not the motivation that is normatively significant, but the effect that the 
caring action has, says Sevenhuijsen. 
Sevenhuijsen’s postmodern consequentialism (when it comes to judging 
motivation) is not inherently problematic - as long as she also maintains that 
all moral action is essentially ad hoc and a matter of trail and error. But 
Sevenhuijsen’s position is not that radical: her book on citizenship and caring 
harbours a teleological message concerning the importance of community. 
And this gives rise to a curious ambiguity: on the one hand, Sevenhuijsen 
emphasises that there are no moral or normative systems over and above 
individual acts. On the other, she accentuates that individuals are responsible 
for a sense of community and for the consequences of their deeds. She also 
emphasises the ontological aspect of ethics of care, namely that human 
beings are basically relational and that caring is an unavoidable aspect of this 
basic reality (though also temporary and varied). What is it to be: ad hoc 
moralism or ontological communitarianism? 
Sevenhuijsen’s association of ‘obligation’ is with rights and with contract 
thinking, in other words a particular tradition of political thought, namely 
liberalism. She rejects this form of obligation, as I have discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, because she argues that it is normatively empty and 
recommends two alternatives in its place: ‘responsibility’ and ‘trust’. Her 
version of a compelling moral exhortation to act contains the notion of 
responsibility: what she describes as a hermeneutic and interpretative 
moment in reaction to a concrete situation or predicament. Her ideal moral 
reaction – trust – is, in her eyes, a postmodern virtue because it is in 
contradistinction to identity, and socially fixed or universalised values like 
stereotyped gender identities.49 In her view ‘trust’ is interpretative, rather 
than fixed. Like her version of care, it is a practice rather than a moral theory.  
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Is it possible to find another version of responsibility that will overcome 
Sevenhuijsen’s postmodern individualism? Whereas Sevenhuijsen sees 
responsibility as an individual reaction to diverse situations, Walker sees 
responsibility much more as part of mutual understandings. While Walker’s 
philosophical ambitions are much broader than mapping out the demands of a 
care ethics – she is concerned with epistemology in general and concerned to 
develop a concept of moral understandings, fuelled by a critical feminist 
standpoint, within that tradition – she does describe herself as a ‘friend of 
care ethics’50. Her ethics of responsibility is more of a theory about practices 
than a systematic ethical theory: Walker uses the notion of responsibility as a 
meta-ethical tool to diagnose and trace moral understandings in forms of 
social life. She sees the notion of “responsibilities” as representative of that 
which we owe to each other, and her ethics specifically reveals the way in 
which responsibilities are gendered, in other words, what the arbitrary or 
exploitative fit between social contributions and recognition is.51 
As Walker says, she prefers the “more capacious language” of responsibility 
as a conceptual framework for ethics to the language of care-taking. 
Responsibilities trace “our configurations of social roles and the boundaries 
of our community” as well as “the distribution of power between those 
suffering and those being held responsible”. Being held responsible means 
being made accountable, she says; her ethics of responsibility is thus an 
ethics of accountability.52 Her ethics of responsibility captures many aspects 
of ethics of care also found in the care ethics of Gilligan, Baier, Noddings, 
Held, Ruddick, and Tronto. These ethicists also emphasise responsiveness to 
particular others in specific (caring) relationships. Their basic claim is that 
specific moral claims on us arise from our contact or relationship with others 
whose interests are vulnerable to our actions and choices. We are moved to 
respond to particular others when circumstances or ongoing relationships 
render them especially, conspicuously, or peculiarly dependent on us. This 
kind of ethics requires a view of moral judgement with significant expressive, 
interpretative, and (where possible) collaborative features. Walker’s ethics of 
responsibility also deals with specific relationships of vulnerability - but not 
only in terms of relations of dependency. Because it is an ethics of 
accountability, it is concerned specifically with issues like transparency, 
trustworthiness, and honesty. These are all concepts that apply to the attitude 
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of the person who has to give an answer to (or account himself) in terms of 
the obligation taken by him/laid upon him. And this attitude, and the 
information given by him, must be open and not hypocritical or distorted. In 
other words, Walker’s ethics of responsibility is primarily an epistemological 
ethics: it is concerned with the normativity of knowledge claims in general 
rather than the more specific relational claims that caring makes. 
Walker argues that her ethics of responsibility is responsive to questions of 
how to steer a morally responsible course  
throughout our lives among valuable things and important 
commitments, while giving place to the wish that our lives 
might express the people we in particular are. (Moral 
Understandings 1998, 105)  
This kind of view, however, offers no philosophical standard by means of 
which we can determine when we have assumed just enough meaningful and 
sustainable responsibilities in just the right order. Rather than a defect, 
Walker regards this as a virtue of the view. It is a virtue because she does not 
believe that there is a “principled way of ordering for everyone in advance 
the numbers, kinds and combinations and weightings of things that matter 
morally, and with respect to which we may be called to account.”53 She 
thinks that the resistance of our lives to this treatment is due, in part, to the 
nature of things in our lives that morally matter. It is also due to the nature of 
these lives themselves. Morally significant things, concludes Walker, our 
responses to them and responsibility for them, play very important parts in 
our lives, but our lives are not only about or propelled by them.54 
Walker sympathises with moral philosophers – like Gilligan and others55 - 
who strain against a “formulaic view of selves and others, their lives and their 
commitments, and the role of morality in binding or shaping these”.56 What 
this alternative view involves is trying to get the meanings, motives, 
commitments and connections that move individuals through their distinctive 
lives into the right relation with morality’s guiding and constraining force 
within those lives, argues Walker. Gilligan, for example, argues that 
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conflicting responsibilities need to be “separated from self-sacrifice”57 and 
reconciled to “the truth of their own agency and needs”.58 Gilligan uses 
“integrity” to stand for a demand, either within or against morality, for some 
space a self can call its own. Walker herself has a very different conception 
of integrity: she argues that integrity is inherently relational or other-directed 
because it is measured by how reliably others may depend on congruence 
between someone’s position, their action and their responsibility-taking.59 
Thus ‘integrity’ for Walker is not a self space but rather a quality of the self 
that lies between being related to others and taking responsibility. 
A major issue in care ethics is the potential that caring has to overwhelm the 
one-caring. Relationships thick with commitment or expectation could place 
overly exacting demands on a life – is there any end to the number and types 
of demands that can be made? Could a life responsive along these lines 
exhibit the commitments and concerns distinctive of the one who lives it? 
How could a person make, or keep, this life his or her own? This critique 
contains two aspects: the quantitative and qualitative. The first concerns the 
sheer quantity of demands, requests, appeals and pleas for attention on one 
caring – the idea being that this in itself could overwhelm and defeat the one 
caring. The second, qualitative, aspect concerns the type and delimitation of 
requests for care made: if they are unbounded, extreme, too far-going, 
unlimited or continuous then this aspect of care demands could also 
overwhelm the one-caring. Gilligan (In a Different Voice 1982) called this 
the “conflict between integrity and care”. Any person immersed in the 
complex, varied, and changing relationships and episodic contracts of real 
life might be scattered, depleted and “constantly compromised” by an 
unlimited demand for responsiveness. Some feminist critics think that 
Gilligan’s identification of an ethic with open-ended responsiveness by 
women (i.e. the second undermining aspect) is deeply mistaken.60 They think 
it “valorises stereotypes of bottomless feminine nurturing with self-sacrifice 
that continue to haunt women while politically disempowering and 
personally exhausting them.”61 A care “ethic”, in these terms, can look like 
the lamentable internalisation of an oppressively servile social role, argue 
care criticasters.  
                                                          
57
 Gilligan 1982, 134 cited in ibid. 
58
 Cited in op cit, 138. 
59
 Walker, correspondence, 2006. 
60
 See, for example, Jean Grimshaw 1986; Barbara Houston 1987; Claudia Card 1990; 
and Marilyn Friedman 1993. 
61
 Walker 1998, 108. 
  POSTMODERN CARE ETHICS 
  77 
What Walker’s alternative view of responsibility wants to achieve is an 
avoidance of this overwhelming effect. She argues that her practice of 
responsibility can acknowledge a “moving horizon of commitments and 
adjustments” in which the individual can retain a distinctive sense of 
situation and commitment.62 This means that care givers can, from their own 
perspective, based on their situation and their self-determined responsibility-
taking, decide which care tasks they take upon themselves. Walker is not a 
care ethicist in the first place. But because she is concerned with creating 
habitable moral spaces within changing social and experiential environments 
and the pre-conditions for forming moral knowledge, her conclusions are 
relevant for discussions of a naturalised morality in care ethics.  
Conclusion 
In critique of post-modern feminist social criticism, Seyla Benhabib says that 
if social critics argue that cultures and traditions are more like competing sets 
of narratives and incoherent tapestries of meaning than a monolithic set of 
criteria, then she (the social critic) must herself construct out of these 
conflictual and incoherent accounts the set of criteria in the name of which 
she speaks. “The recognition of competing and incoherent sets of meanings 
does not”, concludes Benhabib, “exempt the speaker from the responsibility 
of normative justification.”63 Has Sevenhuijsen addressed the issue of 
normativity in care ethics? In her more programmatic chapters in Citizenship 
and the Ethics of Care (like those on child custody and on Dutch health care 
policies), Sevenhuijsen strives to combine the feminist strategy of 
particularism with a concern for vulnerability (also found in other care ethical 
literature, like that of Verkerk and Manschot) and the justice approach of the 
public domain. What she ultimately argues of favour of is a combination of 
all three: that situated rights should be incorporated into health care and that 
social justice should be achieved by means of public provisions. This 
amounts to, ideally she says, a combination of a politics of needs-
interpretation and ‘caring solidarity’ (which offers more potential for 
understanding the diversity of needs and lifestyles than solidarity based on 
homogeneity). And in her discussions of citizenship she argues that we 
should “judge with care” (the original title of her Citizenship in Dutch: 
Oordelen met zorg).  
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What Sevenhuijsen is doing, to my mind, is to try to combine a post-modern 
ethics of care and humanism – she tries to collapse a feministic ethics of 
care’s emphasis on difference and particularity into the old humanistic goal 
of equality and reconciliation.64 I have argued that her attempt has not been 
successful because it is everything at once: metanarrative (humanism, 
communitarianism) and practice (hermeneutic, particular). Furthermore, I 
have argued that her concept of solidarity is not sufficient to the task of 
motivating caring as a communal activity. This is in part, I argued, because 
Sevenhuijsen bases her ethics of care on an ontological notion of 
vulnerability. If we are all vulnerable then why do we need to feel solidarity 
towards the vulnerable?  
Walker is more consistently rigorous in her naturalised epistemology. She 
offers us a concept of responsibility that has as its basis an individually 
centred self with its own perspectives and commitments, which is capable of 
making choices and determining those responsibilities taken on board. 
Walker rejects monolithic moral principles and horizons and argues instead 
for a complex particularism. Morality, for Walker, is a practice that can form 
“a core of dominant understandings that are widely repeated but differently 
grasped from different positions.”65 Her analysis of moral understanding 
leads to differentiation and proliferation rather than towards a centralised 
discussion of normativity. The following chapter on epistemological care 
ethics is based on the idea that being in a caring relation to others is a unique 
way of acquiring knowledge about them. Walker’s naturalised epistemology 
will play an important part in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: KNOWING CARE 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall deal with a care ethical argument in favour of the 
normative power that caring adds to being able to knowing. This argument is 
based on the idea that what we know about the world has profound 
implications for knowing what we should do. I have argued that the two care 
ethical approaches discussed hitherto – Noddings’ phenomenology and 
Sevenhuijsen’s postmodernism – are lacking in explicit normative content. 
This chapter will examine a care ethical account that is explicitly normative: 
that the kind of knowledge generated by caring is not only basic (to social 
relations) but is indeed superior to other kinds of knowledge generated by 
other means.  
What the claim amounts to is that caring generates a particular kind of 
knowledge – knowledge upon the basis of which the one caring is motivated 
to act. Those arguing from a care ethical perspective claim that caring 
produces and recognises certain kinds of knowledge: information that is not 
only factual and contextual, but also interpretative. The skills necessary for 
garnering such knowledge involve commitment, simulation and self-
reflexivity, and, so goes the argument, such skills transform caring into an 
intellectual capacity that not only casts care out of the private sphere and into 
the public domain, but also designates caring tasks that have hitherto been 
ignored by traditional ethics. In other words, the claim is that caring 
knowledge is special or privileged knowledge. It is one of the tasks of this 
chapter to examine that claim. 
I will draw on two sources to illustrate what an epistemological caring 
position looks like: the Indian epistemological and feminist philosopher 
Vrinda Dalmiya’s (“Why Should a Knower Care?” 2002) care ethics as a 
“responsibilist epistemic virtue” and the American feminist moral 
philosopher Margaret Walker’s “naturalised epistemology” (Moral 
Understandings. A Feminist Study in Ethics 1998). The first source is from a 
care ethics perspective; the second is from a general feminist ethical 
perspective (though notably care-friendly). 
Perhaps the best statement of what epistemological (care) ethics is about is 
this one by Annette Baier, cited by both Dalmiya and Walker: “A reliable 
sign of real caring is the intolerance of ignorance about the current state of 
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what we care about.”1 Contained within this statement are several claims, I 
believe. I shall list them and use this list as a means to describe what Dalmiya 
means by a “caring epistemology”. There is the claim that, firstly, there is 
such a thing as ‘real’ caring (probably in contrast to bogus or bad caring); 
secondly, when a person or a cause is important to us, then we will want to 
know everything possible about the welfare of that person or cause. And 
thirdly, it must be ‘reliable’ knowledge that is generated, perceived and 
acknowledged by those who wish to engage in an open discussion of what we 
regard as important (‘what we care about’), free of ignorance but also free of 
subterfuge, falsity or the intention to deceive. In this perspective, thus, a 
caring attitude is an important sensor for generating knowledge: according to 
Baier it is directed at what we care about, it is critical and impatient and, I 
shall argue, it is profoundly normative.  
This claim raises, to my mind, the question whether there is (special) 
knowledge that is only accessible to caring people? In order to answer them I 
shall firstly, examine Dalmiya’s concept of caring (which is in part based on 
that of Noddings). Herein she distinguishes five stages of caring including a 
‘simulation heuristic model’ on the basis of which information can be 
gathered about the cared-for. I will pay special attention to her first-person, 
phenomenological-type model. Secondly, I will discuss what the 
consequences are of seeking verifiable and “simulated” caring knowledge 
and will mention certain problems with Dalmiya’s model. Thirdly, I will 
examine Dalmiya’s proposal for caring as the basis for a ‘responsibilist’ 
epistemology that she argues is superior to a reliabilist epistemology. And 
finally I will introduce Walker’s natural epistemology which offers a very 
different approach to gathering information about what we care about, in 
particular, her emphasis on the formation of collective “moral 
understandings”.  
Simulated knowledge 
Dalmiya bases her conception of care ethics on the existentialist 
phenomenology of Noddings2 and derives from it five stages or steps in the 
caring process:3 first, caring about; second, caring for; third, taking care; 
fourth, care reception; and fifth, caring about caring. Dalmiya uses what she 
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calls a “individualistic, dyadic model” in which she describes a caring 
relationship between two people. Walker has called this type of care ethics 
“personalist”4 meaning small-scale caring relations (usually one-to-one) in 
which other conditions, like intimacy, or familiarity, or responsibility are part 
of the caring relationship. 
Firstly, caring about, this is the normative moment of valuing “particularised 
others”, says Dalmiya, irrespective of their instrumental values. I care about 
my children not because I hope they will support me in my old age but 
because they are my children. However, I cannot just care about anyone: 
whom I care about must coincide in some way with who I am and what I 
regard as important. If I care in this way, argues Dalmiya, I “succumb to the 
normative pull associated with making the cared-for important”.5 
Secondly, caring for, as Dalmiya applies it, is encapsulated in Noddings’ 
term “engrossment” with which I have dealt at length in Chapter One: it is 
the displacement of interest from the experience of the one-caring into that of 
the cared-for – as Noddings says: “when the other’s reality becomes a real 
possibility for me, I care”.6 Making something a “possibility” implies first 
and foremost a reorientation of interests. Caring for involves the 
displacement of interest which Dalmiya refers to as “the distinctive 
phenomenology of the attitudinal alteration involved in a caring for”.7 
Because Noddings herself says nothing more about how the “displacement” 
occurs or about the rather problematic notion of “the other’s reality”, 
Dalmiya offers the suggestion that displacement should occur in the manner 
of a “simulation”.8 This is not a simple matter: since lives are lived in cultural 
contexts, she says, “the other’s reality” is a catch-all for (a) psycho-physical 
happenings, (b) first-person perspectives, and (c) the culture and community 
within which (a) and (b) are situated. And these three elements make for a 
complex whole. 
Making this a “real” or “possible” world for the one-carer involves and 
requires therefore a complex imaginative projection called ‘empathy’ or even 
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just ‘imagination’. Dalmiya calls it “simulation heuristic”. This simulation 
involves (at least) two stages: the first is one in which the other is perceived – 
in as much detail as is necessary – in a process akin to modelling. The one-
caring tries to come to understand the cared-for by constructing his situation, 
his ambitions, and his desires. This would be imagining his situation or 
“imaginatively entertaining certain mental states.”9 In the second stage, in a 
further act of imaginative identification, the one-caring adopts those states as 
if they were his own and pretends to be in the situation of the cared-for. In 
doing this, the one-caring will no doubt experience further emotions or other 
mental states but they are not self-ascribed in the sense that the one-caring 
does not feel these things on his own behalf. An important part of caring skill 
is to recognise that these feelings are not directly experienced by the one-
caring, says Dalmiya, but they must be attributed to the cared-for. The one-
caring must realise that the “displacement” of which Noddings speaks is 
simulated. This stage is of vital importance for Dalmiya’s epistemological 
enquiry: this is the stage in which knowledge is generated about the cared-for 
and in which the one-caring makes a decision how to act.  
Thirdly, taking care involves motivational displacement as a crucial 
component of caring in which someone must be ready to take care of the 
cared-for by getting involved in his projects. At this point, the caring 
intention has to be placed within a context and decisions have to be made 
concerning the projects and/or behaviour of the cared-for and the specific 
situation in which they take place. Dalmiya argues that the action-orientated 
component of caring makes it very different from a simple desire, and links it 
to negotiations and manipulations of a social context in the attempt to get 
something done for those we care about. It is at this point that the explicitly 
social dimension of caring comes into play, even to the extent of individuals 
wanting to bring about social changes, reform society or affect political 
processes, in their attempts to provide the best care for those they love. 
Fourthly, according to Dalmiya, to care is not simply to will that the other 
flourishes but to wish that his happiness be caused, in part, by my efforts to 
further his projects.10 Here again, as in Dalmiya’s second stage, caring is 
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perceived as a “displacement of interest.” It is not, in the first place in 
Dalmiya’s model, the happiness of the one-caring that is at stake but the 
happiness of the cared-for. I want, says Dalmiya, the cared-for to recognise 
my effort and feel good about the fact that I care. Care reception thus 
involves an acknowledgement of efforts made by the one-caring. Care 
reception can serve as a built-in veracity check for the way in which the one-
caring cares. False or unacceptable types of caring will (probably) not be well 
received by the cared-for and therefore sensitivity to the reception of care 
thus enables the one-caring to adjust his imaginative simulation. 
In instances where it is imaginatively difficult to care for someone, instances 
in which the cared-for might be violent, or intractable, or racially 
discriminating, Dalmiya argues that even then the normative push to care for 
this person remains. In the process of caring for such a person, the one-caring 
might be forced to give up or at least suspend his ideals of pacifism, or of 
never using force, or of non-racialism. Not liking the cared-for, or being in 
disagreement with him, is not grounds for ceasing to care. Caring is not about 
liking (and neither is it about the one-caring ceasing to be a person with 
distinct preferences and opinions), concludes Dalmiya.  
But this (may) result in a potentially acute problem for the one-caring. How 
can this very actual problem be solved? The answer lies, argues Dalmiya, in 
the “initial normative moment”, the moment prior to the heuristic 
understanding of the context of caring, the fifth stage of caring about. In this 
moment, the “care worthiness” of a person is most apparent and it brings with 
it a commitment, not just to him, but to caring itself. After all, she says, when 
someone is acknowledged as being worth caring about, it is hardly possible 
to remain indifferent to whether or not we do care about him. Therefore, as 
Dalmiya concludes in her fifth point about the caring process, in caring for 
the cared-for, the one-caring also cares about caring.  
There are important differences between caring for an individual and caring 
for something abstract – like caring. Making the cared-for important, in other 
words recognising the care-worthiness of the cared-for, is concomitant with 
trying to understand him (and his ‘reality’) and understand him in caring for 
him, says Dalmiya.11 Understanding caring is not the same as understanding 
the cared-for or the context in which the cared-for operates - but there are 
parallels she argues. For example, caring for something abstract or for an 
object does not entail simulation to gain knowledge of that concept or object, 
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nor does it require the one-caring to recede in terms of biases and 
preferences.  
The whole point of Dalmiya’s simulation is to break out of our egocentric 
perspective and imagine the world of another – to adopt a point of view 
different from our own. It could be argued that an imaginative role-playing 
during caring is a wilful stepping out of my perspective on it and looking at it 
from as many points of view as possible. This involves the construction of 
counterfactual possibilities, answering possible objections and asking the 
question (Baier’s question) “What sort of person must I be to care for…”12 
There is a distancing from and evaluation of desires that are already 
presupposed in the concept of taking care. Thus the third kind of self-
transformation following the evaluation moment of care is the move to be 
self-reflective. One cannot, concludes Dalmiya, “really care without being 
self-critical”.13 On examination of the caring relationship I might realise its 
futility or vapidity and the ambiguities involved in wanting to maintain it. 
This is the point at which caring can be terminated because it is the point at 
which the motivation of the one-caring is under critical examination. 
Dalmiya’s concept of caring is critical: 
The root notion of caring for a person generates an epistemic 
vigilance not only about the direct object of care but also about 
the nature and motivations for the caring. (Dalmiya 2002, 41) 
In summary: Dalmiya’s stages one and five (“caring about” and “caring 
about caring”) are similar – both rely on the aspect of ‘normative pull’ to be 
activated. In other words, the one-caring, though willing, is nevertheless 
involuntarily moved to care by the force of the appeal of the cared-for rather 
than because of the urge or impulse or intention to care. Stage two (“caring 
for”) is the phenomenological moment of simulation, a stage that involves the 
‘displacement’ of the personality of the one-caring and the simulation of the 
predicament of the cared-for. This stage is an elaboration on Noddings’ 
vaguer concept of “engrossment”: Dalmiya specifies how the one-caring can 
perceive the cared-for’s reality, or world, by means of a “simulation” model. 
This model has two parts: imaginatively understanding the cared-for’s 
situation and imaginative identification – this is the moment when you pose 
the question, “what would I do/want if I were in this predicament?”  
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Stage three is the actual taking care of the other and it is at this point that the 
one-caring can critically consider his motivations for caring. Stage four is 
care reception in which, hopefully, the “epistemic vigilance” of the one-
caring will be justified and his decision to care will be confirmed by the 
cared-for. But, according to Dalmiya’s stage four, only if the one-caring’s 
motivations are found lacking may the caring relation be terminated. It may 
not be terminated if the cared-for is found to be a difficult or awkward 
character. Having accepted the commitment to care (the fifth stage), the one-
caring’s personality must recede altogether in order to make the cared-for 
“care worthy” - especially in the case of differences of opinion between the 
one-caring and the cared-for.  
Dalmiya is at pains to specify and describe the process involved in caring for 
another. In her “simulation” model what we can see is an alternation of 
perspective: sometimes we are expected to imaginatively simulate the cared-
for’s situation or predicament; sometimes we must critically reflect on our 
own perspective on this situation. This is a complex procedure and I share 
Dalmiya’s critique of Noddings that we do need a detailed explication of 
what happens when the one-caring cares. Before I make any critical points I 
shall first look at Dalmiya’s additional safeguards that she introduces into her 
caring epistemology, namely the concept of care as a “reliability” and 
“responsibilist” virtue. 
Intolerance of ignorance 
Dalmiya construes caring as an intellectual virtue in the sense of virtue 
epistemology in its two forms, “reliabilist” and “responsibilist” virtue 
epistemology. She argues that caring should be added to the list of 
intellectual virtues that she calls “faculties or stable dispositions enabling us 
to reach the epistemic goal of truth.”14 This list of “stable dispositions” 
already includes the examples of sight, hearing, memory, introspection, 
deduction and induction. By ‘intellectual virtue’ Dalmiya means the 
following: a “power or ability or competence to arrive at truths in a particular 
field and to avoid believing falsehoods in that field”.15 Caring as an 
intellectual virtue, according to her, is a competence to arrive at truths and 
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avoid falsehoods in a particular field and care-knowing is justified belief 
arising from the exercise of the ability to care. 
Dalmiya thinks that caring belongs on this list because it is a complex 
(“higher-order faculty”16) and interactive practice involving high degrees of 
competence. What caring does, she argues is to allow us “to cognize the 
particularity and individuality of the cared-for”.17 Caring enables us, she 
says, first to see how we appear in the eyes of others and second, how we 
behave and relate to them. The component of care reception aids us in the 
first and caring about, caring for and taking care aids us in the second 
perception. “The reflexivity of caring about caring ensures that we constantly 
engage with our choices and motives.”18  
Regarding caring as a reliabilist intellectual virtue means that we must show 
how it leads to truths not available to any other cognitive mechanism, she 
says. What Dalmiya calls the “ethical excellence” of the relationship of the 
five care facets arises because the one-caring takes cognisance of aspects of 
self that are usually hidden both to “privilege-preserving” perceptions of 
others (prejudices, opinions, oversights) and to introspection. Whereas other 
types of epistemology use analogical inference that gives it knowledge of 
other minds based on their similarity, caring allows us, she says, to be 
cognizant of the particularity and individuality of the cared-for. The 
transition from simulation – the best way of perceiving the other as someone 
different and not merely similar to the one-caring - to full-blown caring 
indicates why the beliefs produced in this way are likely to be true, she 
argues.  
The power of caring knowledge should not be underestimated, according to 
Dalmiya. Because of the characteristic motivation behind caring (a caring 
about), caring produces reliable and valuable knowledge. She argues that  
(…) the underlying motivation of caring – to make a 
particularised other important – maps onto the (intellectual) 
desire – to make cognitive contact with reality. Both entail a 
backgrounding of the subject to create a space for the other – 
be it another person or the object of knowledge. (Dalmiya 
“Why Should a Knower Care?” 2002, 46.) 
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Dalmiya specifies that the knowledge generated by caring is different from 
‘scientific’ knowledge. It is not accuracy or ‘truth’ but rather the search for a 
coherent narrative that links the five facets of her caring ideal: caring about, 
caring for, taking care, care reception and caring about caring. Genuine 
caring contacts with people, more often than not she believes, lead to true 
beliefs about them and also to reflective knowledge. Caring, she says, in this 
sense, can be deemed an intellectual virtue, a broadening of one’s perceptive 
skills. Such knowledge, caring knowledge, is distinct from other types of 
knowledge, like empirical knowledge legitimised by science. For this reason 
she wishes to define caring epistemology not as a ‘reliability intellectual 
virtue’ but rather as a ‘responsibilist intellectual virtue’. Reliabilist 
epistemology has a domain restricted to the centres of consciousness; it is 
concerned with kinds of knowledge production like mathematics or natural 
history. The epistemological framework within which reliabilist knowledge 
works is very traditional: it is limited to judging individual beliefs only 
relevant to a restricted sphere and functions only under limited 
circumstances. Furthermore, the epistemic target is truth. Defining caring 
knowledge as ‘reliabilist’ would, therefore, argues Dalmiya exclude much of 
that which caring attempts to achieve: knowledge of other subjectivities, of 
the particularities of individuals and of their goals. The danger is that treating 
caring knowledge as reliabilist could marginalise such knowledge (and 
knowers) in a society that prioritises the type of knowledge produced by 
science and scientists very highly, warns Dalmiya.19 
Dalmiya would like caring to be not merely one of the ways of knowing, but 
as a character-type conducive to and underlying all inquiry. We might say of 
a scientist, for example, that the character underling a scientist’s care for his 
friends is also relevant for the epistemic evaluation of his scientific beliefs.20 
Caring then becomes an adjective for the knower: “he is a caring scientist” 
and it signals the effort this scientist makes in accruing knowledge of things 
and selves. Caring is then not only a “knowledge saturated skill” in the words 
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of philosopher and epistemologist Lorraine Code,21 but it is also an epistemic 
evaluation – a truth indicator – for other types of knowledge.  
Dalmiya offers an alternative to seeing caring a reliabilist epistemology: she 
argues that we should regard caring as a ‘responsibilist’ virtue. 
Responsibilism is a perspective that argues that individual beliefs are judged 
as epistemically good if they follow from a character who reveals a stable 
disposition to acquire truth-conducive dispositions and skills that ensure a 
desired cognitive end. Virtue responsibilists conceive of intellectual virtues 
as good intellectual character traits, traits like attentiveness, fair-mindedness, 
open-mindedness, intellectual tenacity and courage.22 “The concept 
‘responsibility’ allows emphasis upon the active nature of the 
knower/believer that ‘reliability’ cannot”, argues Code.23 To be intellectually 
virtuous, follows Code, “is not just to have a good score in terms of cognitive 
endeavours that come out right. It is much more a matter of orientation 
toward the world, and toward one’s knowledge-seeking self, and other such 
selves as part of the world.”24 Thus, according to responsibilism, the 
emphasis is not so much on the truth-parity but rather on the character who 
seeks knowledge. Dalmiya concludes: “the practice of knowledge-seeking is 
sustained by trustworthy knowers and ultimately, trust is founded on who we 
are, on consciousness and integrity.”25 
Epistemic vigilance 
Furthermore, argues Dalmiya, caring gives us access to information that is 
unavailable by other means. The important motivation of caring – to make a 
particular other important – involves, she says, the crucial aspect of self-
lessness.26 Selflessness is the moment in which we, along with our biases and 
expectations, recede so that the object of knowledge can present itself. 
Constant examination, in the form of reflection and inquiry, must ensure that 
the submission to the object is complete. In this manner caring involves “self-
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transcendence” and can therefore provide the basis for truth, says Dalmiya.27 
On this point Dalmiya’s approach to the phenomenon of caring is very 
similar to that of Noddings. However, Dalmiya does attempt to rectify the 
potential loss of self with her model of “imaginative” simulation without the 
self-ascribed experiences of the cared for. She says that “imaginative 
identification” involves the pretence that you are in the same situation as the 
cared-for. These ‘pretend’ states are not self-ascribed (for example, if the 
cared-for is angry and frustrated then I do not become angry and frustrated); 
these are experienced as “off-line” states and are attributed by the one-caring 
to the cared-for. However, she warns, the more dissimilar we are from the 
cared-for, the more the process of simulative caring for him is likely to miss 
the truth. The reaction of the cared-for is a continual ‘reality’ check for the 
one-caring. If simulation involves a “struggle” towards that understanding 
then, says Dalmiya, that understanding is likely to be more accurate. (In this 
aspect Dalmiya, again, resembles Noddings though, unlike Noddings, 
Dalmiya is not propagating a form of selflessness in all the stages of one-
caring which, as I argue in Chapter One, I thought a particularly bad idea.)  
But this is not the only perspective on how to deal with arduous or intractable 
caring tasks. Baier takes a different perspective on difficult caring. She 
emphasises what she calls “epistemic vigilance”. Realising that a caring 
relation is not appropriate can lead the one caring to break with caring, she 
says. In her article in response to Frankfurt’s “The Importance of What We 
Care About”, Baier lists several aspects the detection of which would make 
her want to terminate the caring relation. She argues, as starting-point, that 
caring is risky: caring makes us vulnerable in ways we need not have been to 
the losses and grief we will suffer when what we care about is defeated, or 
tormented, or dead, or permanently absent from our lives. This in itself is not 
a reason not to engage in caring but it is an indication of what is involved in 
the inevitable emotional attachments involved in caring. She acknowledges 
that being in a caring relation is being subject to the willing constraints (or 
“volitional necessities” as Frankfurt refers to them) that sweep us along either 
in a state of desire or in a state of unwillingness to stop whatever process is at 
hand.28 But, says Baier, 
(i)t is not just acts of will, but necessities too which can be 
criticised – and the resultant raised critical consciousness may 
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break the necessity reflected upon, when criticism is 
accompanied by an understanding of why we were thus 
necessitated. (Baier “Caring About Caring” 1982, 275) 
Fetishism (in the sense of fanaticism), perversity (in the Freudian sense) and 
false consciousness (in the Marxist sense) are examples provided by Baier as 
sufficient grounds for breaking with what Frankfurt calls “necessity” (the 
constraint to care). In particular, Baier insists that our understanding of our 
caring relations includes an understanding of its nature and history. Caring is 
not, she says in critique of Frankfurt, only a forward-looking, prospective 
(Frankfurt refers to caring as a type of investment)29, future relation but also 
one that has a past, says Baier. And we, reflecting critically on whether we 
want that relation or not, can conclude - as Baier does - that a caring 
relationship which cannot survive a confrontation with its own past is 
“unworthy”.30 But, she reminds us, caring is always a risky business and even 
in-depth understanding of a relationship’s past does not guarantee that we 
will care unscathed. What Baier has, apparently, found unacceptable about 
Frankfurt’s account of caring is his non-normative perspective. The additions 
that Baier makes – the conditions under which one as a one-caring is entitled 
to break with caring relations and the insistence on a past as well as a future – 
are normative qualifications. According to her, caring under conditions of 
fetishism, perversity and false consciousness is not good and should be 
desisted. Exploitation, manipulation, and deceit could clearly also be added 
to this list – these are the negative qualities that Walker is concerned to 
eliminate from a moral epistemology. 
Naturalised epistemology 
A brief introduction to Walker’s rather unique epistemological ethics is in 
order. Walker is concerned to establish guidelines or a template for a moral-
epistemic perspective in moral theory. Her Moral Understandings (1998) can 
be read as a prologue or a prolegomenon to a critique of moral reflection 
found in what she refers to as the theoretical-juridical characteristic of much 
of contemporary moral philosophy. Her alternative is to describe, by means 
of a model31, the necessary ingredients for the development of moral theory 
according to “reflective equilibrium” which seeks the best fit between our 
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intuitive judgements about particular cases and those principles we can 
recognise as “the premises of their derivation”.32  
Moral judgments, or understandings, in this approach she says, acknowledge 
the relation of judgements to theory but give neither an unimpeachable 
foundation. On the contrary, normativity is something that is collectively 
sought – it represents the best of our ‘intuitive’ judgments at a social level. 
Intuitive judgments are relatively fixed starting points and continuing 
reference points of understanding, reasoning and discussion. They are simply 
the judgments most commonly taken as being correct. Deliberation and 
debate initiate from these socially shared bases for moral thinking, often by 
means of analogical and narrative elaboration on specific cases or kinds of 
case. Intuitive judgments need to be linked to specific situations in order that 
morality retains its dynamic and contextual character. Not only should we 
harmonise our individual practices of moral judgement with the standing 
moral belief which we all more or less maintain, but we should also aim to 
harmonise judgment and action among us, argues Walker.33 Equilibrium 
should thus not only be aimed at internally to individuals but also among 
them. 
Walker rejects the idea that trans-historical moral principles are necessary for 
arriving at valid moral judgements. An objective moral judgement, she says, 
is a judgement “from the (comparatively) best epistemic position we know 
of”, such that there is no other epistemic position which trumps it.34 What we 
need, she argues, is a reliable and reflexive error theory to explain why others 
may have different moral judgements. And her chief tool for the critical 
assessment of practices is the idea, inspired by Bernard Williams, of 
“transparency”. A community’s moral account of itself, she argues, should 
not be out of step with its actual practices; neither fraud, nor manipulation, 
nor deception are to be used in order to maintain or install social practices 
that purport to be based on mutual trust. The normative thrust of Walker’s 
epistemology is that ‘appropriate’ knowledge is not generated by 
philosophical reflection, critiqued, clarified and encoded into a theory but by 
the experience of those in actual, contingent and specific situations. What 
does she mean by that? Can these practices be recognised as moral? And 
what are the benefits of doing so? 
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Walker’s moral epistemology consists of four working hypotheses: firstly, 
morality consists of practices, not theories. Secondly, those practices that 
should be traced are ‘practices of responsibility’. Thirdly, morality is part of 
shared, social life and does not exist beyond or separate from it. And 
fourthly, moral knowledge must be sought in experience. The second aspect, 
that of responsibility, I have discussed briefly in Chapter Two and shall 
summarize shortly (see Practices of responsibility below). The other three 
aspects, morality as practice, morality as shared and morality as experience I 
shall address now by taking a closer look at Walker’s “expressive-
collaborative model”, her template for what could become new moral theory. 
Furthermore, I shall examine what Walker means when she describes her 
moral epistemology as “naturalised”. 
For Walker, morality is collaborative in that it is interpersonal: it is 
constructed and sustained by means of the efforts of people together. What 
goes on morally between people is constrained and made intelligible by a 
background of understandings about what people are supposed to do, expect 
and understand. These are the ‘moral understandings’ that form the title of 
her book (1998). Morality is not only collaborative but also expressive: 
people learn to understand themselves as bearers of particular identities and 
as actors in various relationships that are defined by certain values. People 
learn to understand each other this way, says Walker, and express their 
understandings through, what she calls, “practices of responsibility”. In these 
practices, people assign, accept, or deflect responsibilities for different 
things. The combination of the collaborative element with the expressive 
element Walker calls her ‘expressive-collaborative model’.  
The three elements of attention, contextual and narrative 
appreciation, and communication in the event of moral 
deliberation might be seen, in their natural interdependence, as 
an alternative epistemology of moral understanding, or the 
basis of one. (Walker Moral Understandings 1998, 19) 
This model treats morality as “a socially embodied medium of mutual 
understanding and negotiation between people” as regards their responsibility 
for things open to human care and response.35 In this view, moral knowledge 
is thoroughly embedded in social, psychological, historical, anthropological, 
and other empirical knowledge. Moral reasoning takes the form of narratives, 
specifically, narratives of identity, relationship, and value. It presents moral 
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problems in terms of the histories and relationships of the parties involved 
and their shared understandings of what is important.36 The point of using an 
expressive-collaborative model is not only for action guidance but also for 
clarification of shared understandings and evaluation of emotional responses 
to past acts, especially failures to live up to responsibilities. Morality, writes 
Walker, “consists in a family of practices that show what is valued by making 
people accountable to each other for it,” and “what goes on morally between 
people is constrained and made intelligible by a background of 
understandings about what people are supposed to do, expect, and 
understand”.37 
The tasks of moral philosophy, on the basis of Walker’s model, are two-fold: 
first, to analyse reflectively the forms that moral life actually takes, and 
second, to evaluate those forms of moral life. The first of these tasks requires 
substantial empirical research: documentary, historical, psychological, 
ethnographic, and sociological. Walker does not distinguish between general 
empirical knowledge and knowledge of particulars. The second task, 
evaluation or critical reflection, is a testing of the moral understandings 
embedded in particular forms of moral life. It asks whether those 
understandings – about such things as who may, and who must, do what to 
whom, as well as who has standing to give or demand accounts – really are 
intelligible and coherent from all points of view within the form of moral life 
that is under examination. It looks for relations of earned trust and for places 
where only coercion, duplicity, or manipulation sustain relationships that try 
to pass themselves off as mutually agreeable understandings. With respect to 
particular forms of life, Walker’s expressive-collaborative model aims to be 
“fully normative” in the sense that it involves comparative evaluations and 
judgements of the best moral positions. That is not in a Platonic, idealistic 
way but in a comparative way: “when we ask ourselves what can be said for 
some way of life, we are asking whether it is better or worse than some other 
way we know or imagine”.38 It aims not just to record and analyse the forms 
that moral life takes but ultimately to see whether a particular form of moral 
life truly is the way to live for people 
(…) in a particular set of historical, cultural and material 
circumstances, which already include some legacy of moral 
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understandings and practices of responsibility” (Walker Moral 
Understandings 1998, 13).  
It does this by recognising that among the forms that moral life takes are 
practices of criticism and self-criticism, practices that are themselves not 
exempt from moral evaluation. Walker’s view of moral life is bottom-up 
rather than top-down: embedded life experiences inform general moral 
understandings, not the other way around.  
It is at this point that Walker’s concept of transparency comes into play. The 
significance of transparency is that “shared moral understandings create 
mutual intelligibility”, she says.39 Feminist ethics, for example she argues, 
pursue transparency by making visible gendered arrangements which 
underlie existing moral understandings, and the gendered structures of 
authority that produce and circulate these understandings. In so doing it 
magnifies “embarrassing double binds of modern morality”. This means that 
“official’ conceptions of moral agency, in which alternative forms of agency, 
judgement and responsibility are devalued or disqualified, are rejected. 
Purportedly universal norms that define moral personhood, rationality, 
autonomy and objectivity but are in fact not universally accessible positions 
or statuses under actual conditions should also be rejected. Walker’s use of 
‘transparency’ is as a tool for the deconstruction of existing and persisting 
norms and universalities, she claims: a kind of ideology critique. It reveals 
hypocrisies, double-binds, distortions and outright lies; it is in itself a 
normative instrument. But transparency is not only critical; it is also a 
normative stance in which trust and credibility are prioritised, thus enabling 
moral understandings by creating a kind of “equilibrium” between people. 
Thus, in Walker’s account of how moral epistemology works, transparency 
engenders truthful or meaningful mutual understandings. It is also a criterion 
for internally coherent lives – one’s own moral life should be transparent to 
oneself; it should be reflective to the extent that it is a subject of explicit 
consideration in the sense that people should consider what they are actually 
doing, value and care about. It should also be reflexive in that it is a critical 
and self-critical stance towards the epistemic positions that people occupy. 
Having examined in some detail Walker’s expressive-collaborative model, in 
particular what she means when she emphasises practice, interpersonal 
morality and experience as a basis for moral knowledge, I shall now look at 
what she means when she describes her moral epistemology as “naturalised”.  
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Walker’s definition of naturalised moral epistemology is that “it takes actual 
processes and determinants of human cognition and inquiry as its subject”.40 
It sees theories of knowledge as interdependent with, and subject to the same 
sorts of confirmations or (re)considerations as, whatever else we (think we) 
know, says Walker. This means that prevalent or authoritative assumptions 
will shape the direction, practice, interpretation and results of inquiry, and 
that social powers can render some people’s assumptions arbitrarily prevalent 
or undeservedly authoritative in inquiry as elsewhere.41 Epistemology, she 
argues, consists of two things: an actual production of knowledge plus 
normative standards for good epistemic practice – and both processes need to 
be taken into consideration. Naturalised moral epistemology eschews 
practices of assuming to know a priori the nature of situations and 
experiences that require moral deliberation, says Walker.42 Thus it promises 
to close a gap between formal ethical theories and circumstances where 
people need guidelines for action. Moral experience consists of how moral 
agents, singly and co-operatively, express their sense of self, situation, 
community, and agency in the responsibilities they discover and/or claim as 
theirs. Expressing and claiming are thus personal processes: the actions of 
specifically identified, located deliberators, trying to work out how to live 
well in the circumstances in which they find themselves; starting not from an 
unstructured, uncontaminated ‘original position’ but from the possibilities 
and constraints consequent upon the hand they have been dealt, insists 
Walker. Moral precepts are derived from the exigencies of practice. 
Naturalised moral epistemology begins down on the ground, where people 
attempt to know their experiences and circumstances well, to claim 
acknowledgement for what they know, and to act well in light of them. This 
kind of moral philosophy “bears a far greater descriptive and empirical 
burden, in pursuing details of actual moral arrangements, than is commonly 
thought”, she argues.43 Just as naturalised epistemology abandons the quest 
for a priori, necessary and sufficient conditions for “knowledge in general” 
in favour of examining how people actually produce knowledge variously, so 
naturalised moral epistemology seeks to discern real-world (natural) 
conditions for knowing people, events, values, and situations well enough to 
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produce responsible assessments of “the habitability of a particular form of 
moral-social life”.44  
This potential for enormous variety is what makes Walker choose a narrative 
structure of moral understanding: that narrative is a principal source of 
evidence in negotiations directed toward resolving moral problems.45 From 
narratives one can derive understandings of “how responsibilities are kept 
coherent and sustainable over substantial stretches of lives”.46 She very 
emphatically stresses the “messy state” of our moral lives that are essentially 
complex and interpersonal. It is under these circumstances that moral 
understandings are “expressive-collaborative”47 – that is, they are “a socially 
embodied medium of understanding and adjustment in which people account 
to each other for the identities, relationships, and values that define their 
responsibilities”.48 But Walker rejects accounts of human lives in the style of 
“narratives of mastery” – of completeness, of consistency, and of coherence 
told, she argues, by philosophers like John Rawls, Bernard Williams and 
Charles Taylor. She is quite cognisant of the fact that most people have 
multiple and disjointed life stories, unfinished story lines, pursued under 
trying conditions. 
Walker’s emphasis on moral practices and on experience means, necessarily, 
that she is also a relativist. “I don’t mind being some kind of relativist,” she 
writes, “as long as I am not the kind that renders individuals’ or societies’ 
moral self-criticism incoherent, or that declares inter-group or intercultural 
moral evaluation and criticism impossible or forbidden”.49 Walker’s 
particularism, and her emphasis of moral understanding as being contextual 
and situation-bound, means that she cannot make any absolute judgements 
about the most superior epistemic position. She cannot, as no one can, 
remove herself from her own particular historically and culturally specific 
normative view. Nevertheless, as she states above, she does not wish to be 
paralysed into being altogether unable to make judgements or choices 
between various epistemic positions. Walker can perhaps better be described 
as a ‘comparativist’ in that she believes that epistemic positions should 
continuously be compared with others, reflected on and the best – the most 
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‘habitable’, or most liveable - sought out. Her relativism or, what I call, her 
‘comparativism’ lies in the need she feels for the evaluation and judgement of 
contingent and specific epistemic positions.  
To summarise, Walker’s account of moral understandings is not a moral 
theory, she says, but an account of moral practices. Thus, in all its 
expressions, morality for Walker is fundamentally interpersonal; she is 
concerned with social practices, interaction between people, how moral 
orders are embodied in social orders, and how moral understandings are 
collaboratively produced and maintained. Morality for Walker is what any 
group of people is doing in a place at a time: it is experiential and naturalised. 
But this type of expressive-collaborative morality is also intensely personal: 
it takes place in a narrative structure consisting of incomplete and 
contradictory identities and values. The best moral understandings are those 
understandings according to which people find that they live best, a quality 
that is necessarily contextualised in time and place. 
But there is also a critical element in and of morality: critical reflection tests 
whether moral understandings really are intelligible and coherent to those 
who enact them and whether they are so from different or divergent 
viewpoints. Critical reflection presses towards, what Walker calls, 
“transparency”. In her interpretation, transparency demands that moral 
understandings produce intelligibility or carry authority to the extent that 
their real workings or preconditions can be grasped and acknowledged. 
‘Transparency’ in itself is not normative in a straightforward way: it is part of 
critical reflection which exposes moral understandings that are not what they 
purport to be.  
Walker’s idea of morality is that shared understandings are about the 
identities, relationships and values that make practices of responsibility 
intelligible. This responsibility yields confidence that these practices actually 
lead to a worthwhile life and in turn support relations of trust between people 
(who presume that others share this confidence and trust). When 
“transparency testing” shatters this confidence or trust, then the authority that 
made the understandings moral can wane or disappear. 
Practices of responsibility 
What are the “practices of responsibility”? Walker uses the notion of 
responsibility as a meta-ethical tool to reveal the various moral 
understandings in social life. She reads responsibilities as representative of 
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what we owe each other: who makes which social contributions and what is 
recognised and credited as such. This means that her meta-ethical tool is also 
a critical tool that can reveal arbitrary or exploitative relations of 
responsibility. 50 This makes Walker’s practice of responsibility suitable for a 
care ethics containing a critique of gendered relations of caring and the (lack 
of) social recognition thereof. 
While Walker is ‘a friend of care’, she prefers the “more capacious language” 
of responsibility as a conceptual framework for ethics to the language of 
care-taking. Responsibilities trace “our configurations of social roles and the 
boundaries of our community” as well as “the distribution of power between 
those suffering and those being held responsible”. Being held responsible 
means being made accountable, she says; her ‘ethics of responsibility’ is thus 
an ethics of accountability.51 Her practice of responsibility captures aspects of 
ethics of care also found in the care ethics of Gilligan, Baier, Noddings, Held, 
Ruddick, and Tronto. These ethicists emphasise responsiveness to particular 
others in specific (caring) relationships. Their basic claim is that specific 
moral claims on us arise from our contact or relationship with others whose 
interests are vulnerable to our actions and choices. Walker’s ethics of 
responsibility also deals with specific relationships of vulnerability but not 
only in terms of relations of dependency. Because it is specifically an ethic of 
accountability, it is concerned with issues like transparency, trustworthiness, 
and honesty. In other words, Walker’s ethics of responsibility is an 
epistemological ethics: it is concerned with normative knowledge claims in 
general rather than the more specific relational claims that caring makes. 
Walker’s practice of responsibility is particularistic in that it is based on the 
priorities that each individual gives to their lives and what they find 
important and valuable.52 There is no a priori ordering of which 
responsibilities are more or less meaningful or sustainable. This Walker 
regards as a virtue of a practice of responsibility because she does not believe 
that there is a principled way of ordering for everyone in advance which 
things matter morally, and with respect to which we may be called to 
account.53 Morally significant things, concludes Walker, our responses to 
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them and responsibility for them, play very important parts in our lives, but 
our lives are not only about or propelled by them.54  
What does Walker’s naturalised epistemology and practice of responsibility 
add to the discussion of caring as a kind of epistemology? What it adds, to 
my mind, is the important emphasis on the non-substantive and particularistic 
morality that (most) care ethics strives for. Walker, with her critique of what 
she calls “trans-historical moral principles” and “narratives of mastery”, 
deconstructs prevalent concepts of morality as existing separately from social 
practices and collaborative moral understandings. As such, Walker’s 
naturalised epistemology can be read as part of the critical tradition that 
Sevenhuijsen describes as postmodernism – though Walker does not use this 
term. The emphasis shifts away from epistemological and moral traditions 
and towards the individual and collective effort that is involved in finding 
expression of both morality and knowledge. Like Dalmiya, Walker chooses 
the notion of responsibility in knowledge production above others. 
‘Responsibility’, for Walker, captures both the reflective and reflexive 
elements in epistemology as well as the obligations that knowledge brings 
with it: responsibility for Walker is about “what we owe to each other” and as 
such generates mutual obligations.55  
Conclusion 
I have described two feminist epistemological accounts in this chapter: a care 
ethics account of virtue epistemology by Vrinda Dalmiya and a naturalised 
epistemology by Margaret Walker. There are some strong similarities 
between these two approaches. Both Dalmiya and Walker (and Baier whom 
they both cite) are actively opposed to ignorance about “what we care about”. 
Not only ignorance but also the more actively harmful practices of deceit and 
subterfuge, and arbitrariness and exploitation, are emphatically rejected.  
The emphasis of these two accounts differ however foremost because 
Dalmiya is specifically concerned with the kind of knowledge that caring 
generates and Walker is concerned with epistemology in general. Dalmiya 
regards caring as a unique means of gathering information about the person 
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that should be cared for and their situation. The aim of pursuing knowledge, 
by means of simulation and suspension of the biases and preferences of the 
one-caring, is her particular epistemic goal. Walker, on the other hand, 
wishes to grant us the moral skills to deconstruct norms which deceive or 
discriminate or purport to be something which they are not. She argues that 
lies and deceit should be deconstructed by means of a transparency test and 
those tried and tested norms can lead to endorsed epistemic goals. Whereas 
Dalmiya pursues the path of the individual one-caring who reaches beliefs by 
means of simulation; Walker urges that we look to collective processes of 
negotiated and contextual knowledge. 
Dalmiya argues that the underlying motivation of caring – to make a 
particularised other important – “maps onto the (intellectual) desire to make 
cognitive contact with reality.”56 Making another important makes us want to 
know more about him, she says. Furthermore, the special qualities of caring – 
being committed, involved, concerned, compassionate, interested – are 
beneficial adjectives for knowledge.57 The question of what the role of caring 
is in empirical philosophy, it would seem to me, is if it is possible to achieve 
a perspective at all without being in a caring relationship.  
What a reading of Dalmiya’s position makes clear is how difficult it is to 
perceive the cared-for’s predicament with a prejudiced or biased perspective. 
Dalmiya argues that caring provides an answer to this epistemological 
problem. She argues that caring is a unique and superior manner of gaining 
knowledge of the cared-for (she includes objects as well as people as well as 
scientific knowledge in her category ‘cared-for’). First of all, Dalmiya 
follows Frankfurt in arguing that we cannot just care about anything; 
who/what I care for must coincide in some way with who I am and what I 
regard as important. Secondly, to care for something is to displace interest 
from oneself to another (this is the simulation stage of caring for). Thirdly, 
the result of this displacement of interest is that the one-caring becomes 
impatient to make changes or bring improvements or solutions into effect on 
behalf of (for the benefit of) the cared-for. (Dalmiya adds ‘happiness’ to the 
effects for the cared-for; I have fundamental doubts whether achieving 
happiness for someone else is either possible or desirable.) And lastly, like 
Frankfurt, Dalmiya stresses that caring is not about liking otherwise we could 
not care for others or things that conflict with aspects of ourselves (a 
disobedient child, a racist patient, an intractable theory). Dalmiya argues 
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furthermore that caring is a valuable source of information, like our other 
sensory and intellectual capacities, and in particular because the degree of 
engagement with the other/object/scientific knowledge increases the veracity 
of the information gained. She insists that the stage of selflessness – in which 
interest in the self is suspended and displaced onto the cared-for – is the most 
innovative and differs from all other information-gathering moments. Is this 
the case? 
I maintain that Dalmiya’s account of simulation is an insightful elaboration 
on the phenomenological experience of caring (Noddings’ concept 
“engrossment”) – despite its problematic claim of selflessness. While I 
acknowledge that in order to perceive the other as distinct from myself yet 
requiring caring that I am capable of providing, a temporary suspension of 
my own interests might be needed. However I fail to see why this must result 
in “selflessness”. After all, there are many instances of caring in which I need 
not perceive the other’s reality to the extent that Dalmiya and especially 
Noddings recommend. In cases of therapeutic treatment, I can imagine that 
such an approach would be useful, particularly in cases where the one cared 
for is very different to the one caring. But caring relations are not all 
therapeutic. Caring involves taking a position in relation to the cared-for: you 
care about his state of being, his well being and perhaps even his future. 
“Selflessness’ can only be effective, to my mind, if it is momentary. This 
Dalmiya confirms by describing it as a “moment” in which the self, with its 
biases and expectations, “recedes”.58 Dalmiya does not describe the return to 
the self or how the accrued information is different to information garnered 
by a not-selfless one-caring. Dalmiya maintains that the advantage of the 
receding is that the self is transcended and a more objective basis for truth is 
provided.59 I can imagine that this process is useful in situations in which the 
cared-for is in a totally different state to the one-caring. A nurse caring for 
someone just off of the operating table must be able to – for as long as it 
takes - suspend his awareness of his own state of being in order to perceive 
the patient’s. But in order to care, and care capably as a nurse must be able to 
do, he must refer to a comprehensive field of accrued knowledge and 
experience in which the observing-, judging- and decisive-self looms very 
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large. The capacity to be caring implies both a well-developed self and the 
capacity to see the predicament of the other, I would argue.  
The feminist philosopher Iris Young takes a view opposite to Dalmiya’s. She 
questions the necessity of imagining oneself in the position of others at all - if 
you are willing and capable of listening to how others express their 
perspective.60 Just ‘listening’ is arguably too behaviourist; it focuses on the 
expression of whatever it is that the cared-for wishes to express rather than 
on what caring entails. Being in a caring relationship does necessarily entail 
imagining oneself in the position of the cared-for (Dalmiya’s simulation 
model) or the cared-for must coincide in some way with who I am 
(Frankfurt’s definition of caring).  
To return to my central question: does an epistemological approach to caring 
add to our understanding of why we care? Baier, for example, regards an 
“intolerance of ignorance” about what we care about as a sign of “real 
caring”.61 This claim resonates with an impatience and urgency that might 
very well provide a motivation to want to know more about what we care 
about - in the sense: I could not bear not knowing about my loved-ones - but 
this is not the same as motivation to care. This epistemological form of care 
ethics, I conclude, has more to do with the justification of reliable forms of 
knowledge rather than with the motivation to care. Epistemological care 
ethics has much to add to our understanding of how moral knowledge is 
accrued: it is a complex composite of intellectual and inclinational capacities; 
it is not a motivational theory. 
In the following chapter I shall look more closely at what it means to treat 
caring as a virtue and I shall be looking in detail at arguments in favour of 
seeing virtues as incipiently present natural inclinations which, if nurtured, 
can blossom into full-blown stable dispositions. I shall also be considering to 
what extent virtue can be seen as a kind of necessity: to what extent does it 
compel and how does that work? 
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CHAPTER FOUR: VIRTUE-ORIENTATED CARE 
Introduction 
Virtue-orientated caring represents a break from view of the selfless or 
minimal self in the non-normative types of care ethics that I have hitherto 
described and is an elaboration of the discussion of ‘intellectual virtues’ 
begun in the previous chapter. Virtue-orientated caring is an approach to care 
ethics that is dependent on the agent himself: his character, inclinations and 
experience. In order to be caring, according to this ethics, the moral agent 
must have the requisite inclinations and character and – above all - must want 
to care in a virtuous manner.  
This chapter represents a shift in approach to caring away from care ethics 
with a minimal self or with a primary emphasis on particularity, towards a 
type of care ethics with an enduring or stable self. I regard Dalmiya and Code 
in the previous chapter, as having made a start in describing a more ‘filled-in’ 
self. Both authors describe intellectual virtue not in terms of truth parity but 
in terms of character.1 In this chapter I shall continue with this trend: in 
virtue-orientated care ethics, the self has specific characteristics and goals 
towards which he strives – he is more fleshed-out, as it were, than the 
normatively empty or neutral selves in the ontological, postmodern and 
epistemological moral theories that I have addressed thus far.  
The function of this chapter is to act as a lynchpin between two contrary 
directions of thought in care ethics: the idea that the moral self is primarily 
reactive and the idea that the self is substantial and active. The idea of the self 
as reactive is most prominent in the personalist type of care ethics that I 
discuss in this dissertation. This is because, as I describe in the Introduction, 
care ethics distances itself from what it sees as rule-based ethics and seeks its 
allies among non-foundationalist and particularist theories. As I have argued 
throughout, I am not satisfied with the lack of normativity because it leads, to 
my mind, to an absence of motivation for caring and a moral theory without 
any normative clout. 
Virtue-orientated care ethics is a step in the direction of an ethical theory 
with a (more) normative self. But it is a step that I am ambivalent about. As I 
will argue in this chapter, any virtue-orientated care ethics that is based on a 
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naturalistic argument - the argument that it is our nature to be caring 
therefore we should be caring – is questionable. I shall state my objections to 
this type of argument and illustrate them with examples from contemporary 
virtue ethics literature. I have taken the liberty of referring to two authors 
whose domains are relatively far removed from care ethics. First of all, 
Philippa Foot – the eminent British virtue ethicists and author of Natural 
Goodness (2001) – and her notion of “natural goodness” and secondly, the 
ex-Rhodesian/British philosopher of mind and of language, John McDowell 
and his distinction between “mere” naturalist and “rational” naturalist 
approaches. Following McDowell, I argue that “mere” naturalism is 
unacceptable because it brackets that which has been labelled ‘natural’ and 
removes it from normative discussion. Given the emphasis in this chapter on 
the reflective self, McDowell’s “rational” naturalism might offer an 
alternative type of naturalism more palatable than “mere” naturalism. I will 
be discussing this alternative later on in the chapter.  
If virtue-orientated care ethics is possible without a naturalistic basis, then it 
is an ethical variety certainly worth considering. The focus on character traits 
and striving towards a teleological goal does, as I shall argue, provide a 
motivational counterweight to what I have called the ‘normative pull’ of 
caring. The virtuous self is not merely reactive. The New Zealand 
philosopher and virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse and her account of 
virtuous reasons is of great help in providing this alternative. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: I initially follow a virtue-orientated 
version of caring that describes caring as a virtue and conceives of caring as a 
capacity or a “skill”. This is a version of care ethics that has been developed 
by the American virtue ethicist Raja Halwani (in “Care Ethics and Virtue 
Ethics”, 2003). Halwani has named three characteristics of virtue-orientated 
care that he believes overlap with important characteristics of virtue ethics in 
general. They are: a focus on agents and agents’ lives; an emphasis of 
emotive and natural inclinations; and the importance of social skills. I shall 
deal with each of these in turn. I shall pay critical attention to the naturalistic 
tendencies in virtue-orientated care ethics with the help of McDowell’s two 
types of naturalism. And I argue that virtue, described as a “stable character 
ascription”, goes part of the way in explaining what it is to be motivated to be 
caring - but not all the way.  
  VIRTUE-ORIENTED CARE 
  105 
Agents and agents’ lives  
Halwani argues that care ethics should be subsumed under virtue ethics and 
to do so would be to the advantage of care ethics. He argues that virtue ethics 
and care ethics share several important features and that virtue ethics is 
capable of lending care ethics precisely that element vitally missing from 
care ethics, namely normativity. By regarding caring as a virtue, he argues, 
caring gains a “mechanism”, as it were, “by which care can be regulated so as 
not to become morally corrupt”.2 
The first overlap between virtue ethics and care ethics is the centrality of 
agents and agents’ lives. According to Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (in 
their definitive introduction to Virtue Ethics 1997), virtue ethics focuses on 
moral agents and their lives, rather than on discrete actions (telling a lie, 
having an abortion, giving to a beggar) construed in isolation from the notion 
of character, and the rules governing these actions. Virtue ethics attempts to 
look at lives as a whole, at agents’ characters as well as at their actions, they 
argue. Indeed the notion of character is key to virtue ethics – how they are 
acquired and how they are developed. In the words of Hursthouse, acting 
from virtue means that we act from “a settled state of good character”.3 
Character, in this conception, is reliable or constant. It can be depended upon 
and appealed to.  
According to Halwani, this virtue ethical notion of character could be central 
to care ethics. I elaborate on his reasons as follows: because care ethics 
distinguishes itself from rule-based ethics, it has no stable factor upon which 
to make judgements about caring because it prioritises three qualities: 
partiality, particularity and spontaneity. What Halwani argues is that 
character, conceived of as a stable disposition, offers a reliable perspective 
from which to make judgements and also does not hinder partiality, 
particularity or spontaneity. He argues that care ethics is typically concerned 
with relations of partiality:4 the agent acts in relation to another that the agent 
knows and is in relation with, such as his friend, lover or offspring. And this 
is precisely the element that distinguishes care from other altruistic motives 
that typically target strangers and perhaps acquaintances, such as 
benevolence or sympathy, pity or compassion. Also, what is involved in 
caring says Halwani, is the intimate knowledge of the person cared for. In 
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acting from care, one utilises one’s knowledge for the cared for to tailor one’s 
action to suit the needs of the cared for. 
I have dealt with the (second) quality of particularity at length in Chapters 
Two and Three. Suffice it to say here that particularity in care ethics enables 
each situation to be viewed as a (unique) moment in an individual’s life, in 
which decisions made are related to the context and specific life story of that 
individual, here and now. To put it differently, each (caring) action is agent-
relative; its relevance and meaning are related specifically to the agent 
committing the action. 
The third quality, spontaneity, is linked to the other two, partiality and 
particularity. Halwani argues that caring actions must be emotionally 
motivated in that they are spontaneous and immediate. This does not mean 
that caring actions are committed without reasons. Emotional attachment to 
someone is very often motivation for a caring action: we often react caringly 
because we are concerned about someone’s safety, or their well-being. These 
are actions that are not learnt by rote or demanded by law; they are 
spontaneous in the sense that they are individual, partial and (perhaps) 
unique.  
To conclude, Halwani argues that both virtue ethics and care ethics place 
agents and agents’ lives at the centre of their accounts. He argues that the 
virtue ethical notion of character is of great use to care ethics because it 
offers care ethics the opportunity to introduce a reliable source of moral 
judgement while at the same time retaining the important aspects of 
partiality, particularity and spontaneity in care ethics. I would concur with 
Halwani that the notion of (reliable) character does offer a grip on a type of 
moral agent that is otherwise very difficult to localise – with his 
contextuality, particularity and spontaneity. But it would seem to me that the 
focus on character does not in itself make care ethics subsumable in virtue 
ethics – there must be other compatible features too. 
According to Crisp and Slote, what must precede this focus on character is an 
account of the moral significance of inclinations. Virtue ethics is credited (by 
virtue ethicists like Crisp and Slote and Hursthouse) with giving a better 
account of the inclinations than, say, deontological or utilitarian ethics. This 
is because, Hursthouse argues, the virtues are concerned with actions and 
feelings (and not only actions).5 Care ethics, as elaborated by Nagel-Docekal 
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in the Introduction, is also concerned with inclinations – this is true for 
personalist care ethics in any case.  
Inclinations 
According to Halwani, in acting from care one typically acts from one’s 
inclinations (he uses the word “emotively” but I prefer ‘inclinations’). The 
one caring has an attachment to the cared for and is inclined to be concerned 
with his well-being. The one caring is concerned with the needs of the cared 
for, takes pleasure in his happiness, and is sad when he is not faring well. 
While I certainly agree with Halwani’s point that there is a degree of 
matching between the one caring and the cared for, I would urge that this 
model has its limits. I do not literally feel my daughter’s pain – it is her pain 
– but I will do my best to understand what she is feeling with all my 
experiential and imaginative powers. Likewise, it makes me happy to see her 
joy but it is not her joy that I am experiencing but recognition of it. Caring 
without inclinations is impossible, that I concede, but the importance of 
inclinations for care ethics does not mean that care ethics is therefore a virtue 
ethics.  
Does being a caring person involve having special kind of inclinations? For 
example, “natural inclinations”? Philippa Foot argues that having certain 
virtues, like charity or benevolence, is linked to having several other virtuous 
character traits like generosity, kindness, concern, and sympathy. Thus acting 
charitably, to take one example, for such a person is an act that is prompted 
by the having of the other traits and the desires associated with them. 
Likewise Lawrence Blum in his approach to friendship, altruism and morality 
assumes that I have the virtue of compassion if I have a compassionate 
character, and that I have a compassionate character if, simply, I am prone to 
feel and act out of compassion on suitably moving occasions.6 This quality of 
“being prone to” because of already present inclinations is what is meant by 
natural inclination. But this would mean that caring is not itself an 
inclination, but rather flows from having other inclinations, natural or other, 
like compassion, concern or empathy. 
While I wholeheartedly agree that part of being motivated to care is 
experiencing a number of inclinations – be it the ‘pull’ of the claim to care, or 
finding someone important (we need to be moved to act, after all) – I have 
reservations about concurring with the idea of natural inclinations. As I shall 
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be discussing in the section on two types of naturalism below, I do not 
believe that the precept “natural” is useful in a discussion on care ethics. 
“Natural” is mostly used in the sense of ‘essential’ and/or part of the 
foundation for the derivation of normative claims. The Scottish 
Enlightenment philosophers like David Hume and John Locke argued that 
benevolence was a natural and general human characteristic. More 
contemporary ethics does not proceed from any such assumption and I am 
inclined to argue that by assuming that any such inclination is natural to 
human beings does not substantially add to the debate on normativity in 
general. Why are some people more caring than others? If they do not posses 
such an inclination, does it mean that they are ‘unnatural’? And if they are, in 
these terms, unnatural then how could virtue ethics, or virtue-orientated care 
ethics address their lack of caring? Their answer to the question ‘Why don’t 
you care?’ would simply be: ‘Because I don’t have it in me.’ And the 
discussion would be closed. 
Social skills 
The third feature of virtue ethics that Halwani mentions overlapping with 
care ethics is social commitment or investment. There are differences 
between their approaches, however. Care ethics begins with the point that 
humans are ontologically relational while virtue ethics proceeds rather from 
the character traits of the individual - albeit for social purposes. What unites 
them, however, is that both ethical approaches rate relations or social skills as 
that which primarily motivate the moral agent. One of the main claims of 
virtue ethics is that we are social animals who need to negotiate the ways we 
are to deal and live with each other. This general claim of sociality must be 
recognised in addition to recognition that we need certain types of 
relationships without which we will not flourish, in particular with friends 
and family members. We need to partake in the pleasures of associating with 
people whom we can trust and share their joys, sorrows and activities. 
Without proper care human beings cannot generally grow up to lead mentally 
and emotionally healthy lives. In this sense, the ends and goals of intimate 
others constrain the ends and goals of the agent and the very conception of 
the agent’s life, according to Halwani. 
The point of caring, in this virtue-ethical view, is that it contributes 
significantly towards a flourishing life and for this reason is indispensable. 
This is the basis of Halwani’s virtue-orientated care argument that caring is a 
virtue - that caring goes part of the way to constitute a flourishing life. 
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“Flourishing” is characteristic of a whole life or an extended period, rather 
than an individual and separate deed or action. What do we require in order 
to flourish? Halwani’s reply is consistent with a virtue ethical perspective: we 
need to be virtuous if we are to flourish, he says. Having or attaining virtues 
requires time, effort, and good upbringing. When one has virtues, one has, 
among other things, the (socially) appropriate values, thoughts and emotions. 
Caring satisfies one of Aristotle’s criteria for being a virtue continues 
Halwani: namely being a “trait” one needs to flourish as a human being. 
Because human beings cannot grow up to lead emotionally healthy lives 
without being cared for properly, proper care is generally necessary if one is 
to flourish. Also intimate relationships are essentially characterised by caring 
and flourishing (among other things) and therefore, according to Halwani, the 
necessity of caring to a flourishing life is established. Without giving and 
receiving care the sociality and the rationality (mental health) of the agent is 
seriously endangered, he argues.7  
Halwani’s chief point that caring is virtue is based on the argument that being 
cared for is necessary for flourishing lives. Though I agree with him on this 
point (being cared for is both biologically and psychologically necessary for 
humans), his argument does not justify the conclusion on the same grounds 
that caring for others is necessary for flourishing lives. If we take a minimal 
reading of Halwani’s point then we can agree that in order to have a life of 
any worth, it is necessary to care. As de Sousa argues: “…emotions are 
essentially implicated in our capacity to live a coherent and reasonably well-
regulated life: unless you care, your life will be a mess.”8 If we wish to have 
a broader reading and infer the necessity of caring for others from the general 
human desire to have a flourishing life, then I fear that the term ‘necessity’ 
will not work. It is impossible to imagine someone who is sociable but not 
caring towards others - but it is not possible to argue on this basis that 
everyone must therefore be caring. As the care critic Sarah Hoagland argues, 
there is nothing binding in the role of the one caring that necessitates others 
to emulate this role.9  
To conclude: I have reviewed Halwani’s reasons for arguing that care ethics 
should be subsumed into virtue ethics. I have touched on three aspects crucial 
to care ethics – its agent-relativity, the role of inclinations and the importance 
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of relationality – that also overlap with virtue ethics. I argued that the notion 
of character as a form of stable or reliable disposition might be of use to a 
more normative conception of caring. This might take the form, for example: 
a caring person is compassionate, concerned, responsible, and empathetic 
(these are a few of several adjectives that could apply to a caring person). I 
could imagine that people with these character traits might be more inclined 
to be caring than someone who is self-concerned, frustrated, fickle or 
disinterested. But this does not mean that only people with a specific type of 
character can be caring, or that being caring means that you have a specific 
type of character. I am inclined to argue that being able to be caring is the 
result of a conglomeration of several character traits and that this 
conglomeration varies according to the circumstances that prompt the caring 
response. Sometimes calmness and disinterest is necessary (when pulling a 
splinter from a child’s hand); sometimes sympathy (as listener); sometimes 
clarity and consistency (in matters of moral education). I would rather argue 
that there are (several) virtues/character traits involved in caring but that 
caring itself is not a stable character trait precisely because of the various and 
flexible nature of caring. 
Furthermore, I am not satisfied with Halwani’s arguments that caring is a 
virtue on the basis of its necessary role in a flourishing life. It is necessary – 
for our physical and psychological survival - that we all are cared for, during 
significant periods of our lives. It is desirable that we are all cared for by 
significant others throughout our lives - and this will indeed contribute 
towards a flourishing life. But does follow that it is necessary for a 
flourishing life that we all care for others? It is certainly desirable and it 
might be sufficient (a lot more is needed for a flourishing life than caring for 
others, I would argue). Is it possible to conceive of someone who does not 
care for anything? It is not: even the most isolated solitudinarian must care 
for something - even if this is only his own survival. (It has been pointed out 
to me that no one will discover whether or not I am correct in arguing that it 
is not necessary for a flourishing life. The agent who does not care for 
anything or anyone does so at his own peril, so he will be the only one to 
complain.10)  
Halwani argues as follows: 
…if intimate relationships are essentially characterised by 
caring, and if flourishing is constituted by intimate 
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relationships (amongst other things), then the necessity of 
caring to a flourishing life stares us obviously in the face 
(Halwani “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics”, 2002, 183.) 
What Halwani is arguing is that caring constitutes intimate relations and 
intimate relations constitute flourishing, therefore that caring constitutes 
flourishing. He concludes from this that “without giving and receiving care, 
the sociality and the rationality (mental health) of the agent is seriously 
endangered.”11 I disagree. I would argue that caring for others does not mean 
that the one-caring will have a flourishing life and this means that caring is 
not necessary for a flourishing life but is rather a conditional or hypothetical 
assumption. The only way in which Halwani’s statement makes sense is in 
the counterfactual form: if you are not caring then you won’t have 
(successful) intimate relations and therefore will not have a flourishing life. 
This counterfactual argument, from the point of view of my own question 
(what motives to be caring?), does not work: the threat of a failed life is 
unlikely to motivate to be caring. It is as if Halwani assumes, from the outset, 
that we have a choice whether we care or not. The contrary point is made so 
clearly and aptly by Noddings and Frankfurt: you are gripped by the cared-
for in way that supersedes your will and the notions of flourishing lives or the 
normative success of being seized is not an issue. It is therefore not that 
caring is necessary for a flourishing life but that caring is necessary. 
In the following section I shall put forward my objections to naturalism in 
virtue-orientated ethics. 
Two types of naturalism 
‘Natural inclination’ is perhaps one of the clearest examples of what ethicists 
like Sevenhuijsen and Walker are opposed to: implicit assumptions with far-
reaching consequences that claim veracity beyond the realm of the empirical. 
Examples of ‘natural inclination’ arguments within virtue ethics are, I would 
argue, Foot’s assertion that humans have a natural inclination to be good;12 
Baier’s claim that good mothers need no account of obligation because they 
are already good;13 and from the terrain of care ethics, Nodding’s ontological 
argument that the mother-child relation is exemplary of good, caring 
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relations14 and Virginia Held’s use of mothering relations as the central 
model for her ethics of care.15 Noddings’ ontology also has many overlaps 
with the feminist ‘maternal thinkers’ Sara Ruddick and Jean Bethke Elshtain 
(also writing in the 1980’s). And the basis of all these arguments is that the 
relation or quality in question, the mother-child relation (or the nurturer-
child) or the inherent quality of human beings, is basic and the source of 
normativity. 
Maternal thinking is a good example of how ‘mere’ nature can be seen 
ethically. Ruddick’s maternal care is a “maternal practice”16 (that includes 
both men and women) in which she argues that the practice of parenting 
(especially mothering) better expresses the dynamics of moral life than 
contract thinking, for example.17 As in Noddings’ account of caring, the 
mother-child relation in maternal thinking exemplifies a relationship that is 
shaped by responsibility and love and nurturing, rather than by emotional 
detachment, objectivity and impersonality traditionally found in the morality 
of the public sphere.  
My concern is not to refute the socio-psychological claim that the family 
(whatever particular form it may take), and the relation between the primary 
care giver and child, is an important source of moral upbringing. Rather, my 
concern is that the appeal to some kind of natural moral inclination short-
circuits thinking critically about normativity. By labelling some morality as 
‘natural’ it is then placed out of reach of reflection. Basing the normativity of 
care on its origin as a natural inclination is however a surprisingly persistent 
argument and difficult to refute. Nevertheless I will attempt to do so. 
Take this argument about trust for example: Baier wants trust to be regarded 
as a virtue in the Aristotelian sense of lying on a mean between extremes. 
Good trust, says Baier is appropriate trustworthiness, appropriate 
trustingness, appropriate encouragement to trust as well as judicious 
untrustworthiness, selective refusal to trust, and discriminating 
discouragement of trust. This balance between all the extremes and varieties 
of trusting is a tall order, but Baier wants more. She also wants trust to be a 
virtue because of its special quality as a natural inclination. What does she 
mean by ‘natural inclination’? She means, as I understand her, that to act 
from inclination is to act as you are prone to feel without being overtly 
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prompted by factors outside of or beyond yourself. Thus Baier argues that it 
is women who are particularly well experienced in matters of trust because 
they are already subsumed in relations of trust with children and intimate 
relationships. Women have a “natural” feeling for trust, she says, because 
they are more vulnerable than men: they have long been exploited and 
dominated by men; they have been and are in relationships which, “depended 
on men’s trust in women and women’s trustworthiness to play their allotted 
role and so to perpetuate their own and their daughters’ servitude”.18  
What Baier is doing, is confusing nature and nurture: as if extended (and 
exploitative) contact with something makes it part of human nature. Baier’s 
argument that women have a ‘natural feeling for trust’, to my mind, borders 
on a form of biological determinism: trust is natural for women because they 
are most intimately acquainted with its advantages and disadvantages. One 
could just as well argue that because coal miners spend much time 
underground in the dark means that they have a feeling for darkness and are 
therefore better at being in dark.  
Not all naturalistic arguments are bad. It is possible to introduce a distinction 
between naturalistic arguments that rely on ‘mere’ nature – like some 
maternal thinkers for example - and naturalistic arguments that require the 
realisation that something is good because of the ‘fit’ between the natural 
impulses of the individual and the virtue or the reason or whatever. The 
phrase, “mere” naturalism, is McDowell’s.19 His example is that the facts 
about the nature – the “mere” nature – of wolves underlie the claim that a 
good wolf is one who pulls his weight in the hunt.20 In other words, it is basic 
to the identity of wolves that their qualifying to be a good wolf is the co-
operation in the vital activity of acquiring food. 
Human beings might have a naturally based need for the virtues, in a sense 
parallel to the sense in which wolves have a naturally based need for co-
operativeness in their hunting says McDowell, but this does not mean that 
virtuous behaviour is genuinely required by reason (as Halwani seems to be 
arguing that it is). The addition of reason means that it is possible to reflect 
on various alternative possibilities of behaviour. Even though these 
alternatives may never be actualised (like a wolf deciding, on reflection, not 
to co-operate in the hunt) and can only be considered real in the imagination, 
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it nevertheless reflects a deep connection, argues McDowell, between reason 
and freedom. The vital question might very well be asked: “Why should I do 
this?” And the answer will appeal to whatever it is that humans (or wolves 
supposing that they acquire rationality as McDowell whimsically does) need. 
What rationality does is to enable one to step back and view these needs from 
a critical standpoint – thus when they become reasons, their status as reasons 
is, by the same token, immediately open to question. 
The other type of natural inclination argument mentioned by McDowell, the 
one that argues that there is some kind of fit between the nature of something 
and whose realisation transcends that, can be described as a “reflective” 
naturalism. It too has an internal source of goodness but it needs continual 
reference to outside possibilities and judgements. Foot, in her book Natural 
Goodness, takes McDowell’s critique of her earlier position as representing 
that of “mere” nature into consideration.21 She argues, for example, that the 
rational will is good22 and that a genuine virtue “fits the individual for his 
own good”.23 In the concluding paragraph of her book, Foot introduces the 
sentiments as a way of reflecting on the ‘fit’ of nature and reason. She 
follows the philosopher David Wiggins in arguing that human sentiments are 
relevant: there is a way in which a good person must not only see his good as 
bound up with goodness of desire and action, but also feel that it is, with 
sentiments such as pleasure, pride and honour.24 By this she means, I take it, 
that a person doing good will feel pleasure. I fear however that a person 
doing ‘bad’ might also feel pleasure – a misgiving which indicates that Foot’s 
argument is rife with potentially problematic moral realisms (good is a good).  
But to return to the idea that caring is good because it is natural: we can now 
distinguish between two types of approaches that are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. First, one can argue that humans are inherently relational and 
therefore need virtues in order to get on well with each other. This is Foot’s 
position on virtue25 and it is also the idea behind Halwani’s argument that 
caring is an important virtue. Virtues, in this conception, are capacities, or 
“excellences” that can be developed in order to achieve a flourishing (and 
sociable) life.  
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Second, one can argue that caring is naturally good because it is intrinsic to 
human nature. Care ethicists, like Noddings, who refer to maternal thinking 
regard the mother-child relation as a model for this intrinsic goodness. Daryl 
Koehn, an American ethicist and author of Rethinking Feminist Ethics 
(1998), typifies this approach as privileging the biological relations of 
reproduction and nurture. Her objection to this is that, on an empirical basis, 
“others have observed that reproduction itself can be seen as the selfish 
attempt of the parent to reproduce his or her life in the child”.26 While this is 
biologically sound (it is reproduction after all), it is not normatively sound: 
narcissistic caring risks reinforcing selfishness (though it need not necessarily 
– not all parents are selfish). And, as I concluded in my critique of Baier, 
there is a real danger of committing a naturalistic fallacy because something 
plucked from the nature of human beings will not imply that it is morally 
desirable.  
But to follow McDowell’s’ advice, what we need here is the presence of 
reason to create the freedom between what we might (or might not) naturally 
feel inclined to do and what we choose to do. Halwani, in his favour, argues 
for a combination of reason and caring: he argues that reason has an 
important regulative role to play in intimate relationships because reason can 
assess whether intimate relationships are morally desirable27 - but he does 
insist at the same time that caring is natural. As an alternative to naturalist 
arguments, I will explore Hursthouse’s argument that acting virtuously, and 
believing that this is the right way of acing, is another way of being morally 
motivated. 
How does Virtue Motivate? 
Rosalind Hursthouse, in her book On Virtue Ethics (1999, especially chapters 
4 through to 7) has an alternative to the naturalist quandary of virtue: the 
virtuous person does not act from inclination, she argues, but from reason. 
Her critique of acting from inclination that follows will lead, to my mind, to a 
very graceful combination of virtue and reason. 
What does it mean ‘to act from inclination’, asks Hursthouse? She begins by 
thinking of certain emotions, say sympathy, compassion and love, as good 
and nice ones. Without having to answer the question as to what such an 
emotion is, or what it is like to feel one, we can say that each 
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characteristically involves such desires as the desire to help others, to comfort 
them in their affliction, to give them what they want and need. In other 
words, we can say that these emotions motivate one to do such things, and 
also that they characteristically involve emotional reactions – felt pain and 
sorrow at another’s pain or grief, felt pleasure or joy at another’s pleasure or 
joy. There are however important differences between people: some are very 
prone to feel these emotions, others very little or not at all. This seems to 
indicate a difference in their characters: the former are charitable or 
benevolent; the latter callous and selfish. So we might regard possessing the 
virtue of charity as being very prone to feeling these emotions on suitable 
occasions. A further difference between people is that some are very prone to 
feeling these emotions without being prompted into action by them, whereas 
others need to be prompted. Thus possessing the virtue of charity is being 
very prone not only to feeling but to acting from the emotions of sympathy, 
compassion, and love, prompted by the desires associated with them. 
(Possessing the virtue x is being very prone to feel and act from the emotions 
of a, b, and c.) 
Can one possess the virtue but not the appropriate character? Hursthouse 
argues that someone who tends to help others and to spread happiness 
around, but feels no joy over their joy or sorrow when she cannot help, lacks 
the virtue in question. For an emotion to be a virtue, it requires the 
appropriate feeling. To be virtuous from inclination means, for example, that 
in order to have the virtue of compassion I must have a compassionate 
character. 
The problem with the notion of virtue being dependent on inclination, I 
would think, is that even people with benign inclinations are liable to go 
wrong in a number of ways. They are liable to go wrong because the 
emotions are (sometimes) unreliable as sources of acting well. In short, the 
emotions of sympathy, compassion and love, viewed simply as psychological 
phenomena, are no guarantee of right action, or acting well. There is nothing 
about them, qua natural inclinations, which guarantees that they occur “in 
complete harmony with reason”, that is, that they occur when, and only 
when, they should, toward the people whose circumstances should occasion 
them, consistently, on reasonable grounds and to an appropriate degree (as 
Aristotelian virtue requires). Moreover, when they are fortunate enough to hit 
on something beneficial and right, they still need to be regulated by 
experience and good judgement, namely ‘practical wisdom’. They may 
prompt one to a good end, but the agent still has to be good at deliberation to 
be (reasonably) sure of attaining it, and the good of others, though a desirable 
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end, is not the only good to be pursued in acting well. Someone’s welfare, a 
desirable end, might not best be achieved by means of goodness alone. 
No, the virtuous agent does not act from inclination but from reason, 
concludes Hursthouse. However this is not to relegate the emotions to an 
insignificant role. On the contrary, Hursthouse argues that she thinks that the 
emotions are morally significant. This statement is made up of three claims, 
she says: first, that the virtues (and vices) are morally significant. Secondly, 
that the virtues (and vices) are all dispositions not only to act, but to feel 
emotions, as reactions as well as impulses to action. And thirdly, that in the 
person with the virtues, these emotions will be felt on the right occasions, 
towards the right people or objects, for the right reasons, where ‘right’ means 
‘correct’.  
What the third claim introduces is the crucial notion of feeling emotions 
rightly or correctly where ‘correctness’ is a cognitive notion achieved in a 
moment of reflection. Hursthouse’s claim is that full virtue involves feeling 
emotions correctly and that this would not be possible without the influence 
of reason. For, in virtue of our reason, we draw the distinction between what 
appears to us to be so, and what is really so - in language. We can express our 
ideas or thoughts or perceptions about generic good and evil in sentences 
which figure, in our languages, as expressions of how things appear to us to 
be – as beliefs which are up for assessment as true or false, correct or 
erroneous, reasonable or unreasonable.  
The best connection between virtue and the emotions is education, says 
Hursthouse. Language has to be taught and therefore moral education and 
upbringing is an essential part of the formation of a virtuous agent. If we 
can’t come up with the right emotional reactions, then we fail people who tell 
us that they have suffered or what they have endured. This is a moral failure. 
Equally so, the person who is thoroughly cold-hearted as an adult is 
responsible for his indifference (unless they are psychologically incapable of 
doing so). We bear, in this sense, the responsibility for our own characters 
because we all have the opportunity to learn to improve our characters 
through time. 
Hursthouse argues that we need reasons for action: that even if we act 
virtuously, we need to have reasons about and for virtuous action. Moral 
action she defines as acting from virtue – “acting from a settled state of good 
character”. It is neither necessary nor sufficient to have the explicit thoughts 
about right action, obligation or principle; we still need reasons to act 
morally. All these aspects: reason, emotion, education and beliefs, constitute 
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‘character’. And, argues Hursthouse, it is character as a whole and not some 
one feature of it that motivates. She concludes her chapters on moral 
motivation with: 
…(W)hat is both necessary and sufficient for a virtuous act to 
be ‘morally motivated’ is that it is done from a state of 
character that adequately resembles the state of character from 
which the perfectly virtuous agent acts. (Hursthouse On Virtue 
Ethics 1999, 159 – 60) 
She argues that ascribing moral motivation, “because she thought it was 
right”, is ascribing something that goes far beyond the moment of action. It 
makes a claim about what sort of person the agent is – a claim that “goes all 
the way down”.28 That is why it is an important feature of our ethical thought: 
“we can give no higher praise to an agent with respect to her action than to 
ascribe it”.29 The consequence of this, argues Hursthouse is that we do not 
need the (first-person) thoughts ‘This is right, virtuous, noble, my obligation’ 
or what have you. They are not necessary for moral motivation nor are they 
sufficient: the (third-person) ascription of a character trait is so significant 
and profound that no further mechanisms of motivation are needed. 
Conclusion 
One of the important shifts of emphasis that takes place in this chapter is that 
particularity and diversity of situation are no longer the determining features 
of moral experience. The emphasis on virtue combines the aspect of a unique, 
individual or personal perspective with striving towards a common goal – 
flourishing lives. Focussing on virtue means making character and 
flourishing lives the prime objects of normative investigation and this means 
that virtue-orientated care ethics focuses on the self and its capacities rather 
than merely developing a response to the ‘normative pull’ of caring. 
I have examined two kinds of virtue-orientated care ethics: one based on 
naturalism (the maternal thinkers are the best examples) and a more socially 
orientated virtue ethics, namely Halwani’s account. I rejected the former as 
being based on a naturalistic fallacy – if being virtuous is ‘naturally’ present, 
then we hardly need a theory to support it. The addition of McDowell’s 
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“reflective naturalism” to the discussion on virtue and Foot’s idea of a “fit” 
between nature and reason brings the discussion back into the realm of virtue 
ethics.  
The alternative approach to naturalism is to argue that virtue is necessary for 
social flourishing. If Halwani can prove that caring is necessary for social 
welfare, then we have grounds for arguing that virtue-orientated care ethics is 
indeed ethical. Halwani’s arguments are extremely general: he argues that 
intimate relations are essentially characterised by caring and therefore the 
necessity of caring to a flourishing life is established. He fails to present 
compelling arguments for why we necessarily need to be caring in order to 
flourish and therefore that caring is a primary virtue. Although I cannot 
conceive of a flourishing life (whatever this is has not been specified) without 
caring, this does not convince me that therefore caring is a virtue. (I cannot 
conceive of a flourishing life without humour - but this does not make 
humour a virtue.) 
Hursthouse’s virtue account of motivation I find more compelling than the 
previous accounts because she has a holistic notion of character and what it 
takes to be motivated. She argues that one needs reasons to convince oneself 
that what one is doing is right and that these reasons are not random but are 
consistent with one’s character. Thus one does not do virtuous deeds as much 
as act from virtue. Virtue does not lie in human nature or in human 
flourishing but in stable (learned and acquired) character ascription, she 
argues. Virtue, in this perspective, is not natural but acquired. I could very 
well imagine caring - in part - being an acquired skill. It is, after all, 
something that happens in relation to the cared-for and the success of caring 
can be measured in terms of how the cared-for responds.  
What is primarily missing from this virtue-orientated account however is the 
aspect of the compelling and necessary character of caring as described by 
Noddings and Frankfurt. The virtue-orientated perspective has added the 
notion of the agent with stable and reasoning virtuous dispositions but it is as 
if the scale has swung too far over towards this stable and reasoning agent. 
Where is the one-caring in the grip of a concern for something that he cannot 
and is unwilling to relinquish? Where is the compelling urge to care, the 
irresistible motivation to invest in the future of someone?  
In the following chapter I shall focus on a very different approach to how 
caring can be seen as compelling. I shall look at a furbished concept of 
obligation with the aim of showing how endorsement makes moral 
motivation work. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: REFURBISHED OBLIGATION 
Introduction  
I have argued at several places in this dissertation that caring is, in large part, 
something that happens involuntarily. The normative pull of finding someone 
important, or being faced with a plea for help, or some kind of appeal to your 
compassionate self, is not a reaction that occurs - initially at least – willingly, 
or contemplatively, or perhaps even consciously. Caring is the moment of 
being compelled or propelled into a whirlpool of wanting, hoping, 
compassion, anxiety, and commitment. Frankfurt calls this a “prospective” 
investment in the object of care; Noddings calls this process “engrossment” 
and Dalmiya elaborates on this concept as a form of “motivational 
displacement” in which we must act in “accordance with the point of view of 
the cared-for himself for his good”.1  
The virtue-orientated, political and constructivist accounts of caring 
(Halwani, Sevenhuijsen, Walker and Tronto, for example) emphasise what 
could be called the ‘competent’ aspects of caring: the volitional and reflective 
application of, among other qualities, virtue, responsibility, trust and 
solidarity. I have argued thus far that there is an imbalance in these accounts: 
that the more compelling accounts of caring contain too few competent 
elements (to the extent of the complete loss of the self at some points) and 
that the accounts of competency are not nearly compelling enough. I seek an 
account that contains both compulsion and competency, for both are 
desirable in an account of caring: the compelling aspect to explain why we 
would engage in what is often demanding, sometimes strenuous and even 
risky commitments. And the competent element because, in order to form the 
basis of a theory about moral behaviour, it must have normativity; it must 
address the moral agent and his behaviour in a prescriptive fashion. 
I want a concept that combines the notion of the compelling or involuntary or 
(morally) necessary with the competent or the skilled. Frankfurt speaks of 
“volitional necessity” which places the emphasis on being willingly 
compelled or necessitated – or not unwillingly necessitated. I wish to do 
something similar because I believe (and have argued in Chapter One) that 
this combination of contrary concepts describes precisely the effect of the 
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 Dalmiya 2002, 36. 
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normative pull cared-for has on the one-caring. In addition, I want a concept 
that expresses being compelled to care but nevertheless doing so 
competently, reasonably and reflectively - thereby adding a normative 
dimension to the activity of caring. 
The concept I have chosen is obligation. ‘Obligation’ captures both the 
element of being compelled or forced but, as I shall argue here, it is not mere 
brute force: it is a delimiting, guiding and informing normative concept. 
While care ethicists are rigorously opposed to anything even resembling a 
law-like approach to ethics because it is supposed to be impersonal and 
universalist,2 I shall argue here that the idea of self-legislated laws or duties 
offers ethics of care an advantage. The concept of obligation offers the 
opportunity to shift attention - in part - away from the mesmeric pull of 
caring and focus more on the regulative and reflective role the agent can play 
in committing himself to caring. I shall spend time examining the idea of 
obligation as a particular type of motivation, a type which I argue is 
compatible with several important features of care ethics.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: first I shall examine my reasons 
for choosing obligation, that concept to which most care ethicists are so 
opposed, as a useful concept for care ethics. Second, I shall look at several 
care ethicists’ critique of Kantian moral philosophy to find out what it is 
precisely that care ethicists object to. And third, I shall refer to recent Kantian 
discussions on the desirability of the concept of obligation and their reply to 
the critique that this concept is impartial and only achieved at the expense of 
integrity.  
Why obligation? 
I argue that a (renewed) look at the concept of obligation will offer care 
ethics the opportunity for further development, especially as regards the 
moral agent’s capacity to be able to decide how and on what terms to care. 
The concept of obligation does need some serious revamping or refurbishing 
though. It is a concept with a very bad press, having come to represent 
everything that liberty-loving, free agents despise and revile. Obligation, and 
its association with “duty” and especially with the Kantian Categorical 
Imperative, is so contentious that it has evoked strong negative reactions 
(thereby indirectly crediting it with notoriety and significance). Nietzsche’s 
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 See the section on care ethicists’ critique of Kantian moral philosophy below. 
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reaction (to the categorical imperative in particular) is perhaps the most 
extreme: 
Und durfte man nicht hinzufügen, dass jene Welt im Grunde 
einen gewissen Geruch von Blut und Folter niemals wieder 
ganz eingebüsst habe? (Selbst beim alten Kant nicht: der 
kategorische Imperativ riecht nach Grausamkeit)… (Nietzsche 
Genealogie der Moral II, 6 (KSA 5.300) 
And it has also evoked ridicule. Amongst her comments on Kant’s command 
to do our duties cheerfully, Baier exclaims: 
This is the ultimate in deontology – a string of commands, of 
which the last reads, “Enjoy obeying the above commands”. 
For example, in Singapore, the injunctions issued by authorities 
to the people read: “Don’t spit”, “No gum-chewing”, etc. 
ending with “Have some spontaneous fun!” (Baier Moral 
Prejudices 1994, 276) 
But even apart from these two rather extreme reactions, obligation is a 
contested concept in moral philosophy, associated for many with what are 
regarded as the more negative characteristics of Kantian moral philosophy: 
rules without content, universalist (achieved by means of ignoring all 
particularities) and quasi-metaphysical (on the basis of whose authority must 
duties be obeyed?). In addition, on a practical level, duties are associated 
with demanding and sometimes onerous responsibilities in life, commanded 
from above by church, state or society and usually carried out 
unenthusiastically (not to mention joylessly). Can obligation be rescued from 
this philosophical doghouse? 
One alternative would be to drop the term obligation altogether because of its 
diverse negative associations. Korsgaard describes how obligations are 
cursed by several philosophers, accused of being constraining and forbidding, 
even “repellent and corrupting” - though this does not discourage her from 
using the term.3 I shall retain obligation because I wish to invoke the 
philosophical debate on this contentious concept. Obligation is a more 
everyday concept – it is one we can and do use in daily life usually meaning 
must (in the sense: I am obliged to return my library books on time if I want 
to avoid being fined). Obligation, on the other hand, has a specific ring to it 
and we use it in specific contexts: it refers to an ultimate or supreme type of 
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 Cited in the “Introduction” by Onara O’Neill to Korsgaard 1996, xii. 
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moral compulsion (I might say, for example, that I have an obligation to vote. 
In other words, I shouldn’t not use my right to vote.) It can also provoke an 
angry (knee-jerk) reaction and that is precisely because it is a concept that 
has authority and history and a series of associations of being commanded 
and having to obey. When I say I have an obligation to do something I am 
saying that I am compelled to do it. I am not logically or causally compelled; 
I have such compelling reasons such that I cannot forbear from a certain 
course of action. In fact though, despite their various associations, obligation 
and duty mean the same. Both refer to a system of morality that – supposedly 
- lies outside of us. In order to remain consistent I shall use obligation. 
My understanding of what an obligation is is the following: the binding 
nature of obligation is an internal happenstance (and not primarily external). 
To undertake an action because you perceive it to be an obligation is to 
concur with commitments that you yourself undertook. Or, to put it 
differently, certain duties will emerge out of specific sets of commitments4. 
Obligations, therefore, come from somewhere. They can be generated 
entirely outside of yourself, for example in the sphere of state and public 
justice; but if they are moral commitments then they are commitments, in a 
very general sense, to aspects of yourself, for example, to cultivate one’s 
talents or to strive to improve one’s moral behaviour.5 These kinds of 
prescriptive principles are what Kant called “duties”6 and these duties can be 
understood in the sense of having a personal undertaking or commitment to 
oneself or to others.  
An example: if I say that I have an obligation to read my son a bedtime story 
(instead of watching the eight o’clock news), what do I mean? This is 
because I believe that the daily reading of a bedtime story calms and soothes 
him and prepares him for sleep and that these considerations outweigh my 
desire not to. Wherein does the obligatory part of my daily bedtime reading 
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 Korsgaard goes so far as to argue that obligations are a result of one’s moral identity 
and in this sense must be obeyed or one will face the extirpation of one’s own identity 
(1996, section 1.2.2, 16 – 18). 
5
 These examples are ones given by Kant in his Groundwork and Doctrine and refer to 
what he calls “imperfect duties”: duties which are prescriptions of general ends and 
require judgement (rather than obedience) to fulfil them (“perfect duties” are 
proscriptions of specific types of actions, the violation of which are morally 
blameworthy). But Kant also describes imperfect duties towards others: the 
prescription of benevolence (Groundwork) and the promotion of the happiness of 
others (Doctrine). 
6
 I shall not distinguish here between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duties. 
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lie? I regard it as an obligation – a self-imposed obligation I must hasten to 
add – because even when I don’t feel like reading, I can refer to that part of 
my belief that says that it is a good thing to do, not only for him but for me 
too (if he sleeps restfully, after all, then I can watch the ten o’clock news 
instead). My belief that it is ‘a good thing to do’ transcends any short-term 
lack of desire that I might have to skip reading to him. But what makes it 
compelling? Well, if my goal is that he sleep restfully and I know that 
reading to him helps to achieve that goal, then in the interests of a good 
night’s rest (for both of us), I must read to him. Furthermore, he expects me 
to read to him – his bedtime story is part of a going-to-bed ritual on which he 
is also dependent for a good night’s sleep. In short, I have an obligation to 
read to him – and while it might not be an absolute obligation because on 
some occasions it is just not possible to read to him for all kinds of 
intervening reasons – it is a general commitment upon which both of us rely. 
And in moments of reluctance on my part to read, I recall my reasons for 
reading in the past; I treat it as an obligation, as something I must do (if I can 
do so). Because of my and his expectations (his good night’s rest) I am 
compelled to read to my son, in the sense that my reasons for doing so are so 
compelling that I cannot forebear from reading to him.  
Care ethicists’ critique of Kantian moral philosophy 
For the sake of clarity, I will briefly repeat a few general characteristics of 
care ethics that I have already mentioned in the Introduction. Care ethics is 
generally explained by contrasting it either with so-called contract theory or 
with Kantian morality.7 The individual in contract theory, or in theories 
derived from it, is portrayed as being impartial, rational and abstract. And the 
moral identity of this subject of moral theory is conceived as being entirely 
independent of the history and culture of which the subject comprises a part. 
In other words, it is a subject that understands himself as abstracted from his 
own particularity and identity. This subject has been described by the 
political philosopher Michael Sandel, in a critique of Rawls as “the 
dispossessed self: the self who, strictly speaking, has nothing”.8 The problem 
is that this model, with its ideal and abstracted subject, has become 
paradigmatic for our concepts of social relations, argues Verkerk, which 
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 These two approaches converge in the political philosopher John Rawls, author of A 
Theory of Justice 1971, for example. 
8
 Michael J. Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 1982 (1998), for example 
page 85. 
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means that relationality, dependence, embeddedness and vulnerability are 
seen as deviating from the paradigm.9 
Accounts of care ethics, au contraire, emphasise responsiveness to particular 
situations. The morally salient features of these situations are perceived with 
an acuteness thought to be made possible by the carer’s emotional posture of 
empathy, openness, and receptivity.10 Responding to the needs of others in 
their concrete specificity is understood as responding to them as unique, 
irreplaceable individuals rather than as “generalised others” regarded simply 
as representatives of a common humanity, as Seyla Benhabib argues in “The 
Generalised and the Concrete Other” (1986). And it is the conclusion of 
Virginia Held (philosopher, feminist and author of texts on, amongst others, 
women’s morality) that  
Caring empathy, feeling for others, being sensitive to each 
other’s feelings – all may be better guides to what morality 
requires in actual contexts than may abstract rules of reason or 
rational calculation.”(V. Held “Feminist Reconceptualisations 
in Ethics” in Janet Kourany (ed.), Philosophy in a Feminist 
Voice 1998, 100). 
It shall not come as any surprise, then, that care ethicists distinguish their 
ethics from what they perceive to be the greatest shortcomings of Kantian 
moral philosophy.11 There are two particularly important kinds of criticism of 
Kantian morality made by care ethics.12 Firstly, care theorists argue that 
Kantian moral philosophy is only concerned with moral impartiality and the 
preferences of ‘abstracted’ individuals. This emphasis, they argue, 
unfavourably contrasts reason to affectivity or relationality and the 
consequence is that this type of moral philosophy excludes the identity of 
humans as fallible and vulnerable but only sees them as being reasonable and 
                                                          
9
  Marian Verkerk 1994, 57. 
10
 According to Lawrence Blum, care theorist and author of “Care” in the 
Encyclopedia of Ethics 1992, cited in Jaggar 1995, 180. 
11
 A note on terminology: though Verkerk distinguishes between contract theory and 
Kantianism though most other care ethicists do not, so I shall persist in representing 
the opposition as being one between care theorists on the one hand and Kantians on 
the other. 
12
 There are too many names to provide a comprehensive list of those care ethicists 
with a Kant or Rawls critique, so a few names will have to suffice: Annette Baier 
(1994), Marilyn Friedman (1987), Carol Gilligan (1982), Virginia Held (1998), Daryl 
Koehn (1998), Mary Jean Larrabee (1993), Rosemarie Tong (1999), Joan Tronto 
(1996), Marian Verkerk (1994). 
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autonomous. And this is because Kantian moral philosophy supposedly 
excludes non-formal, relational issues. What is meant by ‘non-formal’? In the 
words of Benhabib: 
Even in highly rationalised modern societies where most of us 
are wage earners and political citizens, the moral issues which 
preoccupy us most and which touch us most deeply derive not 
from problems of justice in the economy and the polity, but 
precisely from the quality of our relationships with others in 
the spheres of kinship, love, friendship, and sex. (“The Debate 
over Women”, 187 cited in Maria Pia Lara Moral Textures. 
Feminist Narratives in the Public Sphere 1998, 202) 
Identity in care ethics - a combination of autonomy, individuality and 
vulnerability – is not formed on the basis of formal principles. Rather non-
formal relations characterised by affection, connection, and compassion, for 
example, form identity. And this leads Held to suggest, as ‘maternal thinkers’ 
like Ruddick and Noddings also do, that these non-formal relations are found 
in the practice of nurturing: 
…the most promising model, symbol, or metaphor for 
autonomy is not property, but child-rearing. There we have 
encapsulated the emergence of autonomy through relationship 
with others… Interdependence (is) a constant component of 
autonomy. (V. Held “Feminist Reconceptualisations in Ethics” 
1998, 108) 
Thus that aspect which care ethicists most urgently wish to rectify in what 
Sandel calls the “dispossessed” individual: the aspect of people’s 
connectedness to each other. It is a connectedness that presupposes a series of 
attitudes (like responsiveness, openness, and empathy) and a consequence of 
having these attitudes is that individuals are primarily identified with “non-
formal” relations of affection, compassion, interdependence and 
vulnerability. 
The second objection addresses features of the Kantian ideal of supreme 
moral law. Care ethicists reject concepts of moral law like the Categorical 
Imperative and ‘obligation’ because, so they argue, the application of a 
general law requires that we abstract the object of our moral assessment from 
its particularity. What is lost if we maintain a moral law is a sense of the 
uniqueness of persons and their contexts and histories, or a sufficiently 
informed and compassionate standpoint from which to judge them, they 
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argue. From a critical perspective, the Kantian moral agent “views its objects 
“thinly” – with an eye merely to their possible subsumability under some 
abstract rule”.13 The general conclusion of such critique is that Kantian moral 
philosophy is universalist to the exclusion of particulars, and it is these 
particulars that give each human being a unique history and set of relations 
and affiliations. Abstracted from its feminist context, what this objection 
amounts to is scepticism with regard to Kant’s claim to derive from an 
abstract law of practical reason particular moral laws or duties adequate to 
the complexities of human life.  
The concern is that the idea of disconnecting ourselves from particular others, 
which is what Kantians supposedly do, might render us incapable of 
morality, rather than capable of it. In other words, responding to particular 
others is not only an irreducible part of that type of morality which care 
theorists endorse, but also that which - in their view - characterises morality. 
Furthermore, care ethics is also concerned with ‘specific’ others: in other 
words, the feelings of attachment, or compassion, one might have for a 
loved-one. For this reason, Kantian moral philosophy is seen as ‘anti-care’. 
This is an important objection to Kantian morality and shall be addressed at 
greater length in the section Imputing impartiality.14 
An example of how the Kantian preference for abstraction and universality 
precludes other kinds of moral reasoning is given by Gilligan’s critique of 
Kohlberg. According to Gilligan, the incorporation of a “different voice” 
seems to demand that the Kantian moral hierarchy, with impartiality at its 
pinnacle, must be given up. Gilligan argues that if the affective sides of our 
natures cannot play a constitutive role in the making of the strictly moral side 
of our characters, this may be a problem for those who place special value on 
and confidence in their capacities to feel, and who experience feeling as an 
integral part of and aid to judgement. 
Feminist critique challenges not the importance of human judgement and 
self-determination, but the supposed independence of judgement and self-
determination from and priority over the relational aspect of our natures. The 
Kantian picture of agency, according to this view, seems to presuppose a 
context of distrust because it seems that relations of dependency are thought 
to endanger the capacity of self-determination and to interfere with the ability 
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 Cited in Sedgwick 1990, 78. 
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 There are several other important objections to Kant’s philosophy including his 
gender bias. I shall not deal with this particular objection here. 
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to be impartial in the face of competing self-interest. Left solely to the 
devices of inclination, I am a threat to my moral self and I threaten to neglect 
or infringe upon the moral selves of others.15 
To those for whom identity formation involves community and 
connectedness to others in an essential way, the Kantian conception of 
autonomy – perceived of like this - is obviously problematic. Gilligan argues 
that it is not so much self-determination and independence that figure as 
central ingredients of female identity, but empathy, co-operation and trust. 
Another ‘caring’ kind of self-determination would place less emphasis on 
detachment as a necessary precondition. According to this view, the other is 
experienced not so much as a potential threat but as someone to be 
understood and someone through whom I may come to understand or know 
myself. Female identity for Gilligan is formed not in isolation but in 
connection with others – both autonomy and moral obligations are drawn 
from this context. This is because needs and interests of members of 
community change – contexts change – therefore there is no guarantee that 
what is identified as the ground of obligation or of human dignity will be 
beyond revision. There is no a priori metaphysical foundation (Baier makes a 
similar point in “Trust and Antitrust” 1994). Gilligan’s autonomy is based on 
the capacity to care for and connect with others. Moral ends are real-world 
relationships, she says, not antecedently fixed ends that inhabit a transcendent 
side of the self.  
To summarise, care theorists regard Kantian moral theory, and contract 
theory, as containing an insufficient account of the various elements of 
human identity that care ethics regards as essential: not only autonomy and 
individuality but also connectedness. Thus, for care ethicists, moral theory 
should be preoccupied with the quality of our relationships with others, 
including interdependence and affection, rather than with the abstract and 
impartial values required of political and social institutions. Some care 
ethicists argue specifically that women’s experiences have been excluded 
from traditional ethical values. In general, the Kantian conception of the 
individual as impartial and “extracted” from particularities is regarded as 
particularly problematic. Also, Kantian concepts like obligation, obligation 
and moral law are regarded as incomplete or insufficient reflections of the 
complexity and particularity of human life because they are “universalist” 
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 Kant’s supposed ‘context of distrust’ is typified by Sedgwick 1997, 93. Her own 
position however is that Kant does not require that we abstract away from the 
particularities of any given case, op cit 95 and footnote 50. 
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concepts. Any morality that cannot reflect that complexity, argue care 
ethicists, fails to have any relevance to real, partial and particular life. 
Kantians to the defence 
Obligation need not be monolithic or insensitive as its critics would imply. 
On the contrary, as I shall argue here in this rehabilitation of the concept, 
obligation is not only capable of expressing a complex and profound moral 
standpoint, it is also an essential notion in the demarcation of motivation for 
moral actions in real lives. Obligation, namely, is a particular type of moral 
commitment, expressing a rigorous endorsement of a prescribed course of 
action; or, as Korsgaard refers to obligation: it is self-legislative. While this 
denotation of what an obligation is is very general, there is nothing in the 
meaning of obligation that necessarily excludes partialities or particularities. 
On the contrary, as I shall argue, obligation is neither impartial nor does it 
lack sensitivity to context and situation. 
The claim, or rather accusation, that Kantian morality fails to reflect real, 
partial and particular life is one that has been taken seriously by two 
defendants of Kantian moral philosophy: Barbara Herman and Marcia Baron. 
Although Herman and Baron are responding to critique that originates from 
philosophers such as Bernard Williams, Michael Stocker and Susan Wolf, I 
would argue that the content is significantly similar to the objection of care 
ethicists to Kantian moral philosophy. The objection that a conception of 
morality as obligation cannot reflect ‘real life’ shall be addressed directly, 
after I have examined Herman’s and Baron’s reply to their critics. They do 
this in two stages: first of all by arguing that obligation and inclination are 
not (by Kant) and should not (by us) be separated from each other. And 
second by arguing that acting on the basis of obligation is not achieved at the 
expense of a loss of an important characteristic of humans – namely, 
‘integrity’. The concept of obligation that emerges from Herman’s and 
Baron’s defence is significantly closer to ‘real’ or daily life than the concept 
in a narrow reading of Kant’s examples in Groundwork. And it is precisely 
this revision or rehabilitation of the concept that is of concern to my 
argument that obligation plays a unique and important role in the discussion 
on moral motivation.  
What I will do in this section is to rally round Kantian-type arguments that 
refute criticism that claims, firstly, that there is a lack of inclination and, 
secondly, a lack of integrity inherent in the concept of obligation. On the 
issue of the exclusion of inclination from moral judgements in Kantian ethics, 
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I believe that Barbara Herman presents the most compelling arguments for a 
fruitful combination of inclination and obligation. I will discuss Herman’s 
arguments in the section Imputing impartiality. In Sustaining integrity I will 
deal with the two types of obligation that I have called ‘permission’ and 
‘restraint’. What is needed to rehabilitate obligation is the more general point 
that acting from obligation is not, as Marcia Baron ironically calls it, 
“morally repugnant”.  
Imputing impartiality: the importance of inclinations16 
One aspect of the general critique of Kant, that he got it wrong when 
proposing duties to structure moral behaviour, is that duties can only be 
fulfilled by individuals whose moral judgements are not muddied or confused 
by inclinations and personal attachments. This criticism is based on the idea 
that because acting according to obligation excludes inclinations, actions 
according to obligation fail to include an important aspect of human life and 
therefore fall short of being adequate expressions of one of the most 
trenchant human characteristics: emotional reflexivity. In order to argue, as I 
want to do here, that Kantian duties and ethics of care are less incompatible 
than supposed, I want to show that the two concepts of ‘care’ and ‘obligation’ 
are not irreconcilable. I have outlined what care ethicists’ critique of Kantian 
moral philosophy is and now, with the help of Barbara Herman, I shall argue 
that ‘obligation’ is not something that is done unfeelingly or without the 
appropriate inclinations.  
In her essay “Integrity and Impartiality” (1983), Herman argues that it is a 
mistake to understand Kantian moral theory as excluding inclinations from 
making moral decisions. The denial of one’s empirical nature and the 
subservience of one’s personal interests in the service of obligation is not a 
representation but a distortion of Kant’s view, according to Herman. The 
perspective she adopts is to regard inclinations less as impediments and more 
as aids when making moral judgements.  
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 A note on terminology: Kant distinguishes between “affects” and “passions”. The 
example he gives of an ‘affect’ is anger and he regards affects (of ‘feelings’ or 
‘emotions’) as precipitate or rash, their only virtue being in that these feelings quickly 
subside. ‘Passions’, on the other hand, are “sensible desires” (“Sunliche Begeerde”) 
which have become “a lasting inclination (for example, hatred as opposed to anger)” 
(408). ‘Inclinations’ and ‘affectivity’ may be regarded as denoting the same thing 
(though affections could be a subset of the inclinations). In contemporary literature 
the terms ‘emotions’ and ‘feelings’ are most frequently found but I shall (continue to) 
use inclination. 
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The mistake that these critics of Kant’s inclination arguments make, argues 
Herman, is that they read Kant as arguing “if inclination, no moral worth”.17 
This is not, she argues, the point that Kant makes with his various arguments 
and examples. The only point he is making she says, is that inclination alone, 
whether in the form of sympathy, or honour, or self-preservation, has no 
moral worth.18 And this conclusion leads Herman to argue that Kant has said 
nothing to indicate that inclinations might not aid and guide acts motivated 
by obligation. 
Herman concurs with Kant that affectivity without the guidance of reason 
cannot serve as the ground for morality,19 but she adds that this position does 
not entail that acting in the absence of or in opposition to inclinations is 
necessarily desirable from a moral standpoint. On the contrary, insofar as 
affective co-operation diminishes psychological obstacles to acting from 
obligation, it is something to be encouraged. In other words, Herman sees 
suitable and appropriate inclinations facilitating rather than preventing our 
acting according to obligation. Furthermore, she argues, inclinations can 
assist in making better moral judgements. For example, we should cultivate 
in ourselves sympathetic feelings as a means of being better prepared to 
recognise those situations that call for a helping response. And, in the case of 
helping someone, it would be quite ordinary for the action of the normal 
agent to be ‘over-determined’: she might act from the emotion-based desire 
to help and she would act from the motive of obligation. 
Herman thus believes that there is a place for inclinations in Kantian moral 
philosophy. Obligation and inclinations need not be in opposition to each 
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 Herman (1993) is referring in particular to Richard Henson (“What Kant Might 
Have Said: Moral Worth and the Over-determination of Dutiful Action” in The 
Philosophical Review 88 (1979), 39 – 54) and to Bernard Williams. 
18
 Herman (1993) explores the three examples that Kant supplies in his Groundwork: 
that of the sympathetic man, that of the suicidal man and that of the gout sufferer. 
From these three examples Herman concludes the following, respectively: that acting 
from inclination alone is not a moral act; that acts motivated by the inclination of self-
preservation under ordinary circumstances have no moral worth; and that satisfying 
immediate inclinations can be contrary to moral motivations in the long-term. For a 
detailed and careful analysis of these three examples see pp. 378 – 82. 
19
 There are numerous examples of this argument by Kant, for example, he argues that 
sympathy “…however right and amiable it might be, has still no genuinely moral 
worth. It stand on the same footing as the other inclinations… which if fortunate to hit 
on something beneficial and right and consequently honourable, deserves praise and 
encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral content, namely, the 
performance of such actions, not from inclination, but from duty.” Groundwork 398. 
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other. Much of the time, she argues, the motivating influence of inclinations 
and the motive of obligation coincide. There is, in the words of Sara Smollett, 
“no special moral worth imparted by a struggle of motives”;20 rather, an 
internal unity or agreement between inclinations and obligation is preferable.  
One could imagine, thus far, that Kantians and their critics could reach some 
kind of truce on this point: that the motivations of inclinations and obligation 
could overlap, then there need not be any fierce contention – that they might 
ideally even work together to motivate us to lead a full-blooded moral 
existence. Kantian moral agents could wield moral rules and obligations and 
yet still be emotionally sensitive and have a “thick” conception of others.21 
And those moved by inclinations could act as morality requires (though, as 
Herman pace Kant says: “It is to be regarded as a bit of good luck that (one) 
happens to have the inclination to act as morality requires”.22  
So much for happy instances in which the motivation of inclination and 
obligation coincide. There are two additional points about Kantian duties that 
need to be dealt with further: first, the controversial point that motivation 
from inclination by itself is not enough to guarantee a moral action and 
second, the issue of what should happen when inclinations and obligation 
clash. The first point, about why inclination pur sang is not moral, is 
controversial because Kant’s distinction between non-moral and moral 
motivations is not intuitively self-evident. Why should an action done out of 
sympathy not be moral whereas an action done cold-heartedly but according 
to a principle of rightness is? Herman has analysed this controversy in detail 
(see footnote 18, above) and finds the answer in the presence of the internal 
connection between a moral motive and the rightness of a proposed action. In 
acting from a motive attached to a moral principle, the moral rightness of the 
action is, as it were, she argues, guaranteed. In action from inclination (for 
example, responding to someone’s need for help from feelings of sympathy 
and compassion), this is not so. It is not that someone who acted out of 
inclination would frequently fail to act rightly: she might and she might not. 
The point is that the connection between sympathy and helping someone is 
fortuitous; the connection between helping someone on the basis of a 
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principle is not. All helping actions are not also right actions: helping, 
although frequently good and sometimes right, is not always so.  
My daughter, for example, might come to me late on a Sunday evening in 
some distress because she has to hand in a book rapport the next morning and 
has “forgotten” to write it on the weekend. I could help her with this task – I 
certainly would out of sympathy for her plight - and I believe that this would 
be a good thing to do. Indeed, my sympathy might extend to the degree of 
wanting to write it for her (perhaps she also has other unfinished homework) 
but this is the point at which I need to be aware of the line between my 
inclination to help out of sympathy and the ‘rightness’ of my motivation to 
help: it would not be ‘right’ for me to do her homework. It would contravene 
some principle according to which the point of doing homework is to educate 
the child to whom the task was appointed. It is not my sympathy that is 
misplaced; it is my action of helping my daughter to the extent of doing her 
homework for her that is. Right actions, therefore, are those that are not done 
from inclination alone and (usually) refer to some broader or more general 
principle other than the immediate issue at hand (i.e. I will not do my 
daughter’s homework for her because the point of homework is that she gains 
some kind of benefit from it by doing it herself). My helping my daughter 
with her homework to precisely the right degree so that I alleviate her distress 
about undone homework, but at the same time do not contravene the 
principle of her having to do the bulk of the work, is not fortuitous: as every 
parent with school-going children knows, such help is the result of very 
context-sensitive and careful judgement. 
The second point, the issue of what happens when inclinations and duties 
clash, also needs to be addressed. I have said that Herman makes the acute 
point that a clash between the motivations driven by inclination and those by 
principle does not enhance the moral worthiness of the deed. Rather, one can 
imagine that such contention will make moral actions more onerous to carry 
out. If my inclination is to watch an episode of Desperate Housewives rather 
than test my daughter’s Latin homework in preparation for an exam the next 
day, and I am inclined to let that inclination inform me as to what I should 
do, then I will make it harder for myself to experience the motivation to fulfil 
my obligation to my daughter. By allowing my inclination to dominate, I am 
suppressing the motivation (that I otherwise do have) to fulfil my obligation. 
My inclination, in this case, obscures my obligation though, if I were to 
reflect on my obligation to any degree, I would perceive that rehearsing Latin 
verbs with my daughter outweighs my own desire to lie on the couch and 
enjoy the antics of four suburban American housewives.  
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How does obligation ‘outweigh’ inclination? On reflection, I would realise 
that the benefits of my daughter achieving good results for a school subject 
are more significant and worthwhile than the benefits gained by my 
instantaneous gratification. In general, when the internal unity between 
inclination and obligation is not achieved, the Kantian would have moral 
motivation (i.e. obligation) override inclination: obligation being precisely 
that type of reflective motivation that does not involve instantaneous 
gratification. This is the sense in which moral action does not require 
inclinational motivation - but if inclination corresponds to obligation, so 
much the better.  
But the argument that inclination and morality can correspond goes part of 
the way but does not altogether satisfy the more severe critique that 
obligation is performed at the expense of something inherently human, 
namely integrity. I will turn to this argument in the following section. 
Sustaining integrity and obligation 
Because it is believed that obligation is a mono-motivation that merely 
commands, some critics argue that obligation is only achieved at the expense 
of integrity. The implicit argument behind such a criticism is that commands 
are obeyed at the expense of partiality, that the inclination towards human 
attachments is repressed by doing that which is right. One of the better-
known critics is Bernard Williams who argues that what these theories (i.e. 
theories involving obligation for all moral agents) seem to demand that the 
price for morality is that we give up our humanity in order to act from 
obligation. They demand that we surrender our integrity, he says.23  
What are we to understand by ‘integrity’? Integrity is usually defined in 
terms of being “steadfast”, involving “adherence to a strict moral code” as 
well as “being unimpaired; being whole or undivided; completeness”.24 In 
relation to the self, this is a concept that is used varyingly. For example, both 
Gilligan and Williams use integrity to stand for a demand, either within or 
against morality, for some space a self can call its own (although it is likely 
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that they think very differently about the self who needs to stake this claim). 
This is by no means a definitional account of integrity. Margaret Walker, on 
the other hand, defines integrity as primarily relational or, rather, other-
directed, because it is measured by how reliably others may depend on 
congruence between my position, action and responsibility taking.25 She 
defines integrity therefore in terms of the self being accountable to and 
reliable towards others and not merely as occupying an own space within an 
existing moral context. 
Williams might accept that inclinations could not do the same job as the 
motive of obligation, but he argues that the exclusion of inclinations as 
motive stands in the way of an agent’s acting in a natural and humanly 
appropriate way. Obligation is, for critics like Williams, a formalistic 
approach that does not ‘fit’ the spontaneous and sometimes inconsistent 
character of human behaviour in general.  
Take Williams’ lifeboat example: Williams argues that, if his wife were 
drowning, the thought that it is a morally correct thing to do to rescue his 
wife is “one thought too many”. In other words, he would, in the first place, 
simply obey his inclination to save his wife rather than ponder on the 
correctness of his action or on the rule, if any, that states that you should, if 
so capable, rescue those in immediate danger of drowning. Inclinations like 
sympathy lead moral agents to take the welfare of the other as their object, 
argues Williams, and this is what makes action done on a sympathetic basis 
the right thing to do - and not some rule that states that you should. What was 
uppermost in his mind when he rescued his wife was concern for her welfare 
and not the rule about life-saving. Note that Williams does not reject the idea 
as such of there being rules governing right behaviour; what he does is he 
queries the priority of these rules over inclinations like sympathy or concern 
for someone’s welfare.  
Having argued that the motives of inclination and obligation should ideally 
overlap or coincide, Herman’s reply to Williams’ critique that Kantian 
morality separates inclination and obligation and degrades the former, is to 
argue that the motive of obligation should be seen as a limiting condition. 
‘Limiting condition’ motives do two things: firstly, they permit us to act in 
accordance with inclination while at the same time fulfilling our obligation 
and, secondly, they restrain us from acting on the basis of our inclinations in 
some way that contravenes obligation. Both permission and restraint are 
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called limiting conditions because they establish the boundaries, as it were, of 
scope of actions. 
The first type of ‘limiting condition’ motive gives us permission to act as we 
will on the condition that our action satisfies some additional requirement 
(that we stay within our budget, not break some rule, etc). The role of the 
Kantian motive of duty or obligation, argues Herman, is such a limiting 
condition: it expresses the agent’s commitment that she will not act unless 
her action is morally permitted. (This means that it is possible that her actions 
be ‘over-determined’ in the sense of acting both on the basis of an inclination 
and on the motive of obligation.) Thus Williams must first want to rescue his 
wife and act on this inclination, an action which coincides with the obligation 
to care for the welfare of his loved-ones. 
The second type of obligation as a limiting condition operates as a restraint 
and does not motivate or direct the agent to act. Thus, if the agent is 
motivated to act on the basis of inclination, he is able to respond directly and 
the motive of obligation merely acts as a regulative presence informing, as it 
were, the agent of possible contravention of obligation. As a limiting 
condition, the motive of obligation in fact presupposes the effective presence 
of some other motive like sympathy, concern, loyalty, commitment, or 
empathy argues Herman. Obligation’s role here is to prevent or restrain the 
agent from embarking on impermissible acts the agent has an independent 
interest in pursuing. So one could well be prompted by feelings of pride 
prompting one to excel, while committed (in advance, by the motive of 
obligation) not to do this if it turned out to involve committing impermissible 
deeds (nothing illegal, nothing harmful to others, nothing that compromises 
yourself or others, for example). Obligations can, in this fashion, be present 
but inert – unless called into motivating action if necessary. In the Kantian 
scheme of things, in order for an action to qualify as a moral action it does 
require that the motive of obligation be present and effective in its limiting 
function in the sense that the moral agent is one who is motivationally 
prepared not to act in ways that are wrong.  
Is Herman’s revision of obligation an adequate rejoinder Williams’ critique 
that dutiful thoughts are extraneous ballast? Yes it is. Williams’ motivations 
in rescuing his wife satisfy the additional requirements of being concerned 
about the welfare of a loved-one and of the obligation to come to the aid of 
someone in distress if at all possible. Furthermore, because Williams is 
already inclined to rescue his wife out of sympathy, the motivation of 
obligation is not necessary in an active sense. And lastly, Williams’ 
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sympathy is the direct motivation for his rescuing his wife, in other words, it 
is that which moves him to do so. But this does not negate the presence, in 
the background, of an inactive obligation to come to the aid of people in 
distress. There is nothing in the conception of acting from the motive of 
obligation that requires an absolute preference for actions done from the 
motive of obligation as a primary motive, according to Herman. Sometimes 
the motive of obligation is present but not acted on – this too is clearly part of 
the moral data of our lives. “Unless this were so there would be little room 
for moral insincerity”, says Herman26 (and therefore little reason for all this 
palaver about obligation).  
Before I proceed to the following section on obligation, I wish to make a few 
points. Herman’s contribution to the debate on obligation is to introduce 
obligation motivating in a ‘limiting condition’ sense. This limiting condition 
works in two ways: it gives permission to the moral agent who already had 
the inclination to act in a way consistent with obligation and it is inertly 
present as a restraint should the moral agent, who is also acting according to 
inclination, transgresses the conditions of obligation. In the former 
motivation, obligation is active; in the latter, inert or passive (unless called 
into life). These two types describe situations in which inclination and 
obligation, to a large degree, coincide. In instances where inclination and 
obligation clash, as I described in my example of having to choose between 
the instantaneous gratification of a Net 5 television series or the educational 
future of my daughter, I know – on due reflection – that obligation ought to 
reign supreme. This is so precisely because my inclinations (in this case) tend 
towards the gratification whereas obligation is the end result of consideration 
and reflection. This is not the only instance in which obligation must reign. 
The other important juncture at which obligation must be the direct 
motivation for action is when inclination fails altogether to provide 
guidelines for action. 
Had Williams been inclined not to rescue his wife, but to remain sitting and 
to admire the landscape, then – failing all else - his obligation, not only to 
care for the welfare of his wife but his more general obligation of having to 
rescue those in distress would become apparent to him27 and he would be 
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lies beyond the limits of this dissertation let me say the following: according to 
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motivated in the sense of being required to come to his wife’s rescue. If he 
still sat obstinately by, ignoring his sense of having to do something while his 
wife drowned, then he would be consciously ignoring or disobeying his 
obligation.28 Even in instances in which obligation is flouted, obligation 
retains its status. Thus, failing all else, obligation is an imperative that comes 
into play when needed; in other words, when inclination fails to motivate us 
to perform the right action, then obligation commands us. As such, obligation 
becomes a fall-back position – something by which we can be compelled 
should we be insufficiently or inappropriately moved by inclination. 
While it is Herman’s goal to defend obligation from accusations of 
impartiality, a goal which she achieves with great clarity and conviction, 
what her concept of limiting condition does is to indicate but one role that 
obligation plays in demarcating moral motivation: the role of switching in, as 
it were, or being active only when other demarcations, namely inclinations, 
fail to motivate the right thing to do. As Herman argues, as a limiting 
condition the motive of obligation can enter only when there is a proposed 
course of action based on another motive like desire, or sympathy, or 
whatever.29 
The argument that obligation does not obfuscate inclinations negates, it 
would seem to me, the critique that Kantian moral philosophy has no room 
for integrity whether defined as ‘own space’ or as ‘responsibility’. But there 
is another, related, accusation made of Kantian moral philosophy that is not 
entirely yet laid to rest, namely that acting according to obligation is “morally 
repugnant”30. It is true that a lack of integrity can make an action morally 
                                                                                                                             
authority to the self and expresses an absolute necessity, i.e. it is absolutely 
authoritative from the perspective of the addressee. 
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 This counter-example is not fictitious. There have been several recorded incidents 
in which the onlookers have stood passively watching while someone drowned. One 
can only speculate why this should occur: perhaps everyone assumed that someone 
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waited; perhaps they all felt that it was too risky to go to the rescue. What is apparent 
is that inclination - sympathy or concern – failed to motivate the crowd to rescue the 
victim. In one incident (in August 1993 in the Netherlands in which 200 people 
apparently merely watched a nine-year-old drown), the police expressed their 
indignation at the lack of help from the crowd although it later became apparent that a 
few individuals had tried to retrieve the child. It was decided that no charges would be 
pressed (in the Netherlands it is against the law not to come to someone’s aid if they 
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repugnant, but the two are not reducible to each other: the category ‘morally 
repugnant’ includes ‘lack of integrity’ and other moral deviations. Indeed, the 
overwhelming bulk of the critique of Kant’s moral philosophy revolves 
around the accusation that obligation - or obligation, or the notion of 
universal moral laws - somehow sustains a view of humanity that is morally 
repugnant or distasteful or otherwise inaccurate.  
Why obligation is not morally repugnant 
This allegation can be broken down into three reasons, according to Baron: 
first, acting from obligation is to act just minimally morally; second, acting 
from obligation is alienating; and third, acting from obligation is no 
guarantee of normativity. What Baron argues is that this repugnance is not 
attached to acting from obligation as such, but only to certain ways of acting 
supposedly from obligation. She herself argues that acting from obligation is 
crucial to morally good conduct. 
Given the many pejorative associations that we have with the word 
‘obligation’, it is no surprise that many people think of a concern to do one’s 
obligation as a concern to do only what one has to do. We sometimes 
associate obligations with unconditional commands, especially by social 
institutions or norms that are themselves sometimes morally dubious, for 
example, to die for one’s fatherland or betray traitors to the state. Or we are 
familiar with examples, real and fictitious, of particularly unpleasant people 
who claimed to live their lives according to obligation – Karenin in Tolstoy’s 
Anna Karenina is an example of someone who says he acts from obligation 
but really uses the idea of obligation as an excuse to act in a non-reflective 
and cowardly fashion. Acting like this is not to be morally motivated at all, 
but just acting to get off the hook; in other words, such a character only acts 
according to what he or she thinks morality demands but in fact not 
according to what morality recommends. Another example is Effi Briest’s 
husband Baron von Innstetten (in the novel Effi Briest by Theodore Fontane), 
who is a “man of principles”, called, by one critic, a “textbook example of 
Kant’s man who acts out of respect for the moral law”. 31 Instetten kills his 
wife Effi’s lover in a duel and divorces her (thereby condemning her to social 
isolation) even though he feels no anger towards her lover and still loves Effi 
- and he does this, apparently, out of a sense of obligation.  
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This is not what someone like Baron has in mind when she describes ‘acting 
from obligation’. Acting from obligation, in her vocabulary, is a combination 
of doing that which is required and that which is “recommended”. Though 
Baron, unfortunately, does not elaborate on this distinction it would seem that 
the difference lies between obeying the letter of the (moral) law and a sense 
of a normative choice separate from this law. For example, Huckleberry Finn 
is someone who has great difficulty in questioning the few principles he has 
learned, in this case those of a slave-owning society, in order to do the right 
thing (help the slave Jim to escape). Having grasped what his obligation 
according to the laws of the state is – to turn Jim over to the authorities – 
Huckleberry, for a few significant literary moments at least, cannot see what 
the humane or sympathetic thing is he ought to do. He knows he is required 
to turn Jim in, but the appeal Jim makes to his protection and compassion 
recommends that he consider Jim’s humanity and help Jim to escape instead. 
But, as Jonathan Bennett argues,32 had Huckleberry turned Jim in to the men 
hunting the runaway slave, this would have been an example of “bad 
morality”, and not, as so many critics of Kantian moral philosophy assume, 
an example of obligation in action. This distinction between what obedience 
to the dominant norms of a society require and what obligation actually 
recommends can also be made in the Karenin and Innstetten examples: they 
are required to act as husbands and as responsible members of society but it 
is recommended that they do so humanely and sympathetically and pay 
special attention to the plight of those dependent on their support. What the 
examples of Huckleberry and Instetten show, if indeed they are men of 
obligation, is that the so-called principles to which they aspire (the principles 
of a nineteenth-century slave-owning American society on the one hand and 
a highly stratified bourgeois society in nineteenth-century Germany on the 
other) need to be flouted rather than obeyed. So-called obligations embodied 
in societal norms are not necessarily the same as obligations that arise from 
broader and more general duties that pertain, for example, to humanitarian 
values of loyalty, trust, friendship and compassion.  
Instetten and Karenin have been often quoted as examples of acting from 
obligation, supposedly in a minimal fashion (this is the first allegation of 
moral repugnance that Baron describes). I would not describe their actions as 
being from obligation in any sense: the maintenance of repressive and 
discriminating social practices cannot be regarded as ascribing to what 
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obligation – in a Kantian sense - recommends we do. The second allegation – 
that acting from obligation is alienating – is merely another example of what 
Baron argues is not meant by obligation. It has been argued that acting from 
obligation is alienating because it is thought that obligation can only be 
fulfilled impartially. Should a distance between acting according to 
obligation and experiencing feelings of partiality like compassion, concern or 
loyalty exist, argues Baron, it would betray or entrench attitudes towards 
others which are, morally and otherwise, regrettable. This is an example of 
bad morality, not of an obligation. 
The example that Baron discusses in considerable detail is Michael Stocker’s 
treatment of friendship: someone, acting from a sense of obligation, would 
visit a friend in hospital, not out of friendship but out of some sense of being 
morally obliged to do so. Stocker assumes that acting from obligation 
excludes acting from any other kind of emotions (or other motivations) and 
that this separation of obligation from emotion, or distinction drawn between 
friendship and obligation, will lead to a kind of “moral schizophrenia”. As 
Baron argues, any action performed solely from motives of obligation in the 
context of friendship is in itself a morally deficient action, and is patently not 
what is meant by acting from obligation.33  
The third allegation – that acting from obligation does not guarantee 
normativity - is implicit in both the first and the second: if acting from 
obligation leads one to react woodenly according to the supposed dictates of 
obligation or if one behaves in such a way that you apply the dictates of 
obligation in contexts where quite different and affective responses are 
needed as well, then it is clear that one cannot distinguish between good and 
bad actions. Indeed, behaving in either of these deficient fashions is bad 
morality and has nothing to do with what obligation comprises of.  
To summarise: what Baron’s discussion of the three allegations against acting 
according to obligation - that obligation means acting minimally, is alienating 
and does not guarantee normativity - show is that it is not obligation that is 
morally repugnant because obligation is a type of motivation which in fact 
recommends humane and partial actions. Deeds committed according to the 
dictates of repressive and dubious moral institutions, minimally moral deeds 
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and acting impartially when partiality is desired are all examples of bad 
morality; they are not at all what is meant by acting according to obligation. 
To what extent has the concept of obligation, in the hands of Herman and 
Baron, been rehabilitated? In the first section on inclination and obligation, I 
argued that the ideal situation is a coincidence of these two motives. In this 
situation, the agent is moved by inclination and her motives are reinforced 
and confirmed and if needed, delimited, by the regulations of obligation. 
Over-determination, in this sense, is the ideal and desired combination of 
obligation and inclination. Two points were made in this connection: first, 
inclinations on their own do not guarantee moral actions; and second, in 
situations in which inclinations and the motives of obligation clash, the 
commands of obligation must override those of inclination if the moral nature 
of the action is to be maintained. A clash between the two will do nothing to 
improve the ease of achievement, on the contrary, obligation fulfilled 
contrary to inclination is likely to be burdensome and difficult to conclude. 
Furthermore, in those cases where inclination fails or is significantly absent, 
obligation should provide the motive for action. While critics of Kantian 
moral philosophy believe that Kant argues something like “if inclination, no 
moral worth”, Herman’s reply goes: “if no inclination, moral worth is harder 
or even impossible to achieve” because, as she argues, acting in the absence 
of inclination is not desirable.34  
In Herman’s account of obligations, they are present as rules in the 
background to be consulted and used during moments of reflexive action. 
Regarding obligations as being a restraining motive accommodates a far 
more subtle sense of what an obligation can be, namely as something that can 
differentiate between the very many and complex situations in which we 
operate. They need not always be applied or applied equally strongly. 
Motives are typically “interwoven”: having to combine a sense of what is 
right with sympathetic concern, or with profound partiality to someone, is the 
rule rather than the exception. As Baron says,  
Part of what it is to act from obligation is to act with a 
counterfactual always at hand (though not always in one’s 
thoughts): one would not do this if it were morally counter-
recommended. (Baron “The Alleged Moral Repugnance of 
Acting from Obligation” 1984, 217) 
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What is evident, it seems to me, is that inclination and a sense of what is 
permissible and what is not (i.e. obligation) are inseparable and intertwined. 
As Korsgaard argues, pleasure and pain (by which she means remorse and 
regret) are products of the mind’s awareness of its own activities. This leads 
her to conclude that inclination must play an essential role in moral life even 
according to the most rationalistic theory and that it is extremely doubtful 
that we can imagine a sensible creature that lacks these forms of affect.35 It 
seems to me that inclination must play a central role in all motivation, 
including motivations according to obligation. Indeed, the separation of 
inclination and obligation results in an artificial (or analytical) chasm that is 
not actually present in motivation. Furthermore, the general disadvantage of 
this analytic two-step, in the form of the chronology of events – first 
inclination then obligation; first obligation then inclination – is that it is a 
linear and two-dimensional way of looking at how motivation works. This 
results in an artificial flattening out of motivation and a reduction of it to a 
crude cause-and-effect relation.36 
What I have been doing here is to rehabilitate the concept of obligation and 
rescue it from the accusations of the heinous incapacity to include inclination 
and a tendency to inculcate inhumanity. Obligation is, in this rehabilitated 
form, interwoven with and inseparable from motivating inclination and 
expresses both limiting requirements and supplementing recommendations. 
This means, in effect, that the grounds upon which care ethicists rejected 
obligation as insufficient for the task of expressing the complexity of human 
lives determined by inclination and attachments, no longer holds. And this 
opens the way for thinking more sympathetically about obligation in general 
and, more particularly, about a conception of care.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I aimed to refurbish obligation in the sense of conceptualizing 
it as a compelling type of motivation which is nevertheless capable of 
subtlety, flexibility and sensitivity to context. First of all, I spent some time 
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differentiating between three different ways in which obligation operates: 
first, as a straight-forward command or imperative in the form “You ought to 
do x” in which x is related to a body of socially endorsed obligations. 
Second, there are those obligations that are usually inert but become active in 
order to restrain me from doing something. For example, let’s say that I have 
an inclination to be too charitable – the obligation of my own self-
preservation (and that of my dependents), in this case, delimits my tendency 
to give all my possessions away. These obligations are like signposts that are 
usually inert but light up when I threaten to wander off the path. And third, 
there are obligations which need not command because they already coincide 
with other reasons to do x or y. These other reasons are usually based on 
inclinations: like the inclination I have to care about the welfare of my loved 
ones. These obligations permit me to do that which I already am inclined to 
do. They operate as beacons on a course of action I am already inclined to 
follow.  
The significant gain of this three-fold differentiation is that obligation need 
not be regarded as a monolithic, singular, and inflexible type of motivation. 
Which does not mean to say that in the refurbished form obligation is any 
less compelling. On the contrary, I have been at pains to argue that 
compellingness does not comprise only of imperatives but that there is, on 
the one hand, an essential cooperation on the part of the moral agent in the 
form of critical endorsement and, on the other, an unavoidable interaction of 
obligation-derived motives with other motivation to act, like inclinations.  
The implication of this line of argument is that obligatory actions can no 
longer be regarded as either decontextualised or impartial actions. And this 
then has far-reaching implications for what is commonly understood as the 
‘universality’ of obligation. The Kantian rule-of-thumb is if a maxim cannot 
be universally willed, then it should be rejected. However, as I argued, there 
have been significant shifts in thinking about precisely what the scope of 
universal moral laws is and the current state of thinking about this issue is 
that practical identities play an essential role in critical endorsement. How 
universally willed laws can be the product of practical identities (i.e. shaped 
by cultural, historical and social identities) is only possible, it seems to me, if 
‘universal’ is not conceived of as meaning ‘sameness’ but as ‘general’. And, 
furthermore, that an essential characteristic of that (human) generality is 
regarded as being mutable. Morality that pays no heed to inclination, context 
or practical identity is merely bad morality. 
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In the next argumentative step I wish to argue that care can very fruitfully be 
reconceptualised as an ethical approach that shares with obligation its 
approach or methodology. This methodology I have referred to as 
compellingness because it describes the manner in which the moral agent is 
necessitated to act – in this case, the effect which the normative pull of caring 
has on her. Why do I think this reconceptualisation would be fruitful? 
Because, as I have argued in the previous chapters, I believe that care ethics, 
when it explicates on motivation, tends towards a naturalized or an 
inclination-steered identification with the cared-for other and/or a voluntary 
selflessness or suspension of the self and her desires and preferences. While I 
believe that these are important aspects of care ethics, I am alienated from 
them by their potential normative vacuity: the suspension of critical judgment 
and absence of practical identity. What I am aiming at is a combination of 
care ethic’s emphasis on phenomenological experience of the other (as 
someone to be cared for) and a motivational methodology that safeguards the 
normativity of the action of caring. By regarding the commitment to caring as 
an obligatory one, the moral agent will, I argue, have recourse to a series of 
limitations and prohibitions concerning the implementation of caring that go 
a long way towards securing the normative nature of caring. Treating caring 
as if it was an obligation, I shall argue, is a way of combining these two 
important features, the experience of the other and moral justification for 
actions. 
The point I shall now elaborate on in the following chapter is that obligations 
are not externals, someone else’s laws or rules – they are principles we 
endorse. In other words, what I shall elaborate on is the issue of the 
“normativity” of obligation. 
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CHAPTER SIX: NORMATIVE CARING 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I described a refurbished form of obligation in which 
obligation is capable of doing several things: it can command, it can restrain 
and it can permit. As such, obligation can occupy several different places on 
the moral ground: it can be overtly present in the foreground; it can be 
generally present in the form of signposts (active or inactive); and it can be 
unobtrusively present in the background in the form of confirmation. This 
makes obligation a multifarious, diverse and flexible concept – quite unlike 
the usual association it has with the monolithic external command to commit 
some (usually) onerous deed. Indeed, ‘obligation’ is merely the name for that 
which we ought to do. 
Furthermore I have argued that the compellingness of obligation lies not in its 
nature as an external command but because it is that which is critically 
endorsed by its proponent and because it is intricately connected to the 
inclinations – the emotions and desires and wishes of the proponent. The 
acceptance of the authority of obligation as prescriptive is, as I argue in this 
internalist account of motivation, necessary for explaining why obligation 
galvanises me to commit certain actions and prevents me from undertaking 
others. My obligation is that which I have accepted or discovered I must do 
even if this obligation is contrary to my inclinations. My responsibility or 
liability, both on a critical and an intentional level, are prerequisites for the 
effectiveness of obligation.  
I have been at pains to separate ‘obligation’ from its association with morally 
repugnant or onerous tasks imposed upon one from without. I have done this 
because I concur with philosophers like Herman and Baron that ‘obligation’ 
is a moral concept capable of nuance and sensitivity. And that it is a 
necessary concept in morality in that it illustrates how motivation works by 
combining the elements of being compelled and yet being able to carry out 
the task you are compelled to do competently. In effect I argue that it is not 
useful to see obligation merely as an imposed task but as a set of internalised 
permissions and restraints – or rules, if you like – according to which one can 
decide upon the best course of action. The significance of this internalisation 
is that rules - and the recognition thereof – are inseparably intertwined with 
inclinations. The pertinence of obligation is that the person carrying out the 
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obligation is responsible for his actions – it must be that which he also 
accepts that he must do. And he can also be held responsible for doing so: he 
is liable or culpable in the sense that the responsibility lies with him and he 
can be judged in these terms. These were, in short, the conclusions of the 
previous chapter. 
The next question, it seems to me, is what does obligation have to do with 
caring? Why have I taken the trouble to refurbish ‘obligation’? In the 
previous chapters I have reviewed several care ethical accounts of motivation 
for caring. These accounts are “engrossment” (Noddings’ phenomenological 
account), “solidarity” (Sevenhuijsen’s postmodern humanist account), caring 
as a “responsibilist virtue” (Dalmiya’s epistemological account) and caring as 
necessary for “flourishing lives” (Halwani’s virtue ethical account). Some of 
these accounts emphasise the compelling aspects of caring; others the 
competency aspects. I reject the accounts that propagate selflessness (the 
phenomenological and epistemological) because of their normative vacuity. I 
also reject ontological accounts and teleological accounts in which it is 
argued that that which humans supposedly are, is also what they should 
become (postmodern communitarianism and maternal thinking). I am also 
extremely wary of ethical accounts that include naturalism instead of 
normativity (some kinds of virtue ethics). This elimination process leaves a 
lacuna on the terrain of motivation in caring: I have suggested that obligation 
– even though it is commonly assumed that obligation is synonymously far 
removed from caring – could provide both the compulsion and the 
competency required for motivation. 
I have argued that the desirability of obligation lies in its capacity to delimit 
inclinations by operating as a guideline in suggesting what should be done or 
as a boundary in indicating what should not. In other words, obligation is no 
more or less than a concept indicating normativity: indicating that which you 
ought to do. Obligation is itself content-free: it merely states that that thing 
should be done/it is required of one but makes little sense unless these 
requirements are internally endorsed by the moral agent who must do them. 
The question here is: is caring something that should be done? Ought we to 
care? Can caring be described as an obligation? 
‘What obliges us to be caring?’ is the topic of this final chapter. If we accept 
that an obligation is that which we should do and we ourselves condone that 
obligation, what is this obligation based on? According to Korsgaard, this 
obligation is based on its normativity; my question is how? How does it have 
the required effect, as it were? In order to formulate a reply I shall, first, ask 
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when caring is normative. Second, in an attempt to understand what 
normativity is, I shall examine Korsgaard’s account of the source of 
normativity. Third, I explore how this normativity works. And last, having 
reached an account of how caring motivation works, I seek an answer to 
Pim’s (the man who wishes to care but cannot) dilemma.  
When is caring normative? 
When told “You should be caring”, you could ask “Why?” Why should you 
commit yourself to a caring task with all the responsibilities and 
complications it (probably) brings with it? This “why” question is a 
normative question and, here’s the rub, any answer can prompt a further why, 
and yet another, and so on. Is there an answer to end this regression? Is there 
something, to use Korsgaard’s phrase, “really behind morality”1 – an answer 
to end all whys?  
In previous chapters I have reviewed several potential answers in care ethics 
to this question. From some perspectives in care ethics it is argued that one 
should care because caring is a basic and good human relation. Other care 
ethics argue that caring is basic because it makes one capable of judging 
others’ humanity or that caring about others creates the preconditions for 
important and special knowledge. Again other care ethical theories argue that 
caring is a basic virtue or that caring is an essential part of human nature. I 
have questioned whether these answers provide the ultimate reply to what 
lies “behind morality”. Moreover, the answers provided are substantive, 
which means that they argue that caring is basic or essential and that caring 
has a meaningful content: an inherent goodness, for example. Much of what I 
have been doing in the previous chapters – but not in these terms – is to argue 
that the primary moving force of caring does not lie in its having a 
meaningful moral value but in something else, something that is not 
necessarily moral. 
But this is not to argue that anything goes. My non-substantive approach 
coincides with Frankfurt’s concept of caring in that he too avoids giving care 
a substantive filling. Where our accounts differ, though, is that his account of 
caring is explicitly non-normative whereas I believe that a discussion of 
caring as an ethical practice must include the element of normativity. 
Frankfurt’s account of caring is all-inclusive (he makes no normative 
distinctions between caring for old-timer automobiles or for world peace). I 
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shall argue that an ethics of care includes those things and people and issues 
for which we bear responsibility and that they exercise a powerful influence 
upon us. Caring for, from a care ethical perspective, is thus profoundly 
normative.  
What constitutes normative reasons for caring? If we care as Frankfurt 
describes, then we can care for anything - no one type of caring is better or 
worse than another. An ethic of care is distinct from caring in this fashion in 
important ways. The very essence of an ethic of care, as I have argued 
throughout this dissertation, is that caring ethically constitutes a way of being 
concerned and involved with the welfare of the one cared for. It is not only 
having an invested interest in the other; it is also a taking on board of the 
interests and well-being of the cared for. And this leads to responsibilities 
and commitments that surpass merely having a caring impulse or desire. It 
involves forming a relationship with the cared for: creating expectations, 
sustaining dependencies and meeting requirements. Having reasons to be 
caring in this manner would involve not only finding an overlap between 
your own desires and those of the cared for, but also the distinct belief that 
you ought to care for the cared for. The obligation to be caring, I would 
argue, is that which transforms caring from merely a ‘finding something 
important’ (in the words of Frankfurt) into a normative activity. Only when 
the relationship is such that we must care is there reason to subject the caring 
for to stringent demands: is it good caring? Does it meet the requirements of 
the cared for? Does it enhance the well-being of the cared for? Is it done 
without the one caring having to compromise or contradict his principles or 
beliefs? What are the circumstances and the context? Where must it begin 
and end? 
This means that there is an enormous variety and diversity of the types of 
caring possible. It is not the caring itself that is good; it is the context within 
which is cared, how and why. It would be an impossible task to specify every 
context under which caring should be conducted. I must rather focus on 
normativity itself - what does it mean when I pose the question why should I 
care? Because of the diversity of caring I have chosen to seek the source of 
normativity in the moral agent who does the caring rather than in the value of 
caring itself. This means that I shall be looking at subjectivity rather than 
objectivity - I shall be looking at how a caring act is normative because of 
why it is done rather than at the value of the caring deed itself. The 
motivation for caring, I argue, must be sought in the subjectivity of the one 
caring.  
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The following account of how normativity can be achieved is derived from 
the various writings of Christine Korsgaard2 with the critical help of the 
historian of philosophy Stephen Crowell and the meta-ethicist Michael 
Smith. According to both these critics, Korsgaard does not succeed in 
securing the source of normativity as the basis of normative action. Her 
attempt is bold and original but her source of normativity, the reflective self  
- which Korsgaard posits as the ultimate decision-maker in normative issues - 
cannot guarantee normativity, they argue (via very different routes). I argue 
that, although Korsgaard might not be able to provide an invincible account 
of the source of normativity, she does have a good deal to say about 
normativity itself and what she has to say throws much-needed light on the 
issue of normativity in caring.  
In what follows I shall, first, outline Korsgaard’s argument that subjectivity is 
the source of normativity. Second, I shall deal with a two-fold critique of this 
argument and, third, I shall offer an addition to Korsgaard’s argument on the 
basis of the phenomenological account of caring that I have established in 
this dissertation (especially in Chapter One), thereby arguing that 
Korsgaard’s account of normativity is feasible. 
What is the source of normativity? 
Korsgaard argues that, because we no longer believe in a supreme deity or in 
the essential qualities of all things on earth, humanity is the only source of all 
valuing.3 This means that any value in the world has been put there or 
invested by people. Things no longer have inherent value: “The real is no 
longer the good.”4 This would imply that the activity of valuing makes for 
value and that there are no objective values outside of this valuing. Who 
values? The human subject is the source of valuing in Korsgaard’s account 
(as distinct from animals). 
Korsgaard’s Kant-inspired theory rejects the metaphysical conception of the 
subject as a substance with certain fixed properties, arguing instead that 
subjectivity is an achievement, something that I can succeed or fail at being.5 
For Korsgaard, this non-metaphysical conception of subjectivity underlies an 
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account of normativity: an explanation of how standards - including the 
standards that measure success or failure at being a subject - can bind you, 
provide you with reasons for acting in some ways and with obligations that 
forbid you from acting in others.6 Her argument is complicated, as Crowell 
says. He summarises it as turning on characterising subjectivity as self-
consciousness: normative concepts do not arise as answers to theoretical 
questions; rather they exist, as Korsgaard says, 
because human beings have normative problems. And we have 
normative problems because we are self-conscious rational 
animals, capable of reflection about what we ought to believe 
and do. (Christine Korsgaard The Sources of Normativity 1996, 
46.)  
Self-consciousness, in this account, thus gives rise to the normative, and from 
the normative flows obligation. But how is self-consciousness connected to 
having particular obligations? How can I explain why some people care and 
others do not, or why people care for different things? Korsgaard argues that 
what is characteristic of humans is that they choose the principles that are 
definitive of their will.7 But what does ‘definitive of their will’ mean? 
Practical identity provides the answer. 
Korsgaard defines practical identity as a “conception of one’s identity”, a 
“description under which you value yourself and find life worth living”.8 
Such conceptions are as various as the roles that human beings can occupy: 
parent, teacher, employee, citizen and so on. Such identities are practical 
because they are not primarily objects for theoretical contemplation, nor 
merely social roles that are attributed to us in a third-person way, but are 
expressed in what we do. For most people, as Korsgaard points out, their 
practical identity is a “jumble” of such conceptions, which often compete and 
conflict with one another. But insofar as you value yourself under a 
conception you can be said to identify with it and so constitute yourself in its 
image.9 In doing so, you provide yourself with reasons to act in certain ways; 
practical identity becomes the principle of choice that replaces mere (or 
animal) instinct.10 
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Human autonomy, according to Korsgaard’s Kantian programme, involves 
choosing one’s principles, and so arises the consciousness of normativity. I 
must now act not only in accord with norms but also in the light of them; I 
must act for a reason, where ‘reason’ does not refer to an external cause but 
to “a kind of reflective success”,11 something that I can endorse from the 
first-person point of view. If I had no practical identity - no conception under 
which I value myself - my choices would not have any purchase on reasons; I 
would have no principle on which to act and so would be incapable of acting 
at all.12 By identifying with a practical identity I gain reasons to do things in a 
particular way, and practical identities become normative for me to the extent 
that I identify with them. I identify with my practical identity as mother, and 
as teacher of philosophy, and as partner, and as daughter, and sister and so 
on. I do the things that I associate with having all those identities and I reflect 
on whether I do them well or not. On the basis of my reflection I can 
conclude whether I should have done otherwise. This is because practical 
identities involve standards of success or failure: there are things that mothers 
ought to do (and ought not). This is not to argue that practical identity is a 
simple matter; practical identity and having a practical identity and 
expressing and dealing with it well or not is a complex and imperfect 
practice.  
We need practical identities because of “our reflective nature”.13 This nature 
makes us aware of the “workings of incentives within us … (and) sets us with 
a problem that other animals do not have”.14 Where the animal’s incentive is 
governed by the principle of instinct, our self-conscious nature means that we 
can “distance ourselves from [incentives] and call them into question”.15 And 
this in turn means that I must decide whether to act on them or not. It is in 
this situation of decision, “in the space of reflective distance, in the internal 
world created by self-consciousness, that reason is born”.16 Because I am 
aware of the workings of incentives within me I must ask whether it really 
gives me reasons to act in a certain way. On what principle do I decide this 
question? The source of what counts as a reason is my practical identity. 
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Identifying with it, its norms provide me with the principles that, in lieu of 
instinct, tell me “what [is] an appropriate response to what, what makes what 
worth doing, what the situation calls for”.17  
In Korsgaard’s account, then, our “self-conscious nature” is the source of the 
normative space in which we operate as humans. According to Crowell this is 
a powerful account - but he argues that Korsgaard’s concept of self-
consciousness lacks an unequivocal basis. On the one hand, self-
consciousness is understood to be a mode of self-awareness, an essential 
“structure of our minds that makes thoughtfulness possible”. On the other 
hand, this structure is defined in terms of reflection: “The human mind is 
self-conscious in the sense that it is essentially reflective”, where reflection is 
understood as our ability “to turn our attention into our perceptions and 
desires themselves”.18 Reflection, Korsgaard goes on to say, is a specific 
higher-order act that ‘reifies’ our states into “a kind of mental item” or 
content of consciousness.19 However the attempt to explain the essentially 
self-aware structure of our minds by an appeal to a specific mental act leads 
to an infinite regress argues Crowell. And infinite regress will not lead us to 
the source of normativity. It is possible to paraphrase Korsgaard’s position 
thus: we must see whether we can reflectively endorse desiring as we do. 
That is, by seeing whether, on reflection, we can sustain a desire to so desire. 
The regress that Crowell mentions is then that we might need a desire to 
desire that we so desire, and so on. As with all regression, it is not clear when 
we have reached the ultimate desire from which all others proceed. 
But Korsgaard’s goal is finally not simply an account of the norms that make 
us good mothers, teachers or friends, but of moral norms, those that 
constitute the “rules for being good at being a person”.20 She argues that were 
there no such norms, all other normativity would be groundless. But how do 
moral norms differ from other norms? Because all my practical identities are 
contingent it is possible that I do not value myself under their description, 
and thus they are, in a certain sense, not really binding on me. Moral norms, 
however, according to Korsgaard, would be norms that bind me, come what 
may. But what are these based on? Korsgaard’s answer is quite simply: 
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humanity - humanity implies rationality, which implies normativity. 21 But 
how is this normativity formed, what gives it content? 
At this point Korsgaard returns to the idea of practical identity for it is, after 
all, only when humanity is expressed in terms of a practical identity that it 
has content and can provide reasons for acting in one way rather than 
another. But Korsgaard has just argued that practical identity is contingent. 
Are we to understand that the universal (humanity) is dependent for its 
meaning on the contingent? In other words that humanity has no content 
without practical identity? What Korsgaard says is action requires that you 
identify yourself with a particular practical identity, for if you do not, “you 
will lose your grip on yourself as having any reason to do one thing rather 
than another”.22 This reason stems from your humanity itself. Hence the 
reason that your practical identity provides you to act in a certain way is a 
reason only “if you treat your humanity as a practical, normative form of 
identity, that is, if you value yourself as a human being”.23  
Korsgaard is thus arguing that our identity as human beings itself provides 
reasons to act - but she has not convinced me that these reasons are any 
different to the reasons implied by a (contingent) practical identity. In 
addition, it would seem that she uses a tautologous argument: it is human to 
have practical identity; being human is a practical identity. Furthermore, I am 
yet to be convinced by Korsgaard that humanity provides moral norms other 
than those provided by practical identity. The best explanation of this 
confusion is to argue that Korsgaard has smuggled a metaphysical concept - 
humanity - back into her otherwise elegantly non-realist equation. This is not 
a problem for Crowell. He argues that the claim that the normativity of 
practical identities has its roots in an ontological structure that is not a 
contingent practical identity seems largely correct.24 I do have a problem with 
Korsgaard’s transcendentalism on this point because, on the one hand, she 
argues that only when humanity is normatively binding when it is expressed 
in terms of practical identity and the reasons that proceed from that identity. 
On the other she argues that humanity itself provides reasons for moral 
action. Crowell describes this as an “aporia, a knot in our understanding of 
just what it can mean to identify with, or value, our humanity as such.”25 
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But to continue: what does it mean to identify with, or value, our humanity as 
such? Korsgaard defines the human being as a “reflective animal who needs 
reasons to act and to live”.26 It is this identity, our humanity, which is 
supposed to provide “rules for being good at being a person”.27 It is at this 
point that Crowell identifies a problem. Humanity for Korsgaard, says 
Crowell, is an internally riven concept, an additive composition of animality-
plus-reflection in which reflection is defined as a break with animality.28 He 
identifies two problems with this composite concept. 
First, self-unification can only come about if, in choosing a practical identity, 
I also commit myself to my identity as human: “Since you cannot act without 
reasons, and since your humanity is the source of your reasons, you must 
value your own humanity if you are to act at all”.29 This is indeed to treat 
humanity itself as a kind of practical identity, as I argued above. But, Crowell 
argues, my humanity cannot be the source of reasons in the way that a 
practical identity is - that is, by providing norms that determine a particular 
way of getting on in the world. Being human in this sense is not something I 
can choose to be, not something, therefore, which I can value or identify 
with. Korsgaard acknowledges that “[t]he necessity of choosing and acting is 
not causal, logical or rational necessity. It is our plight: the simple inexorable 
fact of the human condition.”30 But this means that it really makes no sense to 
speak of constitutive rules or standards here - I cannot succeed or fail in 
being human in this sense. I am it, whether I want to be so or not. In contrast, 
practical identities such as being a mother do involve satisfaction conditions 
that I can fail to instantiate, and so they can give me reasons to do what I do: 
providing meals, picking children up from school, and bringing them to bed, 
for example. Though there is no such thing as reasons unless there is 
humanity - and so humanity is the source of my reasons in that transcendental 
sense - humanity as a ‘plight’ is not by itself the source of any special 
reasons, concludes Crowell. Being human is not an identity in Korsgaard’s 
terms of being able to fail at it. In this sense it is not normative.  
I cannot imagine that this is a conclusion that Korsgaard would want to reach. 
She seems to be saying rather than the plight of being human, the human 
condition, gives rise to - where she wants to go - binding moral norms. She 
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tries to do this in non-realist terms by calling humanity a ‘kind of practical 
identity’ but ends up instead with a marriage between ontology and moral 
constructivism: animality-plus-reflection. 
Crowell’s second problem is that Korsgaard’s concept of humanity as a 
plight must entail constitutive standards that are both distinct from those 
involved in practical identities and provide reasons that can compete with 
those provided by practical identities. Only so can morality help me to act out 
one practical identity or another or ‘test’ the reasons to which practical 
identity gives rise, according to Crowell.31 Korsgaard’s normative concept of 
humanity is in fact wholly governed by the concept of reflection, the 
deliberating agent who is ‘distanced’ from his animal identity. The agent here 
is thus conceived entirely ‘intellectualistically’. And this is where the greatest 
problem lies in Korsgaard’s account of normativity according to Crowell. 
The intellectualistic conception of the agent means that Korsgaard cannot 
give a coherent account of non-deliberated action (Crowell is thinking of 
instinctual behaviour, or causal behaviour - behaviour that animals and 
humans alike share: satisfying hunger, avoiding danger, mindlessly coping) 
unless she smuggles deliberation back into it. In opting for the latter, 
Korsgaard rationalistically distorts the phenomenology of such action 
according to Crowell.32 She has effectively excluded the unreasonable and 
the irrational that are also part of human action.  
The example that Korsgaard uses is the cowboy Tex who refuses to let his 
friends amputate his badly wounded leg.33 Since Tex will die if his leg is not 
amputated and he refuses to have his leg amputated, then he allows fear to 
dictate his actions and, in Korsgaard’s terms, therefore “fails at being a 
subject”. Crowell challenges this conclusion on the basis that it is a common-
sense idea that the supposedly non-rational choices of the soul are no less 
relevant than explicit choices.34 The point is, it seems to me, that Tex might 
have good reasons for his fear: fear of the pain and perhaps also of the loss of 
the leg. While there is undoubtedly an unreasonable element in Tex’s 
reaction (we all instinctively avoid pain), it seems wrong to conclude that 
Tex has failed at being a subject by not choosing to have his leg amputated. It 
might be possible to argue that Tex’s refusal to have his leg amputated is a 
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rational choice (insofar as this is a ceteris paribus choice moment) if he fears 
losing a leg more than he fears death - is a cowboy with one leg a cowboy? 
Rather, it would be better to argue that there are many non-deliberative 
actions and moments (hopefully not all as acute as Tex’s) in humans’ lives, 
none of which involve the failure of subjectivity. On the one hand, if I eat 
because I am hungry, I am clearly fulfilling a non-deliberative desire, namely 
hunger - but I do not fail at being a subject. On the other, this is one of many 
actions that I perform that is both non-deliberative and yet is a matter for 
which I have normative reasons for performing: what I eat, how I eat, where I 
eat, when I eat and how much I eat. I conclude that the correct conclusion to 
draw, as Crowell does, is not that non-deliberative action is not normative but 
that reflection is not always seated in the controlling position in the human 
psyche.  
This is a point on which Michael Smith concurs. He too has a problem with 
the role that Korsgaard gives to reflection as forming what he calls 
“Korsgaard’s meta-ethical premise”.35 He interprets Korsgaard as arguing 
that normative thought is a matter of the formation and expression of beliefs 
about the desires we would have if our desires were to survive a process of 
reflective critical scrutiny.36 She thinks, he says, that the question ‘Should I 
desire that p?’ is the same as ‘Is p desirable?’ He quotes: 
When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and 
above all of your desires, something which is you, and which 
chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or 
law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard 
as being expressive of yourself. (Korsgaard Sources of 
Normativity 1996, 100, quoted in Smith 1999, 388.) 
Unfortunately, Korsgaard gives no arguments whatsoever for how you are to 
determine what is expressive of yourself. She only specifies it as “a 
description under which you value yourself, a description under which you 
find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.”37 
This means, argues Smith, that the reflective self can perform two roles: it 
can either provide us with examples of behaviour we should try to emulate, 
or it can provide us with advice that we should try to follow. He has critical 
points to make about such a conception of the reflective self but first it should 
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be pointed out that Korsgaard is not arguing for a simple, one-to-one relation 
between believing that I have a practical identity and having such an identity. 
The mere fact that I have a certain conception of my practical identity does 
not mean that I should conceive of myself in a certain way. Smith believes 
she is correct in arguing as such. His example is that the mere fact of his 
believing that he is a devoted parent does not mean that he is a devoted 
parent.  
Korsgaard insists that there is an answer to the problem of locating this “you” 
and “yourself”. She argues that we know how to conceive of our practical 
identities if we can find a conception of our practical identity that we cannot 
legitimately question. There is one conception of practical identity that I 
cannot question, says Korsgaard, and that is that I cannot question whether or 
not I have the practical identity of a creature that is capable of reflective 
questioning of my desires.38 The normative claim that issues from this 
incontestable premise is that I must value being a creature that has desires as 
the result of the exercise of the capacity to form desires via reflection. I must 
value myself as a rational creature and, because this premise is not unique to 
me or to my own practical identity, I must value the same in all other 
creatures that are rational. I must value other humans. This is the device 
around which I build my practical identities in order for it to lend my actions 
normativity. It is also the device by which I value other humans. This valuing 
gives rise to obligations, in Korsgaard’s terms, and not contingent norms. 
Like Crowell, Smith draws a distinction between the reflective self and the 
contingent (non-reflective or practical identity) self. Smith argues that it is 
unlikely if not implausible that the reflective and the contingent self are one 
and the same (otherwise what would the reflective self have to do?). 
Furthermore, assuming that the reflective self is the one with ready (readier) 
access to the correct normative attitude, then the contingent self doesn’t 
always ‘get it right’ and commits non-deliberative actions and the like. 
Korsgaard argues that the contingent self must emulate the reflective self but, 
as Smith argues with the following example, the reflective reaction is very 
often not the type of reaction that is required by others. Smith again uses the 
example of being a devoted parent.39 It is conceivable, he says, that his 
reflective self would want him to have care and concern for his children as a 
natural response to their needs, rather than on the basis of reflection. Perhaps 
children can detect the difference between a concern for them that is naturally 
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formed in response to their needs, as against a concern for them that is 
reflectively formed. Perhaps they develop in a happier and healthier way 
when those who care for them have natural cares and concerns rather than the 
reflective ones. If this is right, then his reflective self will certainly not want 
the (contingent) devoted parent to have the desires that he has. The reflective 
self will not want that the contingent self emulate the reflective self and the 
reflective self will not want itself to want it. It is therefore possible, says 
Smith, that the reflective self should not be emulated by the contingent self. 
And therefore he concludes that Korsgaard’s normative conclusion cannot be 
drawn from her meta-ethical premise that we know how to endorse - by 
reflection - a desire to desire. 
While this example is a trifle construed, the point is that Smith is correct 
when he argues that there are situations imaginable when the contingent 
rather than the reflective self should be making normative decisions. Tex’s 
predicament (leg off or dead) is arguably one of them. It is significant that 
both Crowell and Smith reject Korsgaard’s source of normativity argument 
on the basis of her inadequate dealing with the category of non-deliberative 
actions. Crowell, because Korsgaard seems to be arguing that committing 
non-deliberative actions means that you fail at being a subject; Smith, 
because he questions whether reflection has the exclusive right to be the 
normative exemplar. Both point out that practical identity is something 
contingent and that Korsgaard’s attempts to give this identity a categorical 
normative foundation - by referring to “humanity” - do not succeed. Crowell 
rejects Korsgaard’s attempt because she bases practical identity on humanity 
and humanity, in her eyes, is a “plight”, a universal given and therefore 
cannot, says Crowell, be the basis for the content of normative reason. Smith 
reads Korsgaard differently on this point: he sees Korsgaard as arguing that it 
is in the valuing of reflecting on desires that we value other people (because 
they value reflecting on desires too). And that this is the basis of our 
normativity: that we value humanity (in others and in ourselves). This is not 
where the problem lies for Smith, apparently. His problem is rather with 
Korsgaard’s idea that the reflective self provides the exclusive categorical 
basis for normativity and therefore that the normativity of humanity is seated 
in its powers of reflection.  
Why are Crowell’s and Smith’s arguments concerning the normativity of 
non-deliberative actions interesting for me? They are so primarily because 
they reject the idea of an exclusively reflective basis to normativity. Caring 
is, as I have argued extensively in Chapter One, primarily a non-deliberative 
normative action - or at least an action that has, at its basis, a non-deliberative 
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motivation. I argue, following Noddings and Frankfurt, that caring for is to 
be captivated by something irrespective of your will and yet it is something 
you do because you are willing to do so. It is, in Frankfurt’s phrase, 
“volitional necessity”,40 or, in other words, to be willingly compelled. The 
reflective self, I argue, plays an insignificantly small role in this process: the 
motivation to be caring is, in Crowell and Smith’s terminology, primarily 
non-deliberative. 
I do have two points on which I differ from Crowell and Smith though. First, 
I disagree with Crowell’s point concerning the non-normativity of 
‘humanity’. I will argue that even if being human is a “plight” to use 
Korsgaard’s phrase, or a given, it is nevertheless a source of value. And 
second, I disagree with both Crowell and Smith that Korsgaard does not give 
us the means with which to understand non-deliberative actions. Though she 
does not argue this herself, I argue that Korsgaard’s account of how 
normativity works (and not so much her account of the source of normativity) 
has potential for explaining why non-deliberative actions can also be 
normative. I offer now a (third) reading of Korsgaard’s account of the source 
of normativity and I argue in favour of a subtle but distinct change of 
emphasis. 
How does normativity work? 
In order to argue that Korsgaard can provide a good working model of non-
deliberative actions, I need to rephrase what I see Korsgaard doing with her 
account of valuing. Firstly, I shall not even attempt to find a source that will 
guarantee the normativity of actions and practical identity. It is not my 
intention to provide an infallible account of the source of normativity. Instead 
I shall argue in favour of the following two points: first, as Korsgaard argues, 
valuing is located in (rather than beyond) human activity. And second, 
Korsgaard’s account of how normativity works has potential for explaining 
how (some) non-deliberative actions can be normative.  
Korsgaard argues that we humans, in the absence of any higher deontological 
presence, confer value onto things.41 This amounts to a constructivist account 
assuming that values are only brought into the world via human beings. The 
advantage of this position is that it avoids un-examinable ontological 
assumptions about ‘objectively given’ values. The problem however is that 
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nothing has objective value: I value potatoes, you value tomatoes; how could 
we ever get along? Furthermore, the objection has been made that to value 
everything merely because humans value it would open the door to a form of 
value relativism that is unacceptable.42 But it should be pointed out that the 
mere fact of valuing something is not sufficient to make it valuable. This 
would be to open the door to a pernicious moral relativism in which the so-
called “Caligulas” and drunkards and Mafioso of this world could then justify 
their actions as expressions of their valuing and therefore as rightful 
actions.43 What is needed is a moment (a long moment, if necessary) in which 
the things that you want are compared with the things that people you care 
about also want. Thus debauchery and sadism is what Caligula wants but, as 
it is not everyone’s cup of tea, he might find that as a consequence most 
people will not - of their free will - want to share his values. This does not 
however mean that, in some evolutionary sense, we will all eventually desire 
the same things (in a convergence of values).44 The point is, rather, that we 
should not seek unanimity in what we value – the only unanimity that there is 
is that we value. This is the significant starting point of what might be called 
a naturalised (in distinction to a transcendental) account of normativity. 
As far as the ‘objectivity’ of values is concerned, insofar as we share values, 
this is not so much a fact about valuable objects but a fact about human 
beings and their relations to each other. The reasons I have in finding 
something valuable should make me understand the reasons that someone 
else has in finding something else valuable: as Korsgaard says, taking into 
account what other people find of value in whatever they care about is a way 
of being rightly related to those people.45 Unanimity in valuing is not derived 
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from the objects that are valued but from the human relationships in which 
those things are found to be valuable. In this way, shared value has to do with 
mutual appreciation of one another’s capacities, minds, tastes, interests and 
creativity.46  
The exact form of morality and the obligations that flow from it is dependent 
on how we see the idea of moral identity taking shape. In this respect, it is 
clear that we cannot value just any old thing or refer to it as being normative. 
We can value something only if it has some form of appeal to us – broadly 
understood – it satisfies one of our needs, it is the kind of thing we are 
capable of being interested in, it has aesthetic appeal; it is something we can 
endorse; it is something that people we care about also endorse. Something in 
us has to answer to something in the object or the action in order for the 
object or action to be valuable to us. Philippa Foot describes how, during 
lectures on virtue, she holds up a piece of torn paper and asks the question: 
“Is this good?”47 The inappropriateness of the question usually gets her a 
laugh from the audience, she relates. I would argue that it is precisely the 
random nature of the piece of torn paper that makes it impossible for us to 
find it either good or bad. It has no relevance and, most likely, no connection 
to anyone’s practical identity, and therefore has no pertinent value. 
But if value is a human construct, socially endorsed, then how then does it 
have effect or authority on these very same humans? The next step is to argue 
that because the only source of value is the human experience of it, human 
experience itself is valuable. This is a problematic step and I acknowledge its 
circularity. However, unlike the typical example used in any undergraduate 
Logics 1 course – sleeping potion induces sleep because it contains a sleep-
inducing ingredient - there is no possible alternative description of the active 
and/or valuable ingredient of humans except humanity. Therefore I am afraid 
that we shall have to make do with it.48  
I can rephrase and shift the emphasis of the debate though: humans 
experience value and what is significant for an ethical discussion is how they 
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do so. And this is where Korsgaard makes an important contribution: they do 
so rationally because rationality has to do with making decisions that are 
compatible with what one finds valuable. And what one finds valuable has to 
do with who you are - what she calls “practical identity”.49 Korsgaard does 
not argue that it is sensible to be moral in accordance with your practical 
identity. Korsgaard argues that it is morally necessary to act according to 
your sense of who you are.50 Morality in this conception is therefore the 
outcome of rationality – in the broadest sense of “wise people don’t make 
moral decisions counter to their identity.”51 In another sense, practical 
identity has a very practical (rather than logical) aspect: it relates to a jumble 
of conceptions, sometimes contradictory, of who you are, a composite of all 
the identities which you hold to be part of yourself and it is one’s moral task 
to give expression to these identities in the appropriate fashion at the 
appropriate moment. These can be “contingent and local” identities52 but 
even these bring with them moral obligations. 
Korsgaard connects practical identity to having obligations because humanity 
requires both: “part of the normative force of those reasons springs from the 
value we place on ourselves as human beings who need such identities. In 
this way all value depends on the value of humanity.”53 Thus it is not so 
much that humanity has a specific content which then lends practical identity 
normativity (as I understand Crowell as having understood Korsgaard as 
arguing) but it is rather because we value ourselves as human beings that our 
practical identity is normative. It is the valuing itself that makes our activity 
normative and the moral obligations we have to one another flow from that 
recognition of mutual valuing. This, it seems to me, is the crucial step to 
make in a naturalised account of normativity - away from transcendental 
values: it is not the value of humanity but the fact of human valuing that 
lends our actions normativity and gives rise to obligations. 
This means, I would argue, that the fact that human beings have rationality 
does not make morality subordinate to reflection (as I understand Smith as 
arguing that this is what Korsgaard advocates). For two reasons: firstly, 
rationality or reflection is not the same as morality. Rather, rationality is a 
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pre-requisite for morality; it is by no means a guarantor of morality, either by 
example or by means of advice.54 Quite simply, very often the best thing to 
do is not the thing about which one reflects but is the thing that relates 
immediately and directly to who we are.55 If rationality implies impartiality 
(as it indeed does), then it is correct to argue that reflective morality is but 
one kind of morality and therefore that rationality plays an important but 
limited role in being moral.  
This leads to the second, related point: is all morality rational? In a broad 
sense this is true (it is, after all, rational to be moral) but Korsgaard gives an 
answer to the question ‘how can we judge when something is normative?’ 
with a reply that falls both inside and outside of rationality. The only answer 
that Korsgaard provides to this question is highly subjective: it must make 
your life worth living. Practical identity, she says is “a description under 
which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking.”56 There is no blueprint for what a worthwhile life is and there 
are no values other than those created and sustained by us. And this means 
that the contingent and local aspects of practical identity are not necessarily, 
in the first place, rational - and nor do they have to be. The ambition of the 
man who wants to be the first who flies single-handedly over large parts of 
the world, or climbs inhospitable mountains, or swims great stretches of 
ocean is not reasonable - but it is an undeniable part of his practical identity. 
Doing these things makes his life “worthwhile” - he derives a good deal of 
normative satisfaction from doing these things: they are “right” for him. 
Rationality need not, I would argue, be the sole categorical basis for morality. 
This was the first point I wished to make concerning normativity. 
The second concerns the ‘working’ of normativity - the phenomenology of 
normativity, as it were: what does it do? Korsgaard argues that normativity 
(and the obligations attached to that normativity) issues from having a 
practical identity. Practical identity, although often not something simple or 
straightforward, is nevertheless necessary, according to Korsgaard. Its 
necessity arises from self-consciousness because self-consciousness forces us 
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to have a conception of ourselves and we must act according to that 
conception. This is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious. 
The fact that normativity issues from having a practical identity means that 
normativity is as necessary as practical identity is because of being self-
conscious. Thus acting normatively, acting according to our practical 
identity, will have consequences – good, identity affirming consequences. 
And this would also imply that not acting according to our conception of 
ourselves will have consequences – presumably not good consequences, 
whatever these might be. For these latter consequences there is a rich 
semantic tradition concerning the conscience, in particular, what it is to have 
a bad conscience, to be guilt-ridden, remorseful or full of regret. To choose 
but one example, the adulterous King David, in Psalm 32:3, complains: 
“When I kept silence, my bones grew old through my groaning all day long.”  
Korsgaard argues that “a person’s own mind does indeed impose sanctions 
on her: that when we don’t do what we should, we punish ourselves, by guilt 
and regret and repentance and remorse.”57 This is because, she continues, 
“pain is the perception of a reason”.58 Someone who recalls failing to do what 
he is obliged to do will feel pain – that is what remorse and guilt is. “The 
mind’s authority does not depend upon the experience of the negative moral 
emotions, but it absolutely implies it”, she argues.59 This pain is what I call 
the phenomenology of normativity. Korsgaard only mentions pain. This is 
probably because she is primarily concerned with the transgression of 
morality rather than with confirmative experiences of the same. What is 
significant to me in her argument is the description of the effect of 
normativity: the realisation that normativity is an experienced and felt thing; 
that the transgression and affirmation of normativity are felt by the person 
who transgresses or confirms moral reasons. This is an essential part of 
understanding what normativity is - that it is something that is not exclusively 
in the domain of the reasonable but is also something that is (acutely) felt. 
This was the second point about how normativity works: normativity is 
something that you experience: you feel the effect of the confirmation or 
transgression of morality.  
Korsgaard expresses this experience in an extreme form: she links this to the 
consequences of having a practical identity: you act morally because you 
could not live with yourself otherwise. Not following the precepts of one’s 
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practical identity would be continually to contradict or oppose that identity, 
she says. To use Korsgaard’s dramatic phrase: “it could be … worse than 
death”.60  
(M)orality can ask hard things of us, sometimes even that we 
should be prepared to sacrifice our lives in its name. This 
places a demanding condition on a successful answer to the 
normative question: it must show that sometimes doing the 
wrong thing is as bad or worse than death. And for most human 
beings on most occasions, the only thing that could be as bad 
or worse than death is something that for us amounts to death - 
not being ourselves any more. (Korsgaard Sources 1996, pp.  
17 - 8) 
Using the example of extreme old age, accompanied by diminished 
intelligence or an altered character, she argues that the thought ‘that would 
not be me any more’, would lead one to wanting rather to be dead. She then 
concludes “if moral claims are ever worth dying for, then violating them 
must be, in a similar way, worse than death. And this means that they must 
issue in a deep way from our sense of who we are.”61 Korsgaard therefore 
equates morality with identity, and identity with normativity - all necessary 
for human beings.  
This conclusion provides the necessary defence to Crowell’s critique that if 
humanity is a “plight” then it cannot be the source of normativity. Korsgaard 
argues that being human is a plight in which we have no choice; if you are 
human, you have an identity; when you have an identity you have 
obligations; therefore to be human is to have obligations. My response to 
Crowell is that the necessity of having to have an identity does - contrary to 
what he seems to think - provide us with moral content. It might not 
guarantee the logical security of the source of normativity but it emphasises 
the point that humans construct value because they have to. You are not 
human unless you have an identity. Once you have an identity, you have 
obligations: particular obligations flow from being (a particular) someone.  
I have argued here that Korsgaard gives us enough material to construct an 
argument in favour of the normativity of non-deliberative actions. I argued 
that her notion of practical identity is confusing when regarded as a 
transcendental notion (humanity). I have argued in favour of four precepts. 
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These are: first, obligations originate from the necessary plight of being 
human; second, what makes your life worth living is the basis for deciding 
what is normative; third, reflection is not always the best guide for moral 
action; and fourth, the effect of normativity is felt - it is experiential. This 
reading of Korsgaard’s account of the normativity gives me a valuable 
insight for my discussion of caring. I have argued that the activity of caring is 
in large part non-deliberative and necessary and experiential - and now I shall 
argue that it is also normative. 
Non-deliberative yet normative 
It is at this point, I would argue, that a discussion of normativity in care 
ethics can begin. Caring is an expression of valuing other people (I will limit 
my discussion to caring for people here but it can include projects and work 
and programmes and processes and even things). We value because of our 
own practical identities (in the words of Frankfurt: because of our own 
concerns and love), and we value what people who matter to us value (in the 
words of Korsgaard) – if this is consistent with our own practical identities. 
As a mother, I value the well-being of my children; their well-being is dear to 
me because I am a parent. This I can easily conclude after due reflection - it 
is something that fits seamlessly into my practical identity as mother. But my 
love for and profound enjoyment of who my children are goes beyond the 
bounds of reflection. In loving my children as I do, I am seized by the power 
of my emotional response to them: I am enraptured, captured, necessitated - 
and I was from the very first moment I laid eyes on them, in other words 
when I only knew what they were and not who they were. This experience is 
normative in the sense that I strive to fulfil the sufficient conditions for being 
a (good) parent; this experience is non-deliberative, even irrational at times, 
and yet also normative (I am a devoted parent).  
Caring, with its compelling and necessary character, is an excellent example 
of non-deliberative activity. Though caring has reflective and reflexive 
moments too: at moments when the one caring must evaluate whether what 
he is doing is required by the cared for, what kind of effect his interventions 
have and in what kind of situation the caring for places him. But the 
motivation to be caring is primarily - as is clear from the caring theories of 
Noddings and Frankfurt and Dalmiya and Halwani - not a reflective activity 
at base at all. In the words of these authors it is “engrossment”; it is “being 
seized” or “pulled”; it is “displacement”; it is “necessary”. None of these 
experiences warrant the description ‘reflective’. And yet, despite this 
CHAPTER 6 
168   
definitive characteristic of what caring involves, there are important 
normative consequences of caring. These consequences are felt not only by 
the care recipient, the one cared for, but also by the one caring. Because the 
phenomenon of being captured by the object of care has to do with the 
interests and concerns (the practical identity) of the one caring. There has to 
be a significant overlap between what the one caring finds important and 
gripping and rousing in his own self and what he finds in the cared for. 
Without this overlap there is no impetus for caring. Thus, although the urge 
or impulse or tendency to be caring in the first place is largely involuntary, 
there are reasons for why it happens. And these reasons, this overlap between 
the identity of the one caring and what the one caring finds or sees in the 
cared for, is the basis for the normativity of the caring relation. If it is an 
unwarranted or a somehow false representation of the practical identity of the 
one caring, then it is not good care. We can only care if the things we care 
about are somehow consistent or compatible with our practical identities. 
Also, from the point of view of the cared for, if it is illicit, or perverse, or 
exploitative, or inappropriate, or manipulative or harmful in any way, then it 
should be stopped because it is not good care.  
Both rational obligations and non-deliberative impetus to care bring with 
them the normative effect that Korsgaard speaks of: the mental sanctions 
guilt, remorse, repentance and regret. This pain is the realisation that 
something should have been done and was not or that something that should 
not have done was. It is the phenomenology of normativity. But not all 
phenomenological effects are painful. Because care ethics is about relations 
with others,62 it is also concerned with the beneficial effects of caring. Some 
care ethicists focus on the aspect of humanity and define humanity in terms 
of being vulnerable and fallible (care ethicists like Verkerk and Manschot 
and other Dutch care ethicists).63 Some care ethicists focus rather on 
perception and ‘how it is with the other’. This can include need and 
vulnerability - as well as happiness. The carer recognises and takes pleasure 
in the other’s happiness and identifies with and is concerned about his needs, 
and is also aware and responsive to the “fragility and mortality of human 
existence”.64 
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Do we have an obligation to care? 
But how do we get from a theory of what is valuable about caring to an 
obligation to care? At the beginning of this chapter I described that the 
compellingness of an obligation does not lie in its being a command but in its 
endorsement. Only when that which is required to be done is also endorsed 
by the person required to do that thing does the command become an 
obligation. Then it becomes something that someone must do. One has 
reasons based upon one’s practical identity for doing that thing. The activity 
of caring has this structure too: caring is often in response to an appeal of 
some kind, for help or attention. When the appeal overlaps with the one 
caring’s own concerns and desires - when object of care is endorsed - caring 
becomes an obligation. Obligation is thus a step further than the impetus to 
be caring: it is the finding of reasons for being caring rather than (merely) 
being compelled to or propelled into caring. Having being ‘pulled into’ a 
caring relation with someone, it is very often the case that there comes a 
moment in which one says: “I must care for this person”. This moment is the 
moment in which obligation ‘takes over’ and transforms what was a 
“volitional necessity” into a (perhaps but not necessarily) longer stage of 
commitment, responsibility, and trust. In this sense, caring is an obligation in 
that involves the acceptance or endorsement of the responsibility of the 
caring relation by the one caring.  
One cannot have an obligation to love in the sense that we cannot be required 
to love (Kant made this quite clear in his Metaphysics of Morals65), but I 
argue that one can have an obligation to care. Though both love and care 
involve an element of liability, these are different kinds of culpability. In 
love, we are held much less responsible than when we care – love being 
primarily that which is not rational: inclinational, impulsive, unreasonable - 
in short, wholly amoral. Care, on the other hand, has as its goal the 
achievement of what the other desires whether or not one finds them worthy 
of love. This indeed is the single most distinguishing feature of caring. Love 
can also include caring for the other; caring does not include loving the other. 
It is precisely the element of wanting to achieve what the other desires – or 
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“making their ends your own” in Kantian terminology66 – irrespective of 
whether you find them worthy of your love that makes caring an activity that 
must be sustained beyond the whimsicality of mere affection. Caring for 
others is also a responsibility without concern for reciprocity. The cared for is 
under no obligation to reciprocate but the one caring, once the caring 
responsibility has been accepted, has an obligation to sustain this 
relationship.  
This is not to deny the importance of the initial impetus to care which, I have 
argued is non-deliberative. The urge to care can originate in being ‘seized’ by 
the object of care in the sense that the one-caring cannot forbear to care. The 
one caring can become ‘engrossed’ in the cared for or might, due to a process 
of ‘displacement’ in the cared for, feel the same urgency that underlie the 
appeal for care by the cared for. Caring, described as such, is necessary: 
irrefutable, impossible not to do. 
Korsgaard argues that the normative question becomes an issue when an 
agent acknowledges the truth of a moral claim but fails to feel the force of the 
claim.67 Pim, the reluctant carer cited in the Introduction, is caught in ‘the 
normative question’: he asks – knowing that he should care – why he is 
unable to do so; why doesn’t he feel that caring drive to the same degree as 
his partner does? Evidently the knowledge that caring for his child is 
something that is beneficial to that child is not sufficient to galvanise him 
into action. Pim has located the crux of the issue of motivation and finds 
himself in the same predicament as moral rationalists were warned they 
would find themselves: the predicament that understanding is not sufficient to 
motivate one to act morally.68 Quite clearly the solution to Pim’s problem 
will not come from rationality. Pim seems to know what his obligations are - 
what he must do - but he does not. What happens next? 
I argue that Noddings’ and Frankfurt’s accounts are helpful in being able to 
understand what it is to care and (hopefully) to get Pim to care. First of all, 
Pim should do what Noddings urges carers must do: namely to distance 
himself from his own (all too readily taken) perspective and “perceive the 
reality” of the person requiring care - that of his son. For this is indeed what 
is unique and urgent about caring: the needs of the to be cared for are prior to 
the carer’s needs (however temporarily and to whatever degree). Sam’s 
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demands, because he is young and dependent and vulnerable, take priority 
over Pim’s wanting to read the newspaper or spend his time as he wants to. 
Pim needs to see what it is that Sam needs from him in terms of caring - Pim 
must ‘take on Sam’s reality as his own’, in the words of Noddings. Only 
when Pim’s desires have subsided sufficiently to the background will Pim 
have the space to know what it is that Sam requires of him as a carer. This 
does not mean that Pim must do so selflessly or without reflection; Pim after 
all must bear the responsibility for caring for Sam.  
But Pim seems unable to push his own desires and wants into the 
background. He knows that he is a father and should care for his son but he 
regards Sam’s needs only in terms of obstacles in the way of his achieving 
what he wants: to read the newspaper undisturbed, to phone, to sleep, to read 
his mail. How can Pim be encouraged to ‘take on Sam’s reality’? Noddings 
does not have an answer. In her account, morality is located primarily “in the 
pre-act consciousness” of the person caring.69 She argues that experience of, 
and longing for, a caring relationship is condition general to all humans; in 
other words, everyone has, or has had, access to one or more caring 
relationships and we all know, “pre-act consciously” what this relationship 
entails. Pim should therefore have this knowledge and it should galvanise 
him into action – but it does not. What now? 
A second approach, derived from Frankfurt, is more compelling: you care 
because you cannot forbear not to. You are compelled, albeit willingly to care 
for something or someone - because of your own concerns and love. 
According to Frankfurt, either you have concerns and love (for the object of 
caring) or you do not. Nothing, in this account, can make you care. If Pim felt 
these concerns and love as Frankfurt describes them, then he should not be 
able to forbear from caring for Sam. Unfortunately, in this case study, Pim 
apparently does not feel the necessary concern in order to enable him to care. 
Pim does not feel; therefore he cannot care. 
If we were to stop here then, I am afraid, we would have to reject Pim as a 
moral deviant and believe him beyond help. But there is hope in a third 
attempt: much like Frankfurt, Korsgaard argues that one’s normativity flows 
directly out of one’s practical identity (Frankfurt would say that you care for 
the object of caring because of what you find important). But where 
Korsgaard differs from Frankfurt is that she describes is the effect of caring 
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(or not caring). In particular, Korsgaard describes the pain that one feels if 
one acts contrary to one’s practical identity - to act against it feels “worse 
than death”, in the words of Korsgaard.70 Practical identity is not only 
something one has - this is the third step - as it is for Frankfurt; for Korsgaard 
having a practical identity has profound normative implications and 
consequences. These are the consequences that Pim is experiencing: he is 
feeling the pain of not facing up to his obligations in the sense that these 
obligations are his; they are direct consequences of his practical identity (in 
the words of Korsgaard). His illnesses, his rashes, his frustrations and 
feelings of inadequacy: Pim is not fulfilling the obligations that accompany, 
in particular, his practical identity as father, as carer (and therefore also, as 
partner). Pim does not care; therefore he feels. 
Conclusion 
While most of the care ethics literature begins with examples of loving and 
tender caring moments, I have expressly chosen a case study that illustrates 
what I regard as the most urgent problem that care ethics faces: how to 
motivate people to care for others, particularly when they seem insufficiently 
moved to do so. What is problematic for care ethics is that there are those 
who do care and those who do not, and the danger is that the twain shall 
never meet. Furthermore, those who do not can do so by virtue of those who 
do; and those who do are obliged to continue doing so because of those who 
do not.71 Can care ethics effectively address those who do not do caring? An 
ethics cannot force anyone to act morally (and supposing it could do so, there 
are good reasons for not wanting any system of thought that tries to). As 
force is out of the question, we are left to consider various persuasive or 
prescriptive theories and choose the ones with the most compelling 
arguments to motivate.  
I have chosen a combination of three accounts of being necessitated to value, 
two of which concern caring. Noddings’ account of how the one-caring can 
perceive what it is that the cared-for needs and Frankfurt’s account of why it 
is you care - how you are gripped by the object of care. These two accounts 
have no binding moral consequences attached to caring (or not) and are 
therefore non-normative. Frankfurt has an either or account: either you care 
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or you don’t and there is no damage or shame if you do not. Noddings’ 
account is also non-normative in the sense that she cannot consider the 
alternative that you will not “perceive the reality of the other” and therefore 
be swept into a caring relationship. Korsgaard’s key contribution is adding 
the normative aspect to being necessitated - what happens, in the case of Pim, 
when you do not comply to the demands of your practical identity. Without 
Korsgaard, we would have to write Pim off as a moral deviant; with 
Korsgaard, we can understand Pim’s pain.  
  
174   
SUMMARY1 
The fascinating thing about care, as an ethics and a public morality, is its 
capacity to appeal, cajole and irritate. It is a concept that is impossible to 
deny yet very difficult to give form to: we all need care at some stage or 
other, some people have a disproportionate amount of caring to do, yet others 
do their best to avoid doing it or reflecting upon it. No one seems to be able 
to agree about what it is precisely or what it entails, yet it is a word that is 
bandied about on political platforms, used in proposals for social reform and 
is milked mercilessly in advertising. It is a concept that moves us – it reminds 
us of something primordially human, it seems at the same time to promise 
something utopian and ideal and yet is often the terrain of bitter 
disappointment. 
Just how care moves us is the subject of this book. I want to know how care 
moves us – or in philosophical terms, how it motivates us. I shall be arguing 
here that caring involves being necessitated to care. Once we hear a cry for 
help or an appeal for caring, we cannot avoid being moved in some way by 
that cry or appeal (even if we choose to ignore it). We cannot escape 
responding to the care appeal. When I say ‘necessitated’ then I understand it 
to mean the following: it is in the nature of caring that we do so in the sense 
of not being able to - not wanting to - do otherwise; there is something 
compelling or compulsive about caring that places us in an unavoidable 
connection or relation to the object of caring.  
Focussing on motivation, as I wish to do, does not mean being limited 
exclusively to the functioning of the inner life of caring individuals. On the 
contrary, as I shall be arguing, caring represents a type of response to what I 
call ‘compelling’ reasons to act. Caring is a motivation that has both an 
internal and an external source. On the one hand, caring is directly prompted 
by situations and contexts outside of oneself: we can be compelled to care in 
response to someone’s suffering or vulnerability, or cuteness or lovability. 
But, on the other, it can be something that we do despite ourselves, or 
because of ourselves, or for qualities intrinsic to the person we care for; it can 
be voluntary, or involuntary or even as a result of an obligation. In short, I 
argue that caring involves that most contradictory (but most everyday) 
experience of being ‘voluntarily constrained’ or ‘willingly compelled’. 
Caring does something with us: it moves us, it propels us into action, it 
  SUMMARY   
 175 
agitates and tugs at us – and it often does not even require our conscious and 
intentional participation to do so. Caring, in this sense, is ‘necessary’ – it is a 
motivation that is impossible to say “No” to (and even if we do say “no” we 
have to refuse or deny the motivation thereby acknowledging it as 
motivation). 
But at the same time caring is normative: there is adequate or appropriate 
caring and inadequate and inappropriate caring. Therefore this compelling 
activity also requires from us that we critically examine how and under what 
conditions we care and if what we do is the best thing to do or the most we 
can do under the circumstances. We are required to endorse or confirm doing 
this compelling thing: to use our practical knowledge and engage our 
experience and judgement in performing it. Therefore, to summarise, the 
motivation to care contains within it a series of potential contradictions or 
tensions between opposite tendencies and it is amongst these tensions that I 
argue that the dynamic and unique qualities of caring lie. What I shall be 
doing in this book is to set out to explore these tensions and describe what I 
regard as the best way of expressing them. But, first of all, what is care 
ethics? 
Care Ethics 
Care ethics consists of a diverse collection of ethical perspectives with a 
number of common features. Firstly, they are philosophical and/or ethical 
responses to Carol Gilligan’s psychoanalytical account in the nineteen-
eighties of responses to moral dilemmas that are not solely based on justice 
as the most superior moral response. Secondly, care ethics emphasise a three-
fold characteristic of care: context, relationality and feeling. And thirdly, care 
ethics is particularistic. 
In the nineteen-eighties, Gilligan’s psychoanalytic research into women’s 
responses to moral dilemmas was responsible for a new trend in feminist 
research into what Gilligan called a distinctive moral orientation, a “different 
voice”, which she refers to as the care perspective. The care perspective in 
ethics involves seeing oneself as connected to others within a web of various 
relationships. And the ‘voice’ is one of care and responsibility, of concern 
and connection with other people: a shift in the moral question, from ‘What is 
just?’ to “How do I respond?’ (Gilligan, 1987, 23). 
Some care ethicists (like Sara Ruddick) have argued that care and justice are 
entirely different and non-assimilable moral orientations; other care ethicists 
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(like Alison Jagger) argue that both care and justice are necessary to achieve 
fairness in complex and interconnected human relations. What care ethics 
adds to ethics is a new type of motivation in moral discourse. The moral 
agent no longer strives to achieve only a fair or just result to a moral dilemma 
but also a caring result; a result that is beneficial for the welfare or well-
being of others; a result that is tuned to the individual demands and 
requirements of the cared for.  
Heta Nagel-Docekal (1977, 110) argues that care ethics generally has three 
characteristics by which care is usually defined: it is sensitive to context, it is 
guided by relationships and it is governed by feelings. Care ethics’ sensitivity 
to context is derived from the “situated knowledge” tradition in critical 
feminist philosophy of science.2 In this tradition, shared by feminists like 
Donna Harraway, Sandra Harding, Seyla Benhabib, Lorraine Code and 
Claudia Card, knowledge is regarded as being generated and understood in 
specific contexts. This view emphatically rejects the notion that there is a 
neutral ‘view from nowhere’ which would produce universal or non-
contextualised knowledge. Thus the question is not what is known but who 
knows. From within care ethics, Gilligan’s question, ‘how do I respond?’ for 
example, falls within this situated approach.  
Nagel-Docekal’s second characteristic of care, its relationality, is a very basic 
precept for care ethics. All of care ethics is about relations with others.3 Some 
care ethicists focus on the aspect of humanity and define humanity in terms 
of being vulnerable and fallible (care ethicists like Marian Verkerk and Henk 
Manschot and other Dutch care ethicists).4 Some care ethicists focus rather 
on perception and ‘how it is with the other’. This can include need and 
vulnerability - as well as happiness. The carer recognises and takes pleasure 
in the other’s happiness and identifies with and is concerned about his needs, 
and is also aware and responsive to the “fragility and mortality of human 
existence” (Ricoeur cited in Verkerk 1994, 64).  
Nagel-Docekal’s third characteristic of care is that it is ‘governed by 
feelings’. (This emphasis on feelings is however not what the more 
politically-orientated care ethicists like Joan Tronto, Selma Sevenhuijsen and 
Jagger are concerned with. These political care ethicists are concerned rather 
with the notion of a competent practice and instrumental design.) Feelings - 
or inclinations5 - do play a rather unique role in “personalist” or affective care 
ethics: inclinations are the instruments by which caring is expressed and 
information about the cared-one is gathered. All the beneficent inclinations 
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(like compassion, concern, sympathy, empathy, and trust) are involved in 
gathering information and expressing the felt care.  
The third characteristic of care is its ‘particularity’. This characteristic is 
logical consequence of prioritising caring motivation, contextuality, 
relationality and inclinations. Particularistic ethics is a thoroughly 
contextualised and descriptive conception of where someone is, here and now 
and therefore requires a far-reaching inquiry into the position of the other. It 
is a viewpoint of the individual as he is at that particular moment, with his 
own needs, desires and possibilities, his own history and own perspective on 
life. It requires that each instance be, if necessary, judged on its own merit 
which demands a singular degree of openness of mind on the part of the one 
caring. Not only openness as such, but a well-meaning or beneficent 
preparedness to perceive and a capacity to make judgements that are not 
determined by one’s own preferences. After all, what is good for one 
person’s well being might not be good for another. 
These, in brief, are the chief characteristics of care ethics in general and 
personalist care ethics specifically. The focus of this book is on motivation. I 
shall argue that caring involves a combination of being compelled yet doing 
so willingly because it is that which one must do. Before I do so I shall 
present a case study. This particular case study illustrates what I regard as the 
greatest challenge for care ethics, namely how to motivate those who do not 
care to care. 
Case study 
After two years of marriage, Pim and his wife moved from Amsterdam to 
Abcoude and a year-and-a-half later their son Sam was born. 
“I am ashamed to admit it, but I found parenthood terribly difficult. I am so pleased 
with my son and I have not experienced one minute’s worth of regret concerning my 
choice to have a child, but I never expected it to be so exhausting. My wife breast-fed 
for the first nine months and I could sleep reasonably well at night and in the morning. 
But after that we planned to share the care for Sam equally. And that wasn’t easy, 
despite the fact that Sam spent three days in the week at the day-care and I only had to 
look after him for one whole day. 
“As the months passed I felt more and more tired. I began to dread the days I had to 
look after Sam. Not because of him but because of everything that had to happen 
around him. Getting up early, changing his nappy, dressing him, preparing a bottle, 
making sandwiches, taking him to bed, conducting a careful phone call while listening 
for him all the while, vacuuming, checking my mail and yes, he was awake once 
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more. Dressing him, another bottle, another sandwich, going to the shops, playing, 
afternoon nap. By half-past five I was tired-out and happy that my wife came home to 
take over from me. But yes, then he still had to eat supper, yoghurt, in bath and bed. 
And that time and time again. 
“It drove me crazy that I could never do what I wanted to, without being disturbed. 
That all my activities were planned in advance and that I barely had any time to do 
things for myself. I must admit that I find that very difficult. Recently I have not been 
feeling very well and suffer regularly from rashes. I am also more frequently sick than 
I used to be. I am amazed at how my wife manages it all. She has a busy job in 
advertising, finds time to sport three times a week and nevertheless whistles while she 
folds the clean clothes in the evening. It seems as if she can manage everything.” 
This case study is cited in an article in the Volkskrant (Magazine 19 February 
2005: 22 - 26) called “The Young Father is a Little Tired”, and concerns a 
“new” phenomenon: the masculine variety of postnatal depression. This 
phenomenon is linked to the recent and increasing trend in the Netherlands of 
men who have children rather late in life - in their forties – and who have 
difficulty in adjusting to their new role. The article attributes the problems 
men have with caring tasks to a discrepancy between cognition and emotion: 
rationally they think that they should be able to participate equally in caring 
for the children and in the housework, but their behaviour shows something 
altogether different.  
Three solutions to Pim’s dilemma 
What can we say about Pim’s self-acknowledged failure to care? Well, first 
of all, in all fairness to Pim, he is aware that his response – his dread of 
having to take on the responsibility for a day’s caring and his pain and 
discomfort – is inadequate. He compares himself to his wife and sees his 
contribution to the caring tasks by no means matching her energy and 
consistency; in short, she takes on the greater responsibility for caring for 
Sam, contrary to their agreement. What is so patently missing from his 
perception though is what he could do to alter this situation. What he sees is 
that his wife has some kind of caring ‘drive’ that he supposedly lacks. Where 
can Pim get his drive from? Second of all, Pim seems to know what it is he 
should be doing but does not seem able to want to do that which he should be 
doing. What is missing from his moral perception? Not knowledge or 
acknowledgement - he knows that he should care. But why can’t he and why 
is he suffering?  
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The first solution I derive from Nel Noddings, one of the founders of 
personalist care ethics. Noddings’ central question is “how to meet the other 
morally” and the motivation for doing so is to seek the ideal caring relation 
that we all once knew and experienced in the mother-child relation. We not 
only seek this relation - we also wish to “remain in the caring relation and to 
enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring” (Noddings, 1984, 5). Nodding 
defines caring as helping someone to grow and actualise himself and the only 
way of knowing what it is you should do as a carer is to “apprehend another’s 
reality.” This phrase, “apprehending another’s reality”, is used by Noddings 
throughout her book, and means “taking on the other’s reality as possibility 
and begin to feel its reality and to feel that you must act accordingly” 
(Noddings, 1984, 16). In other words, says Noddings, apprehension of 
another’s reality is in effect “feeling impelled to act as though on my own 
behalf, but on behalf of the other.” (This may sound a little confusing. I 
paraphrase as follows: ‘I feel as if I am acting for myself but it is not my 
action; it is that of another’).  
Thus ‘possibility’, in the phrase “taking on another’s possibility”, has a very 
specific meaning. It refers to a form of compulsion: being impelled to 
comprehend the other’s reality (situation, position, dilemma, standpoint). 
What is significant here is not only the notion that one can apprehend 
someone’s reality, but that this apprehension has an immediate effect - you 
feel you must act according to the reality of the other. What happens once 
you have “apprehended the other’s reality”? This other perception has an 
effect upon you: just as your own reality (your situation, your sense 
perception) affects you. Once the reality of the other has been admitted into 
your consciousness, you cannot ignore it just as you cannot ignore your own 
reality (at least, it cannot be done unless at some expense either in terms of 
repressing or in some way containing this apprehension). This apprehension 
is by no means a given. It requires effort. Noddings refers to it as a “struggle” 
and its goal is to eliminate the intolerable, reduce the pain, fill the need, and 
actualise the dream (Noddings, 1984, 14). Encapsulated in the notion of 
apprehension is the drive to care for the other - apprehension inevitably leads 
to the desire to intervene in another’s life (just as one would act in one’s own 
life). All of this is what she means by caring.  
Noddings’ caring theory proceeds from a selfless point of view. The idea is 
“to perceive the reality of the other” and to suspend an awareness of the self 
in order to do so. Noddings wants to ‘receive’ the other. This is in contrast 
with the idea behind empathy, which is to project myself into the other by 
identifying with and understanding another’s situation, feelings and motives. 
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Empathy is too indirect an experience of what the other is experiencing as far 
as Noddings is concerned. Noddings does not wish that the self be present in 
the perception of the other.  
This is an important but contentious point in care ethics. Perceiving the other 
as fully as possible is a noble goal in any ethics. How can it be achieved? 
There is a sense in which Noddings’ suspension of the self coincides with 
older and more established notions of “disinterested interest”. This is a Stoic 
concept used to allow the person striving towards goodness to be able to do 
so - detached from inclinations. Good deeds are performed not for the 
benefits they bring to the one performing them, but because they are right. 
Kant, too, refers to this disinterested interest in his Doctrine of Virtue 
(“practical love” or “beneficence”) (Kant, 1991, 244). Care ethicists, in 
contrast, do not aim at a detachment from inclination because they do not 
argue, as Kant does, that inclinations cannot be moral. Care ethicists wish to 
suspend the self because it intrudes between the one caring and the one cared 
for. Vrinda Dalmiya, for example, concurs with Noddings that the only way 
in which the requirements of the other can be perceived is by a self that is not 
self-preoccupied or encumbered at that moment with its own inclinations.  
On the one hand the idea of the suspension of the self is repellent - why 
should I want to disable my judging and reflective abilities when caring? On 
the other, I think that Noddings has grasped an essential aspect of caring: 
namely, that in order to perceive what it is that the other needs, we ourselves 
need to shelve our own preferences - even if it is only momentarily - in order 
to understand what is required of us, as carers. A momentary displacement of 
interests, a glimpse through the other’s eyes, a deep perception of what it is 
that the other is experiencing and what their needs are. This can only be 
momentary (if achieved at all - after all, can we ever experience another’s 
pain?). And then our judging and reflective abilities must be able to resume 
their place in the forefront of our consciousness.  
On balance, I am inclined to argue that Pim should do exactly as Noddings 
says is necessary in order to care: he should ‘apprehend Sam’s reality’ such 
that Sam’s reality becomes his own. He should suspend his own inclinations 
and feel what it is like to act on behalf of another. One of Pim’s problems is 
precisely, I would argue, that Pim’s personal expectations weigh far too 
heavily in the scale of moral considerations - though exactly whose claims 
should cancel other claims out is of course a complex ethical problem. 
Nevertheless, because of the (healthy) repellence still felt at the idea of 
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suspending the inclinations of the caring self, this solution is not yet complete 
- we need more to sort Pim out than merely switching off his inclinations. 
The second possible solution is provided by the American philosopher of 
action and moral psychology, Harry Frankfurt, who has developed an account 
of “volitional necessity”. This solution is, I believe, potentially more 
complete that Noddings’ “apprehension of another’s reality”. Presupposed in 
Frankfurt’s account is a self that has agency and is self-conscious. What 
Frankfurt does is to offer us an explanation of what it is for this agent to have 
that peculiar concern for the well-being and existence of something or some 
one – namely, what it is for him to care. Frankfurt starts his account of the 
importance of what we care about with the statement: “Caring, insofar as it 
consists in guiding oneself along a distinct course or in a particular manner, 
presupposes agency and self-consciousness” (Frankfurt, 1988, 83). Caring is 
reflexive because a person who cares about something identifies themselves 
with what they care about. This they do by making themselves “vulnerable to 
losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what (they) care 
about is diminished or enhanced” (Frankfurt, 1988, 83). In this sense, by 
caring about something, the agent is connected to that thing – he shares its 
fate, as it were. Caring about something is not liking or wanting it (because it 
is possible to care for something that you might never have); nor is it 
necessarily intrinsically valuable or desirable (what you care for might be 
low on my list of things I care about). Caring, according to Frankfurt, is 
specifically prospective: to care about something is to consider it having a 
future. Caring is not only identification with the thing cared for, but also 
identification in the sense of an investment (to invest something with 
importance, or significance, or meaning).  
Frankfurt refers to the example of the Protestant theologian Martin Luther’s 
declaration “Here I stand; I can do no other” (Frankfurt, 1988, 86). This is an 
example, argues Frankfurt of the primary lack of control that a carer has over 
the object of care. Frankfurt refers to this absence of control of the carer over 
his choice of the object of care as the “necessity” of caring: caring so much 
for something that you cannot forbear from a certain course of action. This is 
neither causal nor logical necessity: what Luther was unable to exercise was 
not the power to forbear, but the will. Frankfurt refers to this kind of 
constraint as “volitional necessity” – a type of necessity that renders it 
impossible for a person to act in any other way other than he acts; it renders it 
impossible by preventing him from making use of his own capacities. Luther 
might have prevented himself from taking the action he took. But he could 
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not bring himself to do so. He was unwilling to oppose it and, furthermore, 
his unwillingness was itself something that he was unwilling to alter.  
Why is he unwilling to alter his unwillingness? Frankfurt asserts that the 
reason a person does not experience the force of volitional necessity as alien 
or external to himself is because it coincides with – and is partly constituted 
by – desires which are not only his own but with which he actively identifies 
himself. This is why Frankfurt, right from the start, insists that caring 
presupposes agency and self-consciousness. Necessity is thus personal, or 
permitted, or even self-imposed - and to a certain extent imposed or 
maintained involuntarily. The latter must be the case otherwise we could not 
explain why the agent cannot prevent himself from caring merely at will. 
Caring says Frankfurt is not a matter of willing, or at least, not only a matter 
of will. What is it then? 
The answer is that the person caring is “captivated” by the object of care. 
“(His) attention is not merely concentrated upon the object; it is somehow 
fixed or seized by the object” (Frankfurt, 1988, 89). Frankfurt analyses 
“seized” in terms of being guided by the characteristics of the cared-for 
object rather than the agent’s own; he succumbs to, what I call, the 
‘normative pull’ of the other. The normative pull is effective because of the 
agent’s feelings for the other and he voluntarily concedes to this pull because 
he wants to (because he regards the other as important for himself). Or he 
concedes to the pull because he doesn’t not want to. Thus to care for 
something is also to be (willingly or not unwillingly) “captivated”, “seized” 
or “pulled”. It is not inactive in the sense that caring is mere submission – 
there is a distinctly volitional aspect to caring in terms of being an investment 
or a prospective interest. It is also not inactive because the carer does not 
want to not care.  
How does this relate to the necessity part of caring? ‘Volition’ usually means 
consciously wishing or willing something, whereas ‘necessity’ implies being 
under (considerable) constraint to do something. Frankfurt’s “volitional 
necessity” model of caring about something, or feeling that something is 
important, expresses precisely this tension between willing and being 
constrained: a person who is constrained by volitional necessity, says 
Frankfurt, accedes to (the constraining force) because he is unwilling to 
oppose it and because, furthermore, his unwillingness is itself something 
which he is unwilling to alter (Frankfurt, 1988, 87). This most resonant 
aspect of Frankfurt’s volitional necessity is the image of the agent in the grip 
  SUMMARY   
 183 
of that for which he cares. Caring about it because it is something that he, as 
a self-conscious agent, finds worth caring about, yet seized by his 
commitment to that thing, its fate, its future successes or failures. 
Necessitated to care, yet done willingly.  
As far as Frankfurt is concerned, the object of caring has no inherent qualities 
whatsoever other than it is cared for by someone. “What makes the thing 
worth caring about is… that the justification of importance originates from 
the caring and not from the object of care” (Frankfurt, 1998, 270). It is an 
amoral account of what caring entails – Frankfurt only tells us what happens 
when we care and not when or if that caring is good or desirable. Are we any 
closer to a solution for Pim’s dilemma? The motivation that Noddings’ 
account provides us with is that once we perceive the other we will care. This 
is a phenomenological account - an account of what happens when the one-
caring perceives the cared-for - but has no account of what the agential 
aspects are.  
Frankfurt’s account adds two aspects to the account of what it is to care: first, 
the retention of the notion of agency and self-consciousness; and second the 
‘seizing’ or ‘pulling’ effect of the cared-for because of the concerns and love 
the one-caring has. Caring is, in Frankfurt’s account, more than perceiving 
and feeling the other’s reality: it is having the grounds in himself for 
succumbing to the object of care (his own preferences and ‘what he finds 
important’) and it is an experience of the compelling appeal of the cared for 
object. These two aspects are, I would argue, a significant addition to a 
theory of how caring works: it is not only that the one-caring perceives that 
he should care but it also so that he cannot stop himself from caring.  
But what if Pim does not have the right set of concerns and love that will 
necessitate him to care for Sam? In order to care in the “driving” fashion that 
Pim’s partner does, here must be something inside of Pim that makes him 
find Sam a compelling object of care. He must find Sam important such that 
he makes a prospective investment in Sam and it must also be so that he 
cannot forbear from caring for Sam. Either Pim has it, or he doesn’t, in 
Frankfurt’s terms. All we know about Pim is that these concerns and love are 
not present in him to the extent that he is necessitated to care such that his 
frustrations and illness prevent him from caring with the same ease as his 
partner. Perhaps Pim is that most feared of all agents for ethicists: the 
normative deviant? The incurable wanton, the morally hopeless, insensitive 
to all normative persuasions? In that case, Frankfurt (and others) cannot help 
Pim. 
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The third possible solution, in the form of the neo-Kantian philosopher 
Christine Korsgaard’s theory of normativity, might help Pim. What is 
distinctively human, in Korsgaard’s perspective, is that human agents 
“choose the principles that are definitive of your will” (Korsgaard cited in 
Crowell, 2007, 318). What does this mean? It has to do with practical identity 
which Korsgaard defines as a “conception of one’s identity”, a “description 
under which you value yourself” and find life worth living (Korsgaard, 1996, 
101). Such conceptions are as various as the roles that human beings can 
occupy: father, partner, researcher, and teacher. Such identities are practical 
because they are not primarily objects for theoretical contemplation, nor are 
they merely social roles that are attributed to us in a third-person way, but are 
expressed in what we do. For most people, as Korsgaard points out, their 
practical identity is a jumble of such conceptions, which often compete and 
conflict with one another. But insofar as you value yourself under a 
conception as father or teacher you can be said to identify with it and so 
“constitute yourself in its image” (Korsgaard 1996, 101). In doing so, you 
provide yourself with reasons to act in certain ways: practical identity 
becomes the principle of choice that replaces being governed by random and 
uncontrollable instincts (Crowell, 2007, 318). 
But what is the connection between practical identity and normativity? What 
binds acting morally and having an identity and valuing yourself as such? 
Korsgaard does have an explanation of how standards or values can bind you, 
can provide you with reasons for acting in some ways and with obligations 
that forbid you from acting in others. Her argument is complicated, but it 
turns on characterising subjectivity as self-consciousness: normative concepts 
do not arise as answers to theoretical questions; rather they exist “because 
human beings have normative problems. And we have normative problems 
because we are self-conscious rational animals, capable of reflection about 
what we ought to believe and do” (Korsgaard, 1996, 46). Self-consciousness 
thus gives rise to the normative; the normative gives rise to knowing what we 
must do; knowing what we must do gives rise to obligations; and 
“obligation…makes us human” (Korsgaard 1996, 5). In Korsgaard’s terms, 
being obliged (to act morally) is therefore as human (and as necessary) as it is 
have a practical identity. Obligations flow from being someone - to use non-
Korgaardian words.  
Back to Pim: Pim is someone. He is a father, a partner, a son, and many other 
things besides. He is self-conscious and he reflects on what he ought to 
believe and do. He seems to know what his obligations are - what he must do 
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- but he does not. What happens next? Korsgaard argues that humans choose 
principles rationally because rationality has to do with making decisions that 
are compatible with one’s practical identity. You act morally because you 
could not live with yourself otherwise. Not to do so would be to sacrifice 
your practical identity in a fundamental way. To use Korsgaard’s 
unforgettable phrase: “it could be … worse than death” if you did not 
(Korsgaard, 1996, 17). To put it differently, if I do not act according to the 
obligations of my practical identities, I will feel the (mental, emotional, 
physical?) pain of what it is to ignore or deny my practical identity – who I 
am. And this is the pain, I would argue, that Pim is feeling! His illnesses, his 
rashes, his frustrations and feelings of inadequacy: Pim is not fulfilling the 
obligations that accompany, in particular, his practical identity as father, as 
carer (and therefore also, as partner).  
Although I believe that Korsgaard holds the key to explaining why one must 
- under some conditions - care, I argue that Noddings’ and Frankfurt’s 
accounts are also necessary to understand what it is to care and (hopefully) to 
get Pim to care. First of all, Pim should do what Noddings urges carer must 
do: namely to distance himself from his own (all too readily taken) 
perspective and “perceive the reality” of the person requiring care - that of 
his son. For this is indeed what is unique and urgent about caring: the needs 
of the to be cared for are prior to the carer’s needs (however temporarily and 
to whatever degree). Sam’s demands, because he is young and dependent and 
vulnerable, take priority over Pim’s wanting to read the newspaper or spend 
his time as he wants to. Pim needs see what it is that Sam needs from him in 
terms of caring - Pim must take on Sam’s reality as his own, in the words of 
Noddings. Only when Pim’s desires subside to the background will Pim 
know what it is that Sam requires of him as a carer. This does not mean that 
Pim must do so selflessly or without reflection.  
The second step, derived from Frankfurt, is that you care because you cannot 
forbear not to. You are compelled, albeit willingly to care for something or 
someone because of your own concerns and love. If Pim felt these concerns 
and love as Frankfurt describes them, then he should not be able to forbear 
from caring for Sam - but the opposite is true. Either you have concerns and 
love (for the object of caring) or you do not, according to Frankfurt. And if 
we were to stop here then, I am afraid, we would have to reject Pim as a 
moral deviant and believe him beyond help.  
But there is hope: much like Frankfurt, Korsgaard argues that one’s 
normativity flows directly out of one’s practical identity (Frankfurt would say 
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that you care for the object of caring because of what you find important). 
But where Korsgaard differs from Frankfurt is that she describes the pain that 
one feels if one acts contrary to one’s practical identity - to act against it feels 
“worse than death”, in the words of Korsgaard. Practical identity is not only 
something one has - this is the third step - as it is for Frankfurt; for Korsgaard 
having a practical identity has profound normative implications and 
consequences. These are the consequences that Pim is experiencing: he is 
feeling the pain of not facing up to his obligations in the sense that these 
obligations are his, rationally chosen (in the words of Korsgaard).  
Conclusion 
While most of the care ethics literature begins with examples of loving and 
tender caring moments,6 I have expressly chosen a case study that illustrates 
what I regard as the most urgent problem that care ethics faces: how to 
motivate people to care for others, particularly when they seem insufficiently 
moved to do so. What is problematic for care ethics is that there are those 
who do care and those who do not, and the danger is that the twain shall 
never meet. Furthermore, those who do not can do so by virtue of those who 
do; and those who do are obliged to continue doing so because of those who 
do not.7 Can care ethics effectively address those who do not do caring? An 
ethics cannot force anyone to act morally (and supposing it could do so, there 
are good reasons for not wanting any system of thought that tries to). As 
force is out of the question, we are left to consider various persuasive or 
prescriptive theories and choose the ones with the most compelling 
arguments to motivate.  
I have chosen a combination of three accounts of being necessitated to value, 
two of which concern caring. Noddings’ account of how the one-caring can 
perceive what it is that the cared-for needs and Frankfurt’s account of why it 
is you care - how you are gripped by the object of care. These two accounts 
have no binding moral consequences attached to caring (or not) and are 
therefore non-normative. Frankfurt has an either or account: either you care 
or you don’t and there is no damage or shame if you do not. Noddings’ 
account is also non-normative in the sense that she cannot consider the 
alternative that you will not “perceive the reality of the other” and therefore 
be swept into a caring relationship. Korsgaard’s key contribution is adding 
the normative aspect to being necessitated - what happens, in the case of Pim, 
when you do not comply to the demands of your practical identity. Without 
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Korsgaard, we would have to write Pim off as a moral deviant; with 
Korsgaard, we can understand Pim’s pain.  
                                                          
1
 Previously published in Dutch (translated by Anke Huizinga) as “Waarom zou het 
iemands zorg zijn?”, in Filosofie & praktijk (2008), 29, 1: 19-30. 
2
 See, for example, the feminist philosopher of science Sandra Harding: The Science 
Question in Feminism (1986) and Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991). 
3
 The historical ontologist Michel Foucault with his concept of “care of the self” is an 
exception to this rule - but he does conclude that you cannot care for others unless you 
also care for yourself, and his caring for himself is a kind of objectifying of his own 
self. I will not be dealing with Foucault’s caring concept. Foucault The History of 
Sexuality. Volume III, 1984. 
4
 See their essays in Verkerk (ed.), 1997. 
5
 I prefer the term ‘inclinations’ to ‘feelings. ‘Feelings’ is a term with broad 
application refers to both emotional and moral sensitivity. I wish to draw a distinction 
between the two and, in my discussion, use ‘inclinations’ meaning emotions, desires, 
impulses, tendencies. 
6
 See, for example, Sevenhuijsen 1996 or Bowden 1997 and especially Noddings’ 
1984. 
7
 Tronto has a powerful account of the political consequences of this division of 
labour in her Moral Boundaties1993. 
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SAMENVATTING1 
Het boeiende aan zorg als ethiek en als publieke moraal is haar vermogen een 
beroep op ons te doen, ons over te halen en ons te prikkelen. Het is een 
moeilijk vorm te geven maar onmogelijk te negeren concept: We hebben 
allemaal op een zeker moment zorg nodig, sommige mensen moeten 
onevenredig veel zorgen, en weer anderen vermijden het tot elke prijs zorg te 
bieden of erover na te denken. Er is geen consensus over wat het precies is of 
behelst, en toch wordt het voortdurend genoemd op politieke podia, gebruikt 
in voorstellen voor maatschappelijke hervorming en eindeloos uitgemolken 
in de reclame. Het is een concept dat ons in beweging brengt – het doet 
denken aan iets oermenselijks, lijkt tegelijkertijd iets utopisch en ideaals te 
beloven en is ook vaak het terrein van bittere teleurstelling.  
Hoe zorg ons precies in beweging brengt is het onderwerp van dit boek. Ik 
wil weten hoe zorg ons beweegt – of, in filosofische termen, hoe het ons 
motiveert. Ik beweer dat zorgen inhoudt genoodzaakt te zijn zorg te bieden. 
Zodra we een roep om hulp of een vraag om zorg horen, brengt dat ons 
onvermijdelijk in beweging ( zelfs als we ervoor kiezen het te negeren). Het 
is onontkoombaar de zorgvraag te beantwoorden. Wanneer ik ‘genoodzaakt 
zijn’ zeg bedoel ik daarmee: dat het in de aard van zorgen besloten ligt dat 
we het doen, in die zin dat we niet anders kunnen of willen; dat zorg iets 
dwingends of onweerstaanbaars heeft, dat ons in een onvermijdelijke 
verhouding tot het onderwerp van zorg plaatst. 
Mijn focus op motivatie betekent niet dat het uitsluitend over de werking van 
het innerlijk leven van individuen gaat. Integendeel, ik beweer juist dat 
zorgen staat voor een type reactie op wat ik ’dwingende’ redenen tot 
handelen noem. Zorgen als motivatie heeft zowel een interne als een externe 
bron. Enerzijds wordt zorgen direct opgeroepen door situaties en 
omstandigheden buiten onszelf: we kunnen tot zorgen worden gedwongen 
door iemands lijden of kwetsbaarheid, of diens schattigheid of 
aantrekkelijkheid. Maar anderzijds kan het iets zijn dat we ondanks onszelf 
doen, of vanwege onszelf, of vanwege intrinsieke eigenschappen van de 
persoon voor wie we zorgen; het kan vrijwillig, onvrijwillig of zelfs uit 
plichtsgevoel gebeuren. Kortom, ik beweer dat zorgen die uiterst 
tegenstrijdige (maar uiterst alledaagse) ervaring inhoudt ‘uit vrije wil 
beperkt’ en ‘vrijwillig gebonden’ te zijn. Zorg doet iets met ons; het beweegt 
ons, het zet ons aan tot handelen, het raakt ons en het trekt aan ons – en vaak 
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is daar onze bewuste en doelgerichte participatie niet eens bij nodig. Zorgen 
is in deze zin ‘noodzakelijk’ – het is een beweegreden waartegen we geen 
“nee” kunnen zeggen (en zelfs als we wel “nee” zeggen moeten we de 
beweegreden weigeren of ontkennen, waarmee we het als beweegreden 
erkennen). 
Maar tegelijkertijd is zorgen normatief: het kan voldoende of passend zijn en 
onvoldoende of niet-passend. Deze afgedwongen activiteit vereist dus ook 
nog zorgvuldige analyse hoe en onder welke voorwaarden we zorg bieden en 
of wat we doen wel het beste is, of onder de gegeven omstandigheden het 
best mogelijke. Dit dwingende ding moet door ons bekrachtigd of bevestigd 
worden; bij de uitvoering ervan moeten we ons praktische verstand gebruiken 
en onze ervaring en oordeelsvermogen inzetten. Samengevat, de motivatie tot 
zorgen bevat dus een stel mogelijke tegenspraken of spanningen tussen 
tussen tegenovergestelde tendenzen, en ik betoog dat temidden van deze 
spanningen de dynamische en unieke kwaliteiten van zorg te vinden zijn. In 
dit boek verken ik deze spanningen en beschrijf ik de naar mijn mening beste 
manier om ze uit te drukken. Maar allereerst, wat is zorgethiek? 
Zorgethiek 
Zorgethiek bestaat uit een bonte verzameling ethische perspectieven met een 
aantal gemeenschappelijke eigenschappen. Het zijn ten eerste filosofische 
en/of ethische replieken op Carol Gilligans psycho-analytische beschouwing 
uit de jaren tachtig van houdingen ten opzichte van morele dilemma’s die 
zich niet alleen baseerden op rechtvaardigheid als het hoogste goed. Ten 
tweede benadrukt zorgethiek een drievoudige karakteristiek van zorg: 
context, relationaliteit en gevoel. En ten derde is zorgethiek particularistisch. 
In de jaren tachtig was Gilligans psychoanalytische onderzoek naar de 
reacties van vrouwen op morele dilemma’s verantwoordelijk voor een 
nieuwe trend in feministisch onderzoek, naar wat Gilligan een 
onderscheidende morele richting noemde, een ‘ander geluid’, waarnaar ze 
verwijst als het zorgperspectief. Het zorgperspectief in de ethiek houdt in het 
zichzelf zien als verbonden met anderen in een netwerk van verschillende 
relaties. En het ‘geluid’ is dat van zorg en verantwoordelijkheid, van 
betrokkenheid en verbinding met anderen: een verschuiving in de morele 
vraagstelling van “Wat is rechtvaardig?” naar “Hoe reageer ik?” (Gilligan, 
1987, 23). 
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Sommige zorgethici (bijv. Sara Ruddick) hebben bepleit dat zorg en 
rechtvaardigheid volledig verschillende en onverenigbare morele richtingen 
zijn; andere zorgethici (Alison Jagger bijv.) stellen dat zorg en 
rechtvaardigheid beide nodig zijn om in complexe en onderling afhankelijke 
menselijke relaties eerlijkheid te bereiken. Wat zorgethiek toevoegt aan 
ethiek is een nieuw type motivatie in het morele discours. De morele actor 
streeft niet meer alleen naar een eerlijke of rechtvaardige uitkomst van een 
moreel dilemma, maar ook naar een zorgende; een uitkomst die bijdraagt aan 
de voorspoed of het welzijn van anderen; een uitkomst die is afgestemd op de 
individuele wensen en noden van de verzorgde(n).  
Herta Nagel-Docekal (1977, 110) stelt dat zorg binnen de zorgethiek meestal 
wordt gedefinieerd aan de hand van deze drie kenmerken: het is 
contextgevoelig, het is relatiegestuurd en het wordt beheerst door gevoelens. 
De gevoeligheid voor context binnen de zorgethiek is afgeleid van de traditie 
van de ‘gesitueerde kennis’ in de kritische feministische 
wetenschapsfilosofie.2 In deze traditie, uitgedragen door feministes als Donna 
Haraway, Sandra Harding, Seyla Benhabib, Lorraine Code en Claudia Card, 
wordt kennis beschouwd als iets dat in specifieke contexten wordt gemaakt 
en begrepen. Zij nemen nadrukkelijk afstand van het idee van een ‘neutraal 
standpunt’ dat universele en niet-contextuele kennis zou opleveren. En zo is 
de vraag niet wat gekend wordt maar wie kent. Vanuit de zorgethiek valt 
Gilligans vraag “Hoe reageer ik?” bijvoorbeeld in deze gesitueerde 
benadering.  
Nagel-Docekals tweede kenmerk van zorg, dat die relatiegestuurd is, is een 
zeer basaal uitgangspunt van zorgethiek. De hele zorgethiek gaat over relaties 
met anderen.3 Sommige zorgethici richten zich op het aspect menselijkheid 
en definiëren menselijkheid in termen van kwetsbaarheid en feilbaarheid 
(zorgethici als Marian Verkerk en Henk Manschot, en andere nederlandse 
zorgethici).4 Andere zorgethici richten zich meer op waarneming en ‘hoe het 
met de ander is’. Dit kan over behoeftigheid en kwetsbaarheid gaan, maar 
ook over vreugde. De verzorgende herkent en verheugt zich in de blijdschap 
van de ander, trekt zich diens noden aan en ontfermt zich erover, en is zich 
ook bewust van en gevoelig voor de “broosheid en sterfelijkheid van het 
menselijk bestaan” (Ricoeur geciteerd in Verkerk 1994, 64).  
Nagel-Docekals derde kenmerk van zorg is dat het wordt ‘beheerst door 
gevoelens’. (Echter, meer politiek-georiënteerde zorgethici als Joan Tronto, 
Selma Sevenhuijsen and Jagger houden zich niet bezig met deze nadruk op 
gevoel. Zij richten zich veeleer op de notie van een competente 
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taakuitvoering en instrumenteel ontwerp.) Gevoelens, of neigingen5, spelen 
een unieke rol in ‘personalistische’ of affectieve zorgethiek: neigingen zijn de 
instrumenten waarmee zorg wordt uitgedrukt en waarmee informatie over de 
verzorgde wordt verzameld. Alle welwillende neigingen (medeleven, 
bezorgdheid, sympathie, empathie en vertrouwen) zijn betrokken bij het 
verzamelen van informatie en het uitdrukken van de gevoelde zorg.  
De derde eigenschap van zorg is haar ‘particulariteit’. Deze eigenschap vloeit 
logisch voort uit het prioriteren van zorgmotivatie, contextualiteit, 
relationaliteit en neigingen. Particularistische ethiek is een grondig 
gecontextualiseerde en beschrijvende opvatting van waar iemand is, hier en 
nu, en vereist dus een verregaand onderzoek naar de positie van de ander. Het 
is een standpunt van het individu zoals hij op dat bepaalde moment is, met 
zijn eigen noden, verlangens en mogelijkheden, zijn eigen geschiedenis en 
levensvisie. Elk geval moet zonodig op zijn eigen waarde wordt beoordeeld, 
en dat vergt een uitzonderlijke mate van openheid van geest van de 
verzorgende. En niet alleen openheid, maar een goedbedoelende of 
welwillende bereidheid om waar te nemen en het vermogen onafhankelijk 
van de eigen voorkeuren te oordelen. Immers, wat goed is voor het welzijn 
van de een hoeft dat niet te zijn voor de ander. 
Dit zijn, in het kort de belangrijkste eigenschappen van zorgethiek in het 
algemeen, en personalistische zorgethiek in het bijzonder. Dit boek richt zich 
op motivatie. Ik betoog dat het bij zorgen gaat om een combinatie van 
gedwongen worden en het toch vrijwillig doen, omdat het is wat we moeten 
doen. Maar eerst geef ik nog een praktijkvoorbeeld. Dit voorbeeld laat zien 
wat ik als de grootste uitdaging voor zorgethiek beschouw, namelijk om hen 
die het een zorg zal zijn te bewegen tot zorg.  
Praktijkvoorbeeld 
Na twee jaar huwelijk verhuisden Pim en zijn vrouw van Amsterdam naar 
Abcoude, en anderhalf jaar later werd hun zoon Sam geboren. 
“Ik schaam me om het toe te geven, maar het ouderschap valt me ontzettend 
zwaar. Ik ben erg blij met m’n zoontje en heb geen minuut spijt van mijn keuze voor 
een kind, maar dat het zo slopend zou zijn, had ik nooit verwacht. De eerste negen 
maanden gaf m’n vrouw borstvoeding en kon ik ’s nachts en ’s ochtends dus redelijk 
slapen. Maar daarna zouden we de zorg gelijk verdelen. En dat viel me niet mee, 
ondanks dat Sam drie dagen per week naar de crèche gaat en ik maar één dag full time 
voor hem zorg. 
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“Naarmate de maanden verstreken, voelde ik de vermoeidheid steeds meer 
toeslaan. Als ik wist dat ik de volgende dag voor Sam moest zorgen, zag ik daar als 
een berg tegenop. Niet om hem, maar om alles eromheen. Het vroege opstaan, 
verschonen, aankleden, flesje maken, boterham smeren, naar bed brengen, met 
gespitste oren voorzichtig een telefoontje plegen, stofzuigen, mail checken en ja hoor, 
was ie al weer wakker. Aankleden, weer een fles, weer een boterham, boodschappen 
doen, spelen, middagslaapje. Daarna begonnen de moeilijkste uren van de dag. Om 
half zes was ik kapot en blij dat mijn vrouw thuiskwam om de zaak over te nemen. 
Maar ja, dan moest hij nog warm eten, yoghurt, in bad en naar bed. En dat steeds maar 
weer opnieuw. 
“Ik werd er gek van dat ik nooit meer ongestoord mijn eigen gang kon gaan. 
Dat al mijn activiteiten vantevoren gepland moesten worden en ik amper nog tijd had 
om iets voor mezelf te doen. Ik geef eerlijk toe dat ik het daar erg moeilijk mee heb. 
De laatste tijd voel ik me verre van fit en heb regelmatig last van huiduitslag. Ik ben 
ook vaker ziek thuis dan vroeger. Ik vraag me af hoe mijn vrouw het allemaal voor 
elkaar krijgt. Zij heeft ook een drukke baan in de reclame, vindt nog tijd om drie keer 
in de week te sporten en vouwt ’s avonds fluitend de was op. Het lijkt wel of ze alles 
aankan.” 
Dit praktijkvoorbeeld is afkomstig uit een artikel in de Volkskrant (Magazine 
19 Februari 2005: 22 - 26) getiteld “De jonge vader is een beetje moe”, en 
betreft een “nieuw” verschijnsel: de mannelijke variant van de postnatale 
depressie. Het verschijnsel heeft te maken met een recente en stijgende trend 
in Nederland van mannen die relatief laat in hun leven kinderen krijgen – na 
hun veertigste – en die moeite hebben zich te schikken in hun nieuwe rol. Het 
artikel schrijft de problemen die de mannen ondervinden met hun zorgtaken 
toe aan een discrepantie tussen cognitie en emotie: rationeel denken ze dat ze 
gelijkwaardig zouden moeten kunnen deelnemen aan de zorg voor de 
kinderen en het huishouden, maar hun gedrag laat iets heel anders zien.  
Drie oplossingen voor Pims dilemma 
Wat kunnen we zeggen over wat Pim zelf erkent als zijn onvermogen tot 
zorg? Ten eerste, we moeten Pim eerlijk nageven dat hij weet dat zijn gedrag 
– zijn weerzin tegen de verantwoordelijkheid voor een dag zorg, en zijn 
moeite en onbehagen – tekortschiet. Hij vergelijkt zich met zijn vrouw en ziet 
dat zijn bijdrage aan de zorgtaken in geen verhouding staan tot haar energie 
en consistentie; kortom, in tegenstelling tot wat ze hadden afgesproken, 
neemt zij het leeuwendeel van de verantwoordelijkheid voor de zorg voor 
Sam. Duidelijk afwezig in zijn visie is echter wat hij aan deze situatie zou 
kunnen doen. Hij ziet dat zijn vrouw een soort zorgdrang heeft die hij 
klaarblijkelijk mist. Waar zou Pim zijn drang vandaan kunnen halen?  
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Ten tweede; Pim lijkt te weten wat hij zou moeten doen, maar hij lijkt niet in 
staat dat ook te willen doen. Wat ontbreekt er aan zijn morele perceptie? 
Kennis of erkenning is het niet – hij weet dat hij zou moeten zorgen. Maar 
waarom kan hij het niet, en lijdt hij daaronder?  
De eerste oplossing ontleen ik aan Nel Noddings, een van de grondleggers 
van de personalistische zorgethiek. Noddings’ kernvraag is “hoe de ander 
moreel tegemoet te treden” en de motivatie om dit te doen is het zoeken naar 
de ideale zorgrelatie die we allemaal eens kenden, de moeder-
kindverhouding. We zoeken deze verhouding niet alleen – we willen in de 
zorgverhouding blijven en het ideaalbeeld van onszelf als zorgend persoon 
versterken” (Noddings, 1984, 5). Noddings omschrijft zorgen als het iemand 
helpen te groeien en zich te ontplooien. En de enige manier om te weten wat 
je als verzorgende moet doen is “de werkelijkheid van de ander bevatten”. 
Deze uitdrukking, “andermans werkelijkheid bevatten” wordt door Noddings 
in het hele boek gebruikt en betekent “andermans werkelijkheid als 
mogelijkheid op je nemen en als werkelijkheid gaan ervaren en beseffen dat 
je dienovereenkomstig moet handelen” (Noddings, 1984, 16). Met andere 
woorden, zegt Noddings, het begrip van andermans realiteit is in feite “je 
gedreven voelen te handelen alsof ik voor mezelf handel, maar dan voor een 
ander”. (Dit klinkt misschien wat verwarrend. Ik herformuleer het als volgt: 
‘Ik heb het gevoel dat ik iets voor mezelf doe maar het is niet mijn handeling; 
het is die van de ander’).  
Zo heeft ‘mogelijkheid’, in de uitdrukking “andermans mogelijkheid op je 
nemen”, een zeer specifieke betekenis. Het heeft iets dwingends: je wordt 
gedwongen andermans werkelijkheid (situatie, positie, dilemma, standpunt) 
te bevatten. Belangrijk is hier de notie dat men niet alleen iemands 
werkelijkheid kan bevatten, maar dat dit begrip een direct resultaat heeft – 
het besef dat je overeenkomstig die werkelijkheid moet handelen. Wat 
gebeurt er als je “andermans werkelijkheid bevat”? Deze andere perceptie 
beïnvloedt je; net zoals je eigen werkelijkheid (je situatie, je zintuiglijke 
waarneming) invloed heeft. Zodra de werkelijkheid van de ander in je 
bewustzijn is toegelaten kun je die netzomin negeren als je eigen 
werkelijkheid (tenminste, niet zonder dit begrip met enige moeite te 
onderdrukken of in te perken). Dit bevatten is bepaald geen gegeven. Het 
vergt inspanning. Noddings noemt het een ”strijd” met als doel “het 
ondraaglijke te elimineren, de pijn te verminderen, en de droom waar te 
maken” (Noddings, 1984, 14). In de notie van bevatten ligt de drang voor de 
ander te zorgen besloten – begrip leidt onvermijdelijk tot de behoefte in te 
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grijpen in andermans leven (net zoals je in je eigen leven zou doen). Dit 
bedoelt ze allemaal met zorgen.  
Noddings zorgtheorie begint vanuit een onbaatzuchtig perspectief. Het idee is 
“de werkelijkheid van de ander waar te nemen” en het bewustzijn van het 
zelf daarvoor op te schorten. Noddings wil de ander ‘ontvangen’. Dit is 
duidelijk iets anders dan empathie, waarbij ik mijzelf op de ander projecteer 
door vereenzelviging met en begrip voor diens situatie, gevoelens en 
motieven. Voor Noddings is empathie een te indirecte ervaring van de 
ervaring van de ander. Noddings wil het zelf niet aanwezig hebben in de 
perceptie van de ander.  
Dit is een belangrijk maar controversieel punt in zorgethiek. De ander zo 
volledig mogelijk waarnemen is een nobel streven in elke ethiek. Hoe dit te 
bereiken? Op een bepaalde manier komt Noddings’ opzijzetten van het zelf 
overeen met oudere en meer gevestigde noties van het “belangeloze belang”. 
Dit Stoicijnse concept wordt gebruikt om degene die het goede nastreeft in 
staat te stellen dat de doen – onafhankelijk van neigingen. Goede daden 
worden niet gedaan ten bate van degene die ze doet, maar omdat ze goed zijn. 
Ook Kant verwijst naar dit belangeloze belang in zijn Doctrine of Virtue 
(“praktische liefde” of “liefdadigheid”) (Kant, 1991, 244). In tegenstelling tot 
Kant streven zorgethici het loslaten van het zelf niet na omdat neigingen niet 
moreel zouden kunnen zijn. Zorgethici willen het zelf opschorten omdat het 
zich tussen de verzorgende en de verzorgde dringt. Bijvoorbeeld Vrinda 
Dalmiya is het met Noddings eens dat de noden van de ander alleen 
waargenomen kunnen worden door een zelf dat op dat moment niet met 
zichzelf of zijn eigen neigingen bezig is.  
Aan de ene kant staat het idee van het opschorten van het zelf tegen – 
waarom zou ik mijn vermogen tot oordelen en nadenken uitschakelen als ik 
zorg? Aan de andere kant denk ik dat Noddings een essentieel element van 
het zorgen te pakken heeft: namelijk dat het noodzakelijk is onze eigen 
voorkeuren op te bergen, hoe kortstondig ook, om te kunnen zien wat de 
ander nodig heeft, te begrijpen wat er van ons als verzorgers wordt gevraagd. 
Een tijdelijke verschuiving van belangen, een kijkje door de ogen van de 
ander, een doorvoeld begrip van wat de ander ervaart en wat diens noden 
zijn. Dit kan hooguit kortstondig (als het al kan – kunnen we ooit andermans 
pijn meemaken?). En dan moeten onze vermogens tot oordelen en nadenken 
weer hun plaats op de voorgrond van ons bewustzijn kunnen innemen.  
Al met al ben ik geneigd te zeggen dat Pim precies moet doen wat Noddings 
noodzakelijk acht om te kunnen zorgen: hij moet op zo’n manier Sams 
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‘realiteit bevatten’ dat het de zijne wordt. Hij moet zijn eigen neigingen opzij 
zetten en voelen hoe het is om voor een ander te handelen. Ik zou zeggen dat 
één van Pims problemen nu precies is dat zijn eigen verwachtingen bij de 
morele afweging veel te veel gewicht in de schaal leggen – hoewel het 
natuurlijk een ingewikkeld ethisch probleem is wiens eisen zwaarder moeten 
wegen dan andere eisen. Desalniettemin, vanwege de (gezonde) weerzin 
tegen het idee de neigingen van het zorgende zelf opzij te zetten, is deze 
oplossing nog niet volledig – we moeten meer met Pim dan alleen zijn 
neigingen uitzetten. 
De tweede mogelijke oplossing wordt geboden door Harry Frankfurt, de 
Amerikaanse filosoof van de handelings- en morele psychologie, met zijn 
beschouwing over “wilsnoodzakelijkheid”. Deze oplossing lijkt mij mogelijk 
vollediger dan Noddings “bevatten van andermans werkelijkheid”. Frankfurts 
betoog gaat uit van een zelf met handelingsbekwaamheid en zelfbewustzijn. 
Hij verheldert wat het voor een actor betekent om die speciale betrokkenheid 
op het welzijn en bestaan van een ander te hebben - wat het voor hem 
betekent om zich om iets te bekommeren. Zorg is volgens Frankfurt reflexief, 
omdat iemand die ergens om geeft zich daarmee vereenzelvigt. Dit doen ze 
door zichzelf “ontvankelijk te maken voor verlies en winst al naar gelang 
datgene waar ze zich om bekommeren verzwakt of versterkt wordt” 
(Frankfurt, 1988, 83). Op deze manier wordt de actor, door zich ergens om te 
bekommeren, met dit ding verbonden – hij deelt zijn lot, als het ware. Je 
ergens om bekommeren is niet hetzelfde als het waarderen of willen bezitten 
(want je kunt je ergens om bekommeren dat je nooit zult bezitten); ook is het 
niet intrinsiek waardevol of begerenswaardig (waar jij je om bekommert kan 
erg laag op mijn lijstje staan). Zorgen is volgens Frankfurt met name 
toekomstgericht: je om iets bekommeren is veronderstellen dat het toekomst 
heeft. Zorgen is niet alleen vereenzelviging met het verzorgde, maar het ook 
beschouwen als investering (zoals je iets als belangrijk of betekenisvol kunt 
beschouwen). 
Frankfurt gebruikt als voorbeeld de uitspraak van de Protestantse theoloog 
Maarten Luther “Hier sta ik; ik kan niet anders” (Frankfurt, 1988, 86). Dit is 
volgens Frankfurt tekenend voor het uiterste gebrek aan zeggenschap dan een 
verzorgende heeft over het object van zorg. Frankfurt noemt deze 
machteloosheid van de verzorgende waar het de keus voor het object van 
zorg betreft de “noodzaak” van zorg; ergens zoveel om geven dat je niet van 
een bepaalde handelwijze kunt afzien. Dit is geen causale noch een logische 
noodzakelijkheid; het ontbrak Luther niet aan de macht er vanaf te zien, maar 
aan de wil. Frankfurt noemt een dergelijke beperking “wilsnoodzakelijkheid” 
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– een type noodzakelijkheid die het iemand onmogelijk maakt anders te 
handelen dan hij doet; het maakt het onmogelijk door hem te beletten gebruik 
te maken van zijn eigen vermogens. Luther had zich kunnen weerhouden te 
doen wat hij deed. Maar hij kon zich er niet toe brengen. Hij wilde er geen 
weerstand aan bieden, en bovendien wilde hij de onwil zelf niet overwinnen.  
Waarom wil hij zijn onwil niet overwinnen? Frankfurt stelt dat mensen de 
druk van de wilsnoodzakelijkheid niet als vreemd of extern beschouwen 
omdat die samenvalt met – en deels gevormd wordt door – verlangens die 
niet alleen eigen zijn, maar ook bepalend voor hoe hij zichzelf ziet. Daarom 
benadrukt Frankfurt vanaf het begin dat zorg handelingsbekwaamheid en 
zelfbewustzijn veronderstelt. Zo wordt noodzaak persoonlijk, of toegestaan, 
of zelfopgelegd – en tot op zekere hoogte afgedwongen of onvrijwillig in 
stand gehouden. Dat laatste moet wel het geval zijn, om te verklaren waarom 
de actor zich er niet van kan weerhouden te zorgen. Zorgen is volgens 
Frankfurt geen kwestie van willen, of in ieder geval, niet alleen van willen. 
Wat is het dan? 
Het antwoord is dat de verzorgende persoon “gevangen” is door het object 
van zorg. “(Zijn) aandacht is niet alleen gericht op het object; hij wordt op 
een of andere manier vastgehouden of gegrepen door het object” (Frankfurt, 
1988, 89). Frankfurt ontleedt “gegrepen” in termen van geleid worden door 
de eigenschappen van het verzorgde object in plaats van die van de actor zelf; 
die zwicht voor wat ik de “normatieve aantrekkingskracht” van de ander 
noem. De normatieve aantrekkingskracht heeft resultaat door de gevoelens 
van de actor voor de ander, en hij geeft vrijwillig toe aan deze kracht omdat 
hij dat wil (omdat hij de ander als belangrijk voor zichzelf beschouwt). Of hij 
geeft eraan toe omdat hij het niet niet wil doen. Zo is voor iets zorgen ook 
(vrijwillig of niet onwillig) “gevangen”, “gegrepen” of “aangetrokken” 
worden. Maar zorgen is niet inactief, niet louter onderwerping – er is een 
duidelijk wilsaspect aan zorgen, in die zin dat het als een investering of een 
toekomstbelang gezien kan worden. Het is ook niet inactief omdat de 
verzorgende niet niet wil zorgen.  
Hoe verhoudt zich dit tot de noodzakelijkheid van zorg? ‘Wil’ betekent 
meestal bewust iets wensen of willen, terwijl ‘noodzaak’ duidt op onder 
(aanzienlijke) druk staan om iets te doen. Frankfurts model van de 
“wilsnoodzakelijkheid” van je ergens om bekommeren, of iets belangrijk 
vinden, geeft precies de spanning aan tussen willen en je gedwongen voelen: 
iemand die gedwongen wordt door wilsnoodzakelijkheid geeft volgens 
Frankfurt toe (aan de druk) omdat hij zich er niet tegen wil verzetten, en 
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bovendien omdat hij die onwil tot verzet niet wil overwinnen (Frankfurt, 
1988, 87). Het helderste aspect van Frankfurt’s wilsnoodzakelijkheid is het 
beeld van de actor in de greep van hetgene waarvoor hij zorgt; waarom hij 
zich bekommert omdat hij het, als zelfbewuste actor, de moeite waard vindt 
om zich erom te bekommeren, maar vastgehouden door zijn betrokkenheid 
bij dat ding en diens lot, toekomstige successen en mislukkingen. 
Genoodzaakt te zorgen, maar vrijwillig zorgend.  
Wat Frankfurt betreft heeft het object van zorg geen andere intrinsieke 
kwaliteiten dan dat iemand er voor zorgt. “Wat het ding de moeite waard 
maakt om je om te bekommeren is… dat de rechtvaardiging voortkomt uit 
het zorgen, en niet uit het object van zorg” (Frankfurt, 1998, 270). Het is een 
a-morele beschouwing van wat zorg inhoudt – Frankfurt vertelt ons slechts 
wat er gebeurt als we zorgen, en niet of en wanneer zorgen goed of wenselijk 
is. Brengt dit ons dichter bij een oplossing voor Pims dilemma? De motivatie 
die Noddings ons biedt is dat we, wanneer we de ander ervaren, zullen 
zorgen. Dit is een fenomenologische beschouwing – een beschouwing van 
wat er gebeurt wanneer de zorgende de verzorgde waarneemt - zonder uitleg 
over wat de actieve aspecten zijn.  
Frankfurts beschouwing voegt twee aspecten toe aan het verhaal over wat 
zorgen inhoudt: ten eerste het behoud van de notie van 
handelingsbekwaamheid en zelfbewustzijn; en ten tweede het “grijpende” of 
“aantrekkende” aspect van de verzorgde via de betrokkenheid en liefde van 
de verzorgende. Zorgen is volgens Frankfurt meer dan het zien en ervaren 
van andermans werkelijkheid; het is ook zelf redenen hebben (zijn eigen 
voorkeuren en ‘wat hij belangrijk vindt’) om toe te geven aan het object van 
zorg, en het is de ervaring van een dwingende appèl van het verzorgde object. 
Deze twee aspecten zijn naar mijn mening een betekenisvolle toevoeging aan 
een theorie over hoe zorg werkt; het is niet alleen dat de verzorgende vindt 
dat hij moet zorgen, maar ook dat hij zich er niet van kan weerhouden.  
Maar wat nu als Pim niet beschikt over de juiste betrokkenheid en liefde om 
hem te noodzaken voor Sam te zorgen? Om zo “gedreven” te kunnen zorgen 
als zijn partner moet er in Pim iets aanwezig zijn dat hem Sam als dwingend 
object van zorg laat zien. Hij moet Sam belangrijk vinden om een 
toekomstgerichte investering in hem te doen, en het moet zo zijn dat hij zich 
er niet van kan weerhouden voor Sam te zorgen. Pim heeft het of hij heeft het 
niet, in Frankfurts termen. Wij weten van Pim dat deze betrokkenheid en 
liefde niet in die mate in hem aanwezig zijn dat hij genoodzaakt wordt te 
zorgen, dat wil zeggen dat zijn frustraties en kwalen hem ervan weerhouden 
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net zo gemakkelijk te zorgen als zijn partner. Is Pim misschien de meest door 
ethici gevreesde actor: de normatief afwijkende? De ongeneeslijk 
lichtzinnige, de moreel reddeloze, ongevoelig voor alle normatieve 
overwegingen? In dat geval kan Frankfurt (noch iemand anders) Pim helpen. 
De derde mogelijke oplossing, in de vorm van de theorie van normativiteit 
van de neokantiaanse filosofe Christine Korsgaard, zou Pim kunnen helpen. 
Het typisch menselijke in Korsgaards gezichtspunt is dat mensen “de 
principes kiezen die beslissend zijn voor onze wil” (Korsgaard geciteerd door 
Crowell, 2007, 318). Wat betekent dit? Het heeft te maken met praktische 
identiteit, hetgeen Korsgaard omschrijft als een “beeld van je identiteit”, en 
“beschrijving waarmee je jezelf waardeert” en het leven de moeite waard 
vindt (Korsgaard, 1996, 101). Dergelijke beelden zijn zo divers als de rollen 
die mensen kunnen spelen: vader, partner, onderzoeker, en onderwijzer. Deze 
identiteiten zijn praktisch omdat ze tot uitdrukking komen in wat we doen, en 
niet in eerste instantie het onderwerp van theoretische overwegingen zijn, 
noch alleen maar rollen die aan ons in de derde persoon worden toegekend. 
Korsgaard wijst erop dat voor de meeste mensen hun praktische identiteit een 
mengelmoes van zulke beelden is, die vaak met elkaar wedijveren of in strijd 
zijn. Maar wanneer je jezelf spiegelt aan het beeld van vader of onderwijzer 
identificeer je je ermee en op die manier “vorm je jezelf naar dat beeld” 
(Korsgaard 1996, 101). Zo verschaf je jezelf redenen om op een bepaalde 
manier te handelen: praktische identiteit wordt het gekozen principe dat in de 
plaats komt van het beheerst worden door toevallige en onbeheersbare 
instincten (Crowell, 2007, 318). 
Maar wat is het verband tussen praktische identiteit en normativiteit? Wat 
verbindt moreel handelen met het hebben van een identiteit en jezelf 
dienovereenkomstig waarderen? Korsgaard heeft inderdaad een verklaring 
hoe maatstaven en waarden je kunnen vastleggen, je redenen kunnen geven 
voor bepaald gedrag en plichten die je ander gedrag ontzeggen. Haar betoog 
is ingewikkeld, maar het draait erom dat subjectiviteit als zelfbewustzijn 
wordt gekarakteriseerd: normatieve opvattingen ontstaan niet als antwoord op 
theoretische vragen; ze bestaan “omdat mensen normatieve problemen 
hebben. En we hebben normatieve problemen omdat we zelfbewuste 
rationale wezens zijn, in staat tot nadenken over wat we zouden moeten 
geloven en doen” (Korsgaard, 1996, 46). Zelfbewustzijn vormt zo de 
aanleiding voor het normatieve; het normatieve leidt tot tot kennis van wat 
ons te doen staat; kennis van wat ons te doen staat leidt tot verplichtingen; en 
“plichtsgevoel ... maakt ons menselijk” (Korsgaard 1996, 5). In Korsgaards 
termen is de plicht (moreel te handelen) dus even menselijk (en even nodig) 
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als het hebben van een praktische identiteit. In niet-Korsgaardse woorden: 
Plichtsgevoel vloeit voort uit het iemand zijn.  
Terug naar Pim: Pim is iemand. Hij is vader, partner, zoon, en nog een hele 
hoop andere dingen. Hij is zelfbewust en hij denkt na over wat hij zou 
moeten geloven en doen. Hij lijkt te weten wat zijn plichten zijn – en wat 
hem te doen staat – maar hij doet het niet. Wat gebeurt er dan? Korsgaard 
stelt dat mensen rationeel kiezen voor principes, omdat rationaliteit te maken 
heeft met keuzes die verenigbaar zijn met je praktische identiteit. Je handelt 
moreel omdat je anders niet met jezelf zou kunnen leven. Dat niet doen zou 
fundamenteel het opofferen van je praktische identiteit betekenen. Om 
Korsgaard onvergetelijke formulering te gebruiken: “het zou ... erger dan de 
dood kunnen zijn” als je het niet deed (Korsgaard, 1996, 17). Anders gezegd, 
als ik niet voldoe aan de verplichtingen van mijn praktische identiteiten zal ik 
(mentaal, emotioneel, lichamelijk) de pijn voelen van het negeren of 
ontkennen van mijn praktische identiteit – van wie ik ben. Ik ben ervan 
overtuigd dat het deze pijn is die Pim voelt. Zijn kwalen, zijn uitslag, zijn 
frustraties en het gevoel dat hij tekort schiet: Pim voldoet niet aan zijn 
plichten die horen bij, in het bijzonder, zijn praktische identiteit als vader, als 
verzorger (en dus ook als partner).  
Al ben ik ervan overtuigd dat Korsgaard de sleutel heeft tot de verklaring 
waarom iemand – onder bepaalde omstandigheden - moet zorgen, ik acht 
Noddings’ en Frankfurts beschouwingen ook noodzakelijk, om te begrijpen 
wat zorgen inhoudt en (hopelijk) om Pim aan het zorgen te krijgen. Als start 
moet Pim doen wat Noddings elke verzorger aanraadt: afstand nemen van 
zijn eigen (maar al te graag ingenomen) standpunt en “de werkelijkheid waar 
te nemen” van de persoon die zorg nodig heeft – die van zijn zoon. Want dit 
is het unieke en dringende aan zorg: de noden van de zorgbehoevende gaan 
voor die van de verzorgende (hoe tijdelijk en tot op zekere hoogte ook). 
Omdat hij jong en afhankelijk en kwetsbaar is gaan Sams behoeften voor de 
behoefte van Pim om de krant te lezen of zelf te bepalen waar hij zijn tijd aan 
besteedt. Pim moet inzien wat voor zorg Sam van hem vraagt – Pim moet 
Sams werkelijkheid op zich nemen als zijn eigen, in Noddings woorden. Pim 
kan pas begrijpen wat Sam van hem als verzorger nodig heeft als Pims 
verlangens naar de achtergrond verdwijnen. Dit betekent niet dat Pim dat 
onzelfzuchtig of zonder na te denken moet doen.  
De tweede stap, ontleend aan Frankfurt, is dat je zorgt omdat je je er niet van 
kunt weerhouden. Vanwege je eigen betrokkenheid en liefde laat je je 
vrijwillig dwingen voor iets te zorgen. Als Pim deze betrokkenheid en liefde 
 200   
zo zou ervaren als Frankfurt ze beschrijft zou hij zich er niet van kunnen 
weerhouden voor Sam te zorgen – maar het tegendeel is het geval. Volgens 
Frankfurt heb je deze betrokkkenheid en liefde (voor het object van zorg), of 
je hebt ze niet. En als we het daarbij zouden laten zouden we Pim vrees ik tot 
moreel afwijkende moeten bestempelen en afschrijven als een hopeloos 
geval.  
Maar er is hoop: vergelijkbaar met Frankfurt stelt Korsgaard dat normativiteit 
voortvloeit uit iemands praktische identiteit (Frankfurt zou zeggen dat wat je 
belangrijk vindt maakt dat je zorgt voor het object van zorg). Maar Korsgaard 
verschilt van Frankfurt in haar beschrijving van de pijn die iemand ervaart 
die in tegenspraak met zijn praktische identiteit handelt – er tegenin gaan 
voelt “erger dan de dood”, in Korsgaards woorden. Praktische identiteit is 
voor haar niet iets wat iemand alleen maar heeft. Dit is de derde stap: het 
hebben van een praktische identiteit heeft bij Korsgaard verregaande 
normatieve implicaties en consequenties. En deze consequenties ervaart Pim: 
hij voelt de pijn van het niet aanvaarden van zijn verplichtingen, van zijn (in 
Korsgaards woorden) eigen, rationeel gekozen verplichtingen.  
Conclusie 
Terwijl de meeste zorgethische literatuur begint met voorbeelden van 
liefdevolle en tedere zorgmomenten6, heb ik bewust gekozen voor een 
praktijkvoorbeeld van wat volgens mij het meest nijpende probleem voor de 
zorgethiek is: hoe mensen tot zorg te bewegen, met name wanneer ze daar 
onvoldoende toe geneigd lijken. Het problematische voor zorgethiek is dat 
sommigen zorgen en anderen niet, en het risico bestaat dat die kloof nooit 
wordt overbrugd. Bovendien kunnen degenen die niet zorgen dat doen 
dankzij degenen die het wel doen; en zij die het wel doen moeten het blijven 
doen vanwege degenen die het niet doen7. Kan zorgethiek de niet-zorgenden 
effectief aanspreken? Een ethiek kan niemand dwingen moreel te handelen 
(en gesteld dat dat wel zou kunnen, dan zijn er goede redenen om een 
systeem dat zoiets probeert niet te willen). Aangezien dwang uitgesloten is 
kunnen we enkel verschillende overredende of beschrijvende theorieën 
overwegen, en diegene kiezen met de overtuigendste argumenten om in 
beweging te komen.  
Ik heb gekozen voor een combinatie van drie beschouwingen omtrent het 
genoodzaakt worden tot zorg. Noddings’ beschouwing van hoe de 
verzorgende kan inzien wat de verzorgde nodig heeft en Frankfurts 
beschouwing van waarom je zorgt – hoe je wordt gegrepen door het 
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onderwerp van zorg. Deze twee beschouwingen hechten geen morele 
consequenties aan zorgen (of niet zorgen), en zijn dus niet normatief. 
Frankfurt heeft een of-of verhaal; of je zorgt, of je zorgt niet, en er is geen 
sprake van schade of schande als je het niet doet. Noddings beschouwing is 
ook niet normatief, in die zin dat ze zich het alternatief, dat je “de 
werkelijkheid van de ander” niet zou “bevatten” waardoor je in een 
zorgrelatie schiet, gewoonweg niet kan voorstellen. Korsgaards belangrijke 
bijdrage is de toevoeging van het normatieve aspect aan het genoodzaakt 
worden – wat er gebeurt wanneer je, in het geval van Pim, je niet voegt naar 
de eisen van je praktische identiteit. Zonder Korsgaard hadden we Pim 
moeten afschrijven als een moreel afwijkende; met Korsgaard kunnen we zijn 
leed begrijpen.  
                                                          
1
 Deze tekst werd vertaald uit het Engels door Anke Huizinga en verscheen als 
“Waarom zou het iemands zorg zijn?”, in Filosofie & praktijk (2008), 29, 1: 19-30. 
2
  Zie bijvoorbeeld de feministische wetenschapsfilosofe Sandra Harding: The Science 
Question in Feminism (1986) and Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991). 
3
  De historisch ontoloog Michel Foucault is met zijn concept van “zorg voor het zelf” 
een uitzondering op deze regel – maar hij conludeert wel dat je niet voor anderen kunt 
zorgen tenzij je voor jezelf zorgt, en zijn zorg voor zichzelf is een soort objectivering 
van zijn zelf. Ik behandel Foucaults zorgconcept niet. Foucault: The History of 
Sexuality. Volume III, 1984. 
4
  Zie hun essays in Verkerk (ed.), 1997. 
5
 Ik verkies de term ‘neigingen’ boven ‘gevoelens’. ‘Gevoelens’ is een breed 
toepasbare term die verwijst naar zowel emotionele als morele gevoeligheid. Ik wil 
daar een onderscheid tussen aanbrengen en gebruik in mijn betoog ‘neigingen’ in de 
betekenis van emoties, verlangens, aandrangen en voorkeuren. 
6
   Zie bijvoorbeeld Sevenhuijsen 1996 or Bowden 1997 and vooral Noddings’ 1984. 
7
 Tronto geeft een sterk betoog over de politieke consequenties van deze 




 202   
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ackelsberg, Martha A. and Mary Lyndon Shanely (1996), Privacy, Publicity 
and Power. A Feminist Rethinking of the Public-Private Distinction, in 
Hirschman and Stefano (eds.)  
Alston, William P. (1998) “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology” in 
Craig, Edward (general ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Altham, J. E .J. and R. Harrison (eds) (1995), World, Mind and Ethics. 
Essays on the ethical philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. (Especially Bernard William’s 
“Replies”.) 
Anderson, Elizabeth (1993), Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press. 
Aries, Philippe (1962), Centuries of Childhood. New York: Vintage Books. 
Baier, Annette (1982), “Caring About Caring: a reply to Frankfurt” in 
Synthese 53 (1982) 273 – 290. 
Baier, Annette (1985), Postures of the Mind. Essays on Mind and Morals. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
Baier, Annette (1987), “The Need for More Than Justice”, in Hanen, Marsha 
and Kai Nielsen (eds.) Science, Morality & Feminist Theory. Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 13, 41 – 56. 
Baier, Annette (1989), “Doing Without Moral Theory?”, in Clarke, Stanley 
G. and Evan Simpson (eds.) Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral 
Conservatism. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Baier, Annette (1991), A Progress of Sentiments. Reflections on Hume’s 
Treatise. Cambridge, Mass. Etc: Harvard University Press. 
Baier, Annette (1994), Moral Prejudices. Essays on Ethics. Cambridge, 
Mass. Etc: Harvard University Press. 
Baier, Annette (1995), “A Note on Justice, Care, and Immigration Policy”, in 
Hypatia “Symposium on Care and Justice”, vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring 1995). 
Baron, Marcia (1998), “Was Effi Briest a Victim of Kantian Morality”, in 
Philosophy and Literature 1998, vol. 12, 95 – 113. 
Baron, Marcia (1984), “The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from 
Obligation”, in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 81, no. 4 (Apr., 1984): 
197 – 220. 
Baron, Marcia (1987), “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation”, in The Journal 
of Philosophy, vol. 84, No. 5 (May, 1987), 237 – 262. 
   
 203 
Baron, Marcia (2002), “Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue” in 
Timmons, Mark (ed.) Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative 
Essays. New York, etc.: Oxford University Press. 
Benhabib, Seyla (1992), Situating the Self. Gender, Community and Post-
modernism in Contemporary Ethics. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Benhabib, Seyla (1987), “The Generalised and the Concrete Other. The 
Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory”, in Kittay, Eva Feder 
and Diana T. Meyers (eds.) Women and Moral Theory. New Jersey: 
Rowman and Littlefield. 
Benhabib, Seyla and Drucilla Cornell (Eds.) (1987), Feminism as Critique. 
On the Politics of Gender. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Bennett, Jonathan (1974), “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn”. In 
Philosophy 1974, vol.49, 123 – 134. 
Berlin, Isaiah (1969), “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Four Essays on Liberty. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Boomkens, René (1998), Een drempel wereld, moderne ervaring en 
stedelijke openbaarheid. (A Threshold World: Modern Experience and 
Urban Publicity.) Rotterdam: NAi Uitgevers (PhD dissertation, 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen). 
Bowden, Peta (1997), Caring. Gender-Sensitive Ethics. New York and 
London: Routledge. 
Broome, John (1999), “Normative Requirements”, in Ratio XII 4 December 
1999, 398 – 419. 
Calhoun, Chesire (1988), “Justice, Care, Gender Bias”, in The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 9 (Sep., 1988), 451 – 463. 
Card, Claudia (2002), “Responsibility Ethics, shared Understandings, and 
Moral Communities” in Hypatia vol. 17, no. 1 Symposium (Winter 
2002), pp. 141 – 55. 
Card, Claudia (1990), “Caring and Evil” (Review article), in Hypatia vol. 5, 
no. 1 (Spring 1990), 101 – 108. 
Card, Claudia (1990), “Gender and Moral Luck”, in Held, Virginia (ed) 
Justice and Care. Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics. Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1995. 
Chodorow, N. J. (1978), The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis 
and the Sociology of Gender. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Clement, Grace (1998), Care, Autonomy, and Justice. Feminism and the 
Ethic of Care. Colorado: Westview Press. 
Code, Lorraine (1983), “Responsibility and the Epistemic Community: 
Woman’s Place” in Social Research, vol. 50, no. 3 (August 1983), pp. 
537 – 55. 
 204   
Code, Lorraine (1988), “Experience, Knowledge and Responsibility”, in 
Griffiths, Marwenna and Margaret Whitford (eds.) Feminist Perspectives 
in Philosophy. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Code, Lorraine (1995), Rhetorical Spaces. Essays on Gendered Locations. 
New York and London: Routledge. 
Code, Lorraine (2002), “Narratives of Responsibility and Agency: Reading 
Margaret Walker’s Moral Understandings” in Hypatia vol. 17 no. 1 
(Winter 2002) pp. 156 – 73). 
Crisp, Roger and Michael Slote (eds.) (1997), Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Crowell, Steven (2007), “Sorge or Selbstbewuβtsein? Heidegger and 
Korsgaard on the Sources of Normativity”. In European Journal of 
Philosophy 15:3, pp 315 – 333. 
Dalmiya, Vrinda (2002), “Why Should a Knower Care?” In Hypatia 17.1 
(2002), 34 – 52. 
Dancy, Jonathan (1993), Moral Reasons. Oxford, UK and Cambridge USA: 
Blackwell. 
Darwall, Stephan (1995), The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’, 
1640 – 1740. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Davion, Victoria (1993), “Autonomy, Integrity, and Care”, in Social Theory 
and Practice, Summer 93, Vol. 19 Issue 2, 161 – 183. 
Dietz, Mary G. (1985), “Citizenship with a Feminist Face. The Problem with 
Maternal Thinking”, in Political Theory, vol. 13, no. 1, February 1985, 19 
– 37. 
Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1981), Public Man, Private Woman. Women in Social 
and Political Thought. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 
Emancipatie Raad (1996), Concerns for a new security. Recommendations 
for an equal opportunities income and social security policy. The Hague. 
Falk, W. D. (1986), Ought, Reasons, and Morality. Ithaca and London:  
 Cornell University Press, 1947. 
Foot, Philippa (1978), Virtues and Vices. Berkeley and L.A.: University of 
California Press. 
Foot, Philippa (2001), Natural Goodness. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Foucault, Michel (1986), The History of Sexuality. Volume Three: The Care 
of the Self. London: Penguin Books, 1984. 
Frankena, William (1963), Ethics. Second Edition. Foundations of 
Philosophy Series. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973. 
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1988), The Importance of What We Care About. 
Philosophical Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
   
 205 
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1999), Necessity, Volition and Love. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fraser, Nancy (1989), Unruly Practices. Power, Discourse and Gender in 
Contemporary Social Theory. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Friedman, Marilyn (1987), “Beyond Caring: The De-Moralisation of 
Gender”, in Science, Morality & Feminist Theory. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 13, 87 – 110. 
Gilligan, Carol (1982), In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Gilligan, Carol (1987), “Moral Orientation and Moral Development”, in 
Kittay, Eva Feder and Diane T. Meyers (eds.) Women and Moral Theory. 
Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Press. 
Gotshalk, D. W. (1962), “The Central Doctrine of the Kantian Ethics” in 
Whitney, George Tapley and David F. Bowers (eds.) The Heritage of 
Kant. New York: Russell and Russell Inc. 
Goudsblom, Johan (1980), Nihilism and Culture. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Grovier, Trudy (1993), “Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self Esteem”, in Hypatia 
vol. 8, no. 1 (Winter): 99 - 120. 
Grovier, Trudy (1992), “Trust, Distrust, and Feminist Theory”, in Hypatia 
vol. 7, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 16 – 33. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1989), The Structural Transformations of the Public 
Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. (Trans. Thomas 
Burger) Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1990), Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 
(Trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen) Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press (1983). 
Halwani, Raja (2003), “Care Ethics and Virtue Ethics”, in Hypatia vol. 18, 
no. 3 (Fall 2003), 161 – 192. 
Harbers, Hans (1994), “Het Monster Man”, in Pels, Dick and Gerard de Vries 
(eds.) Burgers en Vreemdelingen. Opstellen over Filosofie en Politiek. 
Amsterdam: Van Gennip. 
Harrison, Ross (1998) “Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen (1929 - 2003)”, in 
the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (General ed. Edward Craig). 
London and New York: Routledge, 749 – 52. 
Held, Virginia (1987), “Feminism and Moral Theory”, in E. Kittay and D. 
Meyers (eds.), Women and Moral Theory. Savage, Md: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
Held, Virginia (1993), Feminist Morality. Transforming Culture, Society and 
Politics. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 206   
Held, Virginia (1995) (ed.), Justice and Care. Essential Readings in Feminist 
Ethics. New York: Westview. 
Held, Virginia (1998), “Feminist Reconceptualisations in Ethics”, in 
Kourany, Janet A. (ed.), Philosophy in a Feminist Voice. Critiques and 
Reconstructions. Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Herman, Barbara (1993), The Practice of Moral Judgement. Cambridge etc: 
Harvard University Press. 
Herman, Barbara (2000), “Morality and Everyday Life”, in Proceedings and 
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, N 2000; 74(2): 29 - 
45 Press, 1977. 
Herman, Barbara (2002), “The Scope of Moral Requirement”, in Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 30, no 3: 227 – 56. 
Hirschman, Albert O. (1977), The Passions and the Interests. New Jersey and 
Sussex: Princeton University Press. 
Hirschman, Nancy J. and Christine Di Stefano (eds.) (1996), Revisioning the 
Political. Feminist Reconstructions of Traditional Concepts in Western 
Political Theory. Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press. 
Hoagland, Sarah Lucia (1991), “Some Thoughts About “Caring”, in Card, 
Claudia (ed.) Feminist Ethics. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas. 
Hursthouse, Rosalind (1999), On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Jagger, Alison M. (1995), “Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason”, 
in Held, Virginia (ed.) Justice and Care. Essential Readings in Feminist 
Ethics. Colorado: Westview Press. 
Kennedy, Ellen and Susan Mendus (eds.) (1987) Women in Western Political 
Philosophy. Kant to Nietzsche. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books. 
Koehn, Daryl (1998), Rethinking Feminist Ethics. Care, Trust and Empathy. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Kolnai, Aurel (1977), Ethics, Value and Reality. London: The Athlone Press. 
Kolnai, Aurel (1995), “Dignity”, in Dillon, Robin S. (ed.) Dignity, Character 
and Self-respect. New York and London: Routledge. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996), Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge, 
U.S.A.: Cambridge University Press. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996a), The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, 
U.S.A: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Lieshout, Peter van (1995), “Een sociaal-democratische worsteling. De 
politieke urgentie van een zorgbeleid”. In Socialisme en Democratie, 
52/6, 251 – 262. 
   
 207 
Little, Margaret Olivia (1998), “Care: From Theory Orientation and Back”, in 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 23, no. 2: 190 – 209. 
McDowell, John (1995), “Two Sorts of Naturalism” in Hursthouse, Rosalind, 
Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons. Philippa 
Foot and Moral Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press (reprint 1998). 
Mackor, Anne Ruth (2001), “Rechtvardigheid, barmhartigheid en empathie 
(Justice, Benevolence and Empathy)”, in Algemeen Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 93, no. 1, January 2001: 29 – 45. 
Maihofer, Andrea (1998), “Care”, in Jagger, Alison M. and Iris Marion 
Young (eds.) A Companion to Feminist Philosophy. Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Pub. Inc. 
Manschot, Henk and Marian Verkerk (eds.) (1994), Ethiek van de zorg. Een 
discussie. Amsterdam: Boom, 1997. 
Manschot, Henk (1994), “Vulnerable Autonomy?” (“Kwetsbare autonomie? 
Over afhankelijkheid en onafhankelijkheid in de ethiek van de zorg”), in 
Manschot, H. and M. Verkerk (eds.) Ethiek van de zorg. 
Manschot, Henk (1997), “Zorg: een blinde vlek in de moderne filosofie” in, 
Verkerk, Marian (ed.), Denken over zorg. 
Mercer, Philip (1972), Sympathy and Ethics. A Study of the Relationship 
Between Sympathy and Morality with Special Reference to Hume’s 
Treatise. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Morris, Jenny (2001), “Impairment and disability: Constructing an Ethics of 
Care That Promotes Human Rights”, in Hypatia vol. 16, no. 4 (Fall 2001), 
1 – 16. 
Murphy, Jeffrie (1998), “Forgiveness and Mercy”, in Craig, Edward (ed.) 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge, 697 – 701. 
Nagel-Docekal, Herta (1977), “Feminist Ethics: How Could It Benefit from 
Kant’s Moral Philosophy?”, in Schott, Robin May (ed.) Feminist 
Interpretations of Immanuel Kant. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Noddings, Nel (1984), Caring. A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press. 
Norton, David Fate (Ed.) (1993), “Hume, Human Nature, and the 
Foundations of Morality”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hume. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Nussbaum, Martha (1990), Love’s Knowledge. Essays on Philosophy and 
Literature. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Okin, Susan Moller (1989), Justice, Gender and the Family. USA: Basic 
Books. 
 208   
Okin, Susan Moller (1989), “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice”, 
in Ethics, Volume 99, Issue 2 (Jan., 1989), 229 – 249. 
Okin, Susan Moller (1981), “Women and the Making of the Sentimental 
Family”, in Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, no.1, 65 – 88. 
O’Neill, Onora (2002), “Instituting Principles: Between obligation and 
Action”, in Timmons, Mark (ed.) Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: 
Interpretative Essays. New York, etc.: Oxford University Press. 
Pateman, Carole (1992), “Equality, difference, subordination: the politics of 
motherhood and women’s citizenship”, in Gisela Block and Susan James 
(eds.), Beyond Equality and Difference. Citizenship, Feminist Politics and 
Female Subjectivity. London: Routledge. 
Pateman, Carole (1987), “Feminist Critique of the Public/Private 
Dichotomy”, in Anne Phillips (ed.), Feminism and Equality. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Pauer-Studer, Herlinde (2002), “Christine M. Korsgaard: Internalism and the 
Sources of Normativity”. 
www.people.far.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CPR.CMK.Interview.pdf 
Pitkin, Hannah F. (1981), “Justice. On Relating Private and Public”, in 
Political Theory, 9,3, August, 327 – 352. 
Platts, Mark (1980), “Moral Reality and the End of Desire” in Platts, Mark 
(ed.) Reference, Truth and Reality. Essays on the Philosophy of 
Language. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Prins, Baukje (1990), Ethiek als tekstuele praktijk. Over vrouwen, moraal en 
uitsluiting. Krisis-Onderzoek 2. Amsterdam: Krisis. 
Ruddick, Sara (1995), “Injustice in Families. Assault and Domination.” In 
Held, V. (ed.) (1995) Justice and Care. 
Ruddick, Sara (1989), Maternal Thinking. Towards a Politics of Peace. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey (ed) (1988), Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Sedgwick, Sally (1997), “Can Kant’s Ethics Survive the Feminist Critique?” 
in Schott, 1997. 
Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1993), “Paradoxes of Gender. Ethical and 
epistemological perspectives on care in feminist political theory”, in Acta 
Politica. Tijdschrift voor politicologie 2 (28), 131 – 149. 
Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1996), Oordelen met zorg. Feministische 
beschouwingen over recht, moraal en politiek. Amsterdam: Boom. 
Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1998), Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist 
Considerations on Justice, Morality and Politics. London and New York: 
Routledge.  
   
 209 
Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1999), “Too good to be true? Feminist thoughts about 
trust and social cohesion”, in Focaal no. 34, 207 – 222. 
Sevenhuijsen, Selma (2000), “Caring in the third way: the relation between 
obligation, responsibility and care in Third Way discourse”, in Critical 
Social Policy 20 (1). 
Sevenhuijsen, Selma (2000), “De plaats van zorg. Over de relevantie van 
zorgethiek voor sociaal beleid”, Oration, University of Utrecht, 18 May 
2000. 
Sherman, Nancy (1988), “Concrete Kantian Respect” in Paul, Ellen Frankel, 
Fred D. Miller and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) Virtue and Vice. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sherman, Nancy (1997), “Kantian Virtue: Priggish or Passional?” in Reath, 
Andrew, Barbara Herman and Christine M. Korsgaard (eds.) Reclaiming 
the History of Ethics. Essays for Rawls. Cambridge, U.S.A: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Shklar, Judith N. (1984), Ordinary Vices. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Shogan, Debra (1988), Care and Moral Motivation. Ontario: The Ontario 
Institute for Studies in Education Press. 
Slote, Michael (1995), “Agent-based Virtue Ethics”, in Crisp and Slote 
(1997). 
Slote, Michael (1988), “The Justice of Caring”, in Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred 
D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) Virtue and Vice. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Slote, Michael (1999), “Self-regarding and Other-regarding Virtues” in Carr, 
David and Jan Sleutel (eds.) Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Smith, Michael (1994), The Moral Problem. UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
Smith, Michael (1999), “Searching for the Source”. Book review. The 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 196, July, 384 - 94. 
Smollett, Sara (2001), “On Motives and Morals”, in Ethical Theory, 13 
November 2001. http://www.yellowpigs.net/philosophy/kant 
Soper, Kate (1990), “Feminism, Humanism and Postmodernism” in Radical 
Philosophy 55, Summer 1990: 11 – 17. 
Sousa, Ronald de (2004), “Emotions: What I Know, What I’d Like to Think I 
Know, and What I’d Like to Think”. 
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/%7Esousa/whatiknow.pdf 
Stefano, Christine Di (1996), “Autonomy in the Light of Difference”, in 
Hirschman and Stefano (eds.). 
 210   
Stocker, Michael (1978), “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”, 
in Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 14, August, 453 - 466. 
Tannenbaum, Julie (2002), “Acting with Feeling from Obligation”. In Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 5: 3221 – 337, 2002. 
Taylor, Charles (1985), “Kant’s Theory of Freedom” in Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, Charles (1991), The Malaise of Modernity. Don Mills, Ontario, 
Canada: Stoddart Publishing Co, Ltd. 
Taylor, Charles (1995), “A Most Peculiar Insitution”, in Altham and Harrison 
(eds.). 
Thomas, Alan (?), “Remorse and Reparation: A Philosophical Analysis”. 
www.logical-operator.com/RemorseReparation.pdf 
Todd, Janet (1986), Sensibility. An Introduction. London and New York: 
Methuen. 
Tong, Rosemarie (1998), “Feminist Ethics” in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
Tong, Rosemarie (1999), Book review: Moral Understandings: A Feminist 
Study in Ethics, in Hypatia vol. 14, no. 2, Spring, 121 – 124. 
Tronto, Joan C. (1999) “Care Ethics: Moving Forward”, a review essay in 
Hypatia, vol. 14, no. 1, Winter 1999, 112 – 119. 
Tronto, Joan C. (1996), “Care as a Political Concept”, in Hirchmann, Nancy 
J. and Christine Di Stefano (Eds.) Revisioning the Political. Feminist 
Reconstruction of Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory. 
Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press. 
Tronto Joan C. (1995), “Care as a Basis for Radical Political Judgements”. In 
Hypatia vol. 10, no. 2 (Spring 1995). 
Tronto, Joan C. (1995), “Caring for Democracy: a Feminist Vision”. 
Inaugural Lecture, Universiteit voor Humanistiek, Utrecht, 6 June 1995. 
Tronto, Joan C. (1993), Moral Boundaries. A Political Argument for an 
Ethics of Care. New York: Routledge. 
Tronto, Joan C. (1987), “Political Science and Caring: Or, The Perils of 
Balkanised Social Science”. In Women and Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, Fall 
1987. 
Tjalling, Swierstra (1995), “Een Koud Bad”, in Krisis 58 maart 1995, pp. 25 
– 28. 
Vega, Judith (1998), Inventing Enlightenment’s Gender. The Representation 
of Modernity in Dispute. PhD dissertation, Leiden. 
Velleman, David J. (2000), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
   
 211 
Velleman, David J. (2006), ”A Brief Introduction to Kantian Ethics”, in Self 
to Self. New York etc.: Cambridge University Press. 
Velleman, David J. (2006), “The Voice of Conscience”, in Self to Self. New 
York etc.: Cambridge University Press. 
Verkerk, Marian (1994), “Care or Contract: an other ethics” (“Zorg of 
contract: een andere ethiek”), in Manschot, Henk and Marian Verkerk 
(eds.) Ethiek van de zorg. Een discussie. Amsterdam: Boom (2nd edition 
1997). 
Verkerk, Marian (ed.) (1997), Denken over zorg. Concepten en praktijken. 
Utrecht: Elsevier 
Walker, Margaret Urban (2003), “Moral Particularity”, in Moral Contexts. 
Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
Walker, Margaret Urban (1989), “Moral Understandings. Alternative 
“Epistemology” for a Feminist Ethics” in Hypatia vol 4, no2 (Summer 
1989), 15 – 28. 
Walker, Margaret Urban (1998), Moral Understandings. A Feminist Study in 
Ethics. New York and London: Routledge. 
Walker, Margaret Urban (2000), “Holding Ourselves and Others 
Responsible”, unpublished paper. 
Walker Margaret Urban (2002), “Morality in Practice; A Response to Claudia 
Card and Lorraine Code” in Hypatia vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 2002) 174 –
82. 
Wallace, James D. (1999), “Virtues of Benevolence and Justice” in Carr, 
David and Jan Sleutel (eds.) Virtue Ethics and Moral Education. London 
and New York: Routledge.* 
Walzer, Michael (1983), Spheres of Justice: a Defence of Pluralism and 
Equality. New York: Basic Books. 
Willigenburg, Theo van (1998), Moreel Chauvinisme. Inaugural Lecture 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Williams, Bernard (1985) “Morality, the Peculiar Institution”, in Crisp and 
Slote (eds) 1997. 
Williams, Bernard (1976) “Persons, Character and Morality” in Moral Luck. 
Philosophical Papers 1973 – 1980. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, reprinted 1981. 
Williams, Bernard (1976), “Moral Luck”, in Moral Luck. Philosophical 
Papers 1973 – 1980. Cambridge, USA: Cambridge University Press, 
reprinted 1981. 
 212   
Williams, Bernard (1976), “Utilitarianism and Moral Self-indulgence”, in 
Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers 1973 – 1980. Cambridge, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, reprinted 1981. 
Williams, Bernard (1985) “Morality, the Peculiar Institution”, in Crisp and 
Slote (eds) 1997.  
Williams, Bernard (1985), “Ethics and the Fabric of the World”, in Honerich, 
T. (ed.) Morality and Objectivity. A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. London, 
Boston, etc: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 203 – 14. 
Wolf, Susan (1982), “Moral Saints”, in Crisp and Slote (eds) 1997.  
Wolf, Susan (1989), “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” in 
Christman, John (ed) The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wood, Allen W. (1999), Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Young, Iris Marion (1987), “Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some 
Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Political Theory”, in 
Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.). 
   
 
    
 
